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PREFACE
This work is intended to be a contribution to the philosophical
fouiidr.tionp. of e’'.Yironmental studies and environmental education*
particularly in the areas of environmental ethics and values
education. It employs a broadly integrative approach, drawing
from the natural and social sciences, humanities, and religion.
The value of its contribution lies as much in the breadth of its
scholarship as in the depth of its analysis.
Since the results of this study are likely to be of interest
to people based in a number of different disciplines and educa-
tional movements, I have taken pains to write it for a non-specialist.
I have assumed that the reader is interested in the topic,
intelligent, and has a basic understanding of ecology. The last
chapter is an exception, in that 1 assume that the reader has a
general familiarity with educational jargon. The footnotes have
been designed to both document sources used in the text and serve
as an educational tool. They contain asides and elaborations
relevant to points raised in the text, consolidate m.uch of the
relevant literature, and provide the interested reader an
intro-
duction to this literature.
Another unconventional facet of this dissertation lies
in my
use of the firsu person. There are two reasons
for so doing. The
first is related to some of the central themes
of the work: we
should act in ways which avoid dogma, are not
alienating, and in
Vi
which means and ends are joined. Use of the third person, although
it gives the appearance of objectivity, can help to blind the
reader to whether or not. the study is in fact objective. Also,
it is a voice' that alienates the author from his or her work. The
first person introduces the voice of the author and rather than
masking the question of objectivity, forces io. Given the
conclusions of the dissertation, it is inappropriate to use the
conventional style.
In addition, the convention seems to confuse the mode of
inquiry necessary to conduct objective scholarship with the
manner of writing necessary to effectively communicate the results
of that scholarship. In the case of this dissertation, it is
important that 1 be able to evoke different views of the world
and value conflicts in the minds of my readers. I have attempted
to do this, in part, through a number of anecdotal vignettes.
The third person is inappropriate to this stylistic device.
My use of the first person has been approved by my dissertation
committee, the Assistant Dean for Graduate Affairs in the School
of Education, and the Associate Dean of the Graduate School.
Many people have assisted me in preparing this volume,
and I
extend my heartfelt appreciation to them all. I am
particularly
grateful for the contributions made by the members of
my
comittee: Horace Reed, Professor of Educations Linda
Lockwood,
Associate Professor of Environmental Sciences
and of Education; and
vii
David Smith, Professor of Literature and American Studies at
Hampshire College* Their faith in, and support of my sometimes
unconventional and often ambiguous explorations has been invaluable.
Their probing questions and critical comments have played a
major role in helping me to focus my thoughts and bring clarity to
my words. Special thanks go to my chairperson, Horace Reed, who
helped to create a mutualistic learning experience.
The following people have read and commented upon two or more
of my chapters: Gene Frankel, Assistant Professor of Technology
Studies at Hampshire College; Allan Krass, Associate Professor of
Physics and Science Policy Assessment a'o Hampshire; Stephen Guild,
Associate Director of Education in the University’s Office of
Energy Research and Education; and Carl Sv;anson, Professor of
Botany, They have played an important role in the development of
my thoughts and these chapters, I have also profited from mj
discussions with, and the support of Ty Minton, Director of the
environmental education program at Antioch-New England,
Teach vng plays an important role in the way I learn and a
number of my students have taught me a great deal, I thank my
students at Hampshire College, in the Uriversity* s Global
Survival Freshman Year Program, and in the environmental education
program at Antioch—New England for their patience with me, and
my ideas and experiments,
Janice Dagilus has none an outstanding job of typing these
pages under difficult- deadlines. She has put as much care and
nervous energy into the final stages of this dissertation as
have I, Thanks also go to her husband and children for putting
up with the inconveniences created by ”the typewriter man,”
ABSTRACT
The Value Orientation of Mutuality and its Role in
Environmental Studies and Environmental Education
February 1978
Ralph H, Lutts, B.A., Trinity University
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Horace Reed
This dissertation represents an attempt to identify a value
orientation, or ethos, that is compatible with our emerging
ecological view of the world, and to explore the role that
education can play in fostering its development,
A value orientation is a fundamental valuing style; a
predilection to choose certain kinds of values and, thus, actions.
There are three orientations that influence the ways in which we
interact with both people and nature. Under Submission , one
senses oneself as being powerless before other forces.
Domination emphasizes the welfare of oneself at Lhe expense of
others; a view which is predominant in o^'r culture. Mutuality
Involves a concern for the welfare of all parties in a situation.
Mutuality is proposed as the value orientation that snould underlj
our interactions with our social and non-human environments.
Much of the literature of environniental ethics has advocated
that we should regard ourselves as members of a larger group
or
which includes our entire ecosystem. People who viewcommunity.
Xtheir world in this way are likely to consider non-humans to be
of intrinsic value and not simply as means to an end. This does
not mean that we must not use the resources in our environment;
there is no v/ay in which we can avoid this. It does, though,
shift the burden of proof from those who wish to preserve their
environment to ohose who wish to exploit it.
Although the literature of environmental Mutuality is sparse,
there is a large body of literature dealing with mutualistic
relationships between people. An examination of the philosophies
and actions of Edwin Burtt, Martin Buber, Mohandas Gandhi, and
Paulo Freire reveals three characteristic elements of social
Mutuality. After carefully examining the differences between
relationships among humans, and those between humans and their
non-human ecological environment, we can also accept these
elements as being characteristic of environmental Mutuality.
Element One: Mutuality occurs within a meaningful whole . Those
who are engaged in mutualistic interactions are viewed as members
of the same group or community. As such^ each is of intrinsic
value and each occupies a meaningful position within the whole,
Mutualistic acts promote meaningfulness and wholeness, rather
than alienation and fragmentation. Means and ends are not
alienated from each other, but are joined and of equal importance.
Element Tvo t Mutuality requires openmindedness . This means
th:.t we must strive to be free of dogma, which requires that we
xi
have the h-umility to recognize our limitations. It is also
necessary that we try to be aware of our presuppositions and
tiy to be free of self-interests that might distort our
unaerstanding oi others.
Element Three: Mutuality promotes the welfare of others.
V/e should act not just to promote our own welfare, but the
welfare of others as well. The basic psychological motive that
promotes these acts is love.
This value orientation is ideally suited for adoption as the
values content, or agenda, of values education. Although few
contemporary teachers are willing to impose a set of values
upon their students. Mutuality is compatible with this desire.
One of the fimdamental objectives of environmental education
and environmental studies is that of preparing people who vzill
be able to work toward the solution of our environmental problems.
Fostering Mutuality is central to the solution of these problems.
These approaches to education should embrace education for Mutuality
as one of their objectives. Much of their existing teaching
methods and materials can readily be adapted to this end.
This dissertation contributes to the philosophical foundations
of environmental education and environmental studies; particularly
in the area of envirorjnental ethics and values education. It
provides the most thorough examination of environmental
Mutuality
to date; a specific values content for values
education; a
rationale for including the natural and social sciences,
humanities
xii
arts, and religion in environmental education programs; and a
conceptual structure viithin v/hich this can be done.
/
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CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF RELATEDNESS
I once met a woman who found a petrified potato and regained
her sight. She sat nervously in a worn chair in a corner of my
office. Beside her sat a friend who had come to provide trans-
portation and moral support. They looked around at the trappings
of the office
—
glass cases of rocks, fossils and mounted birds,
the shelves of books, the microscope to one side of a cluttered
desk—and half-heartedly asked a fev; questions about the specimens.
How old were they; when did they die; where did they come from?
Eventually they turned to the object she had mentioned on the
phone. She drew the stone from her purse, removed its protective
wrapping of tissues, and placed it hesitantly in my hand.
It was a very special stone. Several years earlier, as the
result of an accident, she had become blind. But, she explained,
her faith had been strong and she had prayed to Saint Peter for a
miracle. She had been praying on that day when, while working in
the darkness of her kitchen, she reached into a sack of potatoes
and graspea the rock. Her vision returned a couple of weeks later.
She wanted me to tell her whether the rock was a pet,rified potato
and whether her discovery was unique, uf it was, the m.iracle of her
sight would be compounded by the nature of the object that had
mediated between her and uhe saint.
She revealed her story slowly and hesitantly, I was young,
less than half her age, and of a generation that might
ridicule
1
2her faith. But I also represented a large museum and science. The
sightless forms of the extinct birds staring at us from their shelves
represented something to which she responded with a mixture of awe
and apprehension. She came seexing the trutn; sure oi vhat it
yet afraid to ask for fear that I would not understand and see simply
a pebble.
It was not a petrified potato. It was a rounded lump of quartz,
the size and shape of a potato, which had been stained brown by the
soil in which it had lain until found by the mechanical diggers, I
had seen similar rocks, which machines and work-weary sorters had
mistaken for potatoes and bagged, and were later found by puzzled
cooks. One of them was locked away in one of the storage cabinets
outside of my office. It was neatly marked with a catalog number
and labeled, "Pseudofossil—Petrified Potato."
Pseudofossils are oddly shaped and textured stones, which look
as if they were once part of something alive. The life, though,
originates in the mind of the observer, not in the history of the
stone. Some people have a tremendous ability to give life to a
piece of clay or quartz. The more that they want it to have been
alive, the more lifelike it becomes. It is very difficult to shake
their belief in what they have found. Often I had to produce before
their eyes an actual specimen of what they thought their find to be.
In the face of the distinct outlines of a real dinosaur footprint,
for example, it became difficult for them to cling to the
belief that
the vague depression in their rock was one also. It was
generally
3disheartening for them to discover that their find was not special.
Often, too, they felt foolish in the face of their mistake. I would
then take them to the pseudofossil collection and show them specimens
sniuxlar to their own; specimens vtiich bore witness to the fact that
they were not alone in their mistake. They were not fools, just
mistaken, and they shared their mistake with many others.
This woman's petrified potato, though, was special. It was as-
sociated with a miracle. To her it was part of a divine event which
fell outside of the lav;s of nature. That rock was part of a pattern
which linked her with a universe which cared about her fate, which
heard and answered her prayers. She was not alone in an uncaring
world. The divine plan, of which the creation, fall, and redemption
v;ere a part, included her. She was not powerless in an impersonal
nature, because she had prayer.
I too, recognized a miracle. But it was one of a different sort.
Richard Jefferies once wrote, "I can see nothing astonishing in
what are called miracles. Only those who are mesmerized by matter
can find a difficulty in such events."^ I was mesmerized by matter,
and saw the miracle as a vronderful and unexpected turn of events in
the material ’-rorld, VJas it an unexpected coincidence of rock and
recovery? Did the rock trigger her recovery from a psychosomatic
blindness? In either case, I viev;ed the miracle as an event of
deep psychological meaning to her, and there lay its real significance
hIn honesty I had to tell her what her stone was to the geological
eye. Yet, it would have been cruel to undermine her faith in the
ever.i,. My route of escape lay in emphasizing my qualifications to
speak to the geological problem, and my inability to address the tlieo-
logical one. It certainly seemed possible for the saint to use a
natural object a- a part of his miracle, I told her, but she should
consult an expert on such matters. I could be of no help. I passed
the buck,
A year later she reappeared, requesting a letter for the church
file. She had begun the long, difficult process of obtaining official
certification of her miracle, I placed in writing the description I
had told her the year before, being careful to note the limits of
my qualifications. She felt much more comfortable with what I had
to say than she had previously. She told me that if it really was not
a petrified potato, then perhaps it was not really a part of the miracle.
In that event. Saint Peter must have acted directly, without the stone
as an intermediary. She seemed to be happier with it this way.
The woman and her stone have been alive in my mind for many years
now. There is a tension in the memory, which I have found difficult
to quiet. Part of the reason may lie in the fact that I did not just
dismiss her as a superstitious old woman, I listened to her story and
I believe, felt something of its significance Id her. I realized that
her view of the world, of the way in which it is structured and
operates, was very different from mine. Although we sat chatting with
each other we lived in very different worlds, which operated according
5"bo very different, sets of rules. Hers was a world of good and evil,
saints and sinners, heaven and hell, Christ and forgiveness. The
power she had to change the world rested in faith and prayer. Mine
was a world of matter and energy, cuuse and effect, ecology and
evolution. Power lay in knowledge and technology. She listened
to my words and placed their meaning into a framework of miracles
and divine love, I listened, and placed her words into a framework
of physical processes, glacial geology, and hnjnan psychology.
Which world was more real? Hers did not help her to understand
and deal directly with the chemical pollutants which filled the air
she was breathing, the missiles poised a finger away from holocaust,
or the insatiable hunger for food and resources of the pressing
population of the world. But she had been a lonely old woman living
in darkness. When science and medicine failed, she placed her faith
in prayers to Peter, the Lord's Rock, and in an oddly shaped stone.
And in some way they were associated with the return of her sight.
In what sense it v.^as, or was not, a miracle is not particularly
important. What is important is that the reality in which she
lived was different from mine. She played a purposeful, significant
and meaningful role in a cosmos that cared for, and was influenced
by, her.
This belief that we are a pivotal point in the universe and that
what we do affects it is what Joseph Wood Krutch has called the Tragic
Fallacy.
the Tragic Fallacy depends ultimately upon the assiunp-
tion which nan so readily makes that something outside his
own being, some ‘spirit not himself—be it God, Nature, or
6that still vaguer thing called Moral Order-Joins him in the
emphasis which he places upon this or that and confirms himin his feeling that his passions and his opinions are
important,^
The tragic character is a person who has done something which is
not permitted, which violates the moral order^ of the universe, or is
contrary to the will of God or nature. This act shakes the very fiber
of the universe, and he is struck down. The blow, however, reaffirms
his stature, because he was struck by a god or a universe v;hich
directed its attention to him. His acts were of cosmic consequence.
In the face of extreme adversity, the tragic character triumphs by
asserting his confidence in the dignity and worth of himself and
humanity. Thus, ’’tragedy is essentially an expression, not of
despair, but of the triumph over despair and of confidence in the
value of human life,”^
The Tragic Fallacy, Krutch pointed out, is the result of an act
of faith, rather than of intellect. Upon it is built our sense of
the spirit of humanity. Without it our lives seem pointless and we
are without dignity. It supports not only tragedy, but the religious
view behind it. Without it exultation turns to despair.
It is not necessary to believe in the importance of man. It is
interesting to note the decline and death of tragic literature in the
modern world. No longer focusing on great people and powerful emotions,
the literature of our day tends to emphasize people and feelings v;hich
are small and common. This, Krutch believed, ”is not because we have
beco»iie interested in commonplace souls and their unglamorous adventures
but because we have come, willy-nilly, to see the soul of man as
commonplace and its emotions as mean.
7Compare, as extremes, the Greek tragedy, Oedipus Rex
,
and Samuel
Beckett's, VJaiting for Godot
. Oedipus solved the riddle of the Sphinx
and became a great king. Unknowingly, though, he committed the unfor-
givable acts of patricide and incest. VJhen the truth discovered
his mother hangs herself, and an anguished and horrified Oedipus tears
at his eyes with her brooch pin.
OEDIPUS: Apollo it was, Apollo, friends
Wlio brought to pass these evil, evil woes of mine.
The hand of no one struck my eyes but wretched me.
For v;hy should I see.
When nothing sweet there is to see with sight?
What more is there for me to see.
My friends, what to love.
What joy to hear a greeting?
Lead me away, friends, wretched as I am.
Accursed, and hated most
Of mortals to the gods.
I would not have come to murder my father.
Nor have been called among men
The bridegroom of her from whom I was born.
But as it is I am godlesss, child of unholiness.
Wretched sire in common with my father.
And if there is any evil older than evil left.
It is the lot of Oedipus.
°
The clarity of Oedipus's position in the moral order of the uni-
verse, and the significance and magnitude of his acts stand in the at
contrast to the amorphous, meaningless world in whica Beckett's
chai’acters find themselves. Wandering on a plain vjhich is barren
except for a gaunt, dead tree, tney wait without knowing vfhy, for
someone wnum they neither have met, nor are sure will arrive. It
is a life without significance: "They give birth astride of
a grave.
8the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more. "7 At the '=‘nd,
weary of waiting, Valdamir and Estragon contemplate suicide, but lack
a rope long enough, or strong enough for the job; so they go on. They
will return tomorrow, perhaps vzitb a proper rope.
In contrast to Oedipus, Beckett's characters live in a world which
is indifferent to their existence. Tragedy is impossible in such a
universe, because it lacks an inherent moral order which would meaning-
fully bond them to each other and to their world. Instead, they live
alienated, meaningless lives. Their lives symbolize those of millions
of people living in modern VJestem society.
The woman with the petrified potato lives in a world which is
shaped by the Christian understanding of its nature. It is a world in
v;hich there can be tragedy. However, with the weakening of the Chris-
tian viev; of the world, in association with the rise of empiricism,
materialism, and individualism, many people have lost their sense of
connectedness with a larger moral order. The world seems to be
burning around us, and we can not find our way out of the conflag-
ration, The old formulas do not work. We find ourselves on our own;
small children with delusions of grandeur in a large and frightening
universe. There seems to be no place outside of ourselves to which
we can turn for guidance.
Me are beginning to realize, however, that we are a part of a
larger order in which our lives are embedded, and upon which our lives
depend. This is the ecological and evolutionary order which is the
very substance of our biological identities. If we wish to live,
then
9we must take care not to disrupt the fabric of the ecological and
evolutionary systems which support our lives. This order is
indifferent to our hopes and aspirations, but it is strongly
ini^ae.iced by our actions. Since ue are an ir tegral part of this
order, our influence upon it is likely to lead to an impact upon
ourselves. In this view of the world, we once again have signi-
ficance, and we can suffer grave consequences if we grossly violate
its order,
V/illiam Holtz has suggested that once the ecological view
of the world becomes integrated into our culture, a new sense of
tragedy may emerge.
What we arc on the verge of realizing in our own time
. . .
is that the whole order is one life, all parts mutually
interdependent within which we, from our privileged
position, can offend and offend and offend.
In such a universe—now a fact, rather than a meta-
physical conception—our own modern version of tragedy
becomes possible,^
This dissertation represents an attempt to clarify this emerging
world-view, to identify some of its moral implications, and to ex-
plore the role that education can play in fostering its development.
The Domination Ethos
A distinction must be made between two elements, ethos and world
view, which have been interwoven in the prior comments. Clifford
Geertz has cogently stated tliese v'oncepts as follows
i
In recent anthropological discussion, the moral (and
aesthetic) aspects of a given culture, the evaluative
10
elements, have commonly been summed up in the term
"ethos," while the cognitive, existential aspects
have been designated by the term "world-view."
A people’s ethos is the tone, character and quality
of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and
mood; it is the underlying attitude toward them-
selves and the'.>.r woi’ld ohac. life reflects. Their
world viev; is their picture of the v;ay things in
sheer actuality are, their concept of nature, of
self, of society. It contains their most compre-
hensive ideas of order. Religious belief and
ritual confront and mutually confirm one another;
the ethos is made intellectually reasonable by
being shox^m to represent a way of life implied
by the actual state of affairs which the world-
view describes, and the world-viev; is made
emotionally acceptable by being presented as an
image of an actual state of affairs of which such
a way of life in an authentic expression.
9
In other words, it is the reciprocal relationship between ethos
and world-view which makes life meaningful. A breakdown in this
relationship leads to alienation; there is no longer a connection
between our moral and aesthetic lives and our understanding of our
place in the universe. It is this kind of a relational disintegration
v/hich leads to the decline of tragic literature.
In order to understand the impact that a particular world-view
and ethos can have upon an environment, we must include an additional
element, technology. It is through our technology that we are able
to act to change our environment and the nature of our actions
is partially shaped by the nature of the technolog-y which is
available to us.
The role of technology in relation to ethos and world-view has
been at the focus of the debate about the impact of the Judeo-Christian
tradition upon our environment. Lynn White, Jr., placed the blame
for our environmental crisis squarely in the lap of that
tradition.
11
He was not the first to make this suggestion, but he fleshed it
out and popularized it in his widely read and highly influential
article, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,
VJhite noted that in the vrorl.i-view of ancient cultures each
place, tree, or animal was imbued with a spirit, or under the
protection of a deity which resided in that place. The ethos of
these cultures required that one placate the spirit of each tree
before it could be cut, and of each animal before it could be
killed, A similar approach to the world is found in contemporary
traditional cultures. The connection between people and their
environment was a spiritual one, and the relationship was reciprocal.
Their fate depended upon the manner in v;hich they interacted with
the spirit in nature (see figure 1).^^
The Judeo-Christian v;orld-view is quite different. God exists
outside of the v;orld in a supernatural realm. Spirit, or soul, is
found on earth only in human beings. At the creation we v:ere given
"dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fov/1 of the air,
and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every
creeping thing that creepeth over the earth. "^3 To Wiite, this
meant that we no longer had any reciprocal responsibility to the
objects in nature. VJith the removal of spirit from nature to
supernature, the creatures of the earth lost their protection from
unbridled acts of man. Reciprocity lay only between humanity and
God, as symbolized in Michelangelo* s painting. The Creation of Adam ,
by the hands of Adam and God reaching toward each other (see figure
2 ).
1?
V J
Non-human Objects Humans
Figure 1. ANIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW. All objects are recognized to
possess a soul or spirit. Both humans and non-humans are able to
influence each other. (The asterisks indicate the presence of soul
or spirit. The double headed arrows indicate reciprocal relation-
ships. )
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FigiJre 2. JUDEO-CKRISTIAN V;ORLD-VIE’.7, The universe is divided into
the. natural and the supernatural, earth and heaven. The source of
soul or spirit is God, who rests outside of the natural world, Hunans
are set apart from nature and are spiritually connected v,’ith God.
iiatural objects are devoid of spirit or soul. (The asterisks indicate
'ihe presence of spirit or soul. The double-headed arrow indicates a
reciprocal spiritual relationship. The single-headed arrow indicates
a non-reciprocal relationship.)
Yet, in the thousands of years spanned by the Judeo-Christian
tradition, not until the period of the fifteenth through the seven-
teenth century, A.D., did the idea that we are controllers of nature
begin to crystallize,^^ This seems extraordinary in light of the
argument that this view is an integral part of the tradition.
Glacken notes that this crystallization appears to have been
associated with three technological events. One was the popu-
larity of draining lakes and swamps, rerouting rivers, and other
forms of land reclaimation projects, A second was the success in
building large bridges and canals. Finally, the joining of science
(traditionally an abstract and scholarly activity) with technology
as a means of gaining power over nature. In other words, the idea
of controlling nature did not become important until v;e had the
power to make a visibly significant impact upon it.
White’s thesis can be summarized as follows: 1) the Judeo-
Christian tradition created a split between humanity and nature, and
placed us in the role of masters over nature; 2) this led to the
development of an increasingly powerful technological control over
nature; and 3) bas led to environmental degradation. But White
added qualifications. He remarked, for example, that the idea of
humanity as controller is particularly characteristic of the
V/estem, Latin Church, It did not arise under Greek Christianity.^^
In Genesis
,
1:28, we read, "... and God said unto them. Be
fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it . . . ."
There is an obvious concept of stewardship in the phrase, "replenish
15
the earth." VJhite suggests that for some reason Latin Christianity
deemphasized this theme. It is, nevertheless, present. This is
probably most obvious in the person of St. Francis of Assisi, whom
recommends as the patron saint of ecologists.
White provides a more subtle summary of his owri thesis;
Men commit their lives to what they consider good.
Because Western Christianity developed strong moral
approval of technological innovation, more men of
talent in the V/est put more resources, energy and
imagination into the advancement of technology than
was the case among Greek Christians or indeed in any
other society, including the Chinese. The result was
an unpi'ecendented technological dynamism of which our
present technological movement (with its attendant
consequences) is the unbroken extension. There may
have been other factors contributing to this advance,
but the novel Western medieval value structure is
central and essential to our understanding of it. 17
V/hite’s thesis was enthusiastically accepted by a great many
people, and his article v/as ^and continues to be) vridely anthologized.
Chrisxopher Derrick, hov;ever, has pointed to the one-sided criticism
that the Judeo-Christian tradition has received. If it is to be
blamed for the negative impacts of technology, should it not also
be praised for its positive benefits?^® It is interesting to note the
eagerness with which many people have placed blame upon their religious
origins. Indeed, Genesis
, 1:28, is often mistakenly quoted as, "Be
fruitful, multiply, and subdue the earth," completely omitting the
stewardship theme. The one-sided zeal of the popular attack would
be a fruitful topic for psychological and sociological study.
A number of V/hite's critics have pointed to positive elements in
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the tradition, which they feel he had underemphasized. Ian Barbour
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points to the affimative attitude toward nature that can be found in
the Bible. One of these is the view that we are the stewards of God's
creation. Another is that nature, as God's creation, is to be viewed
in ..v^nuer and with praise. He beHeves that tnese are attitudes which
we should strive to recover. Derrick, also, points x.o positive
elements.
The idea of man's dominion over Nature is certainly present
in Christianity. But it does not exist there in isolation:
is modified and controlled by other ideas—
—the overlord-
ship of God, his immanence in creation (x^hich does not
exclude his transcendence of it), the goodness of all being,
the wickedness of all arrogance and self-will, our peren-
nial need for restraint and humility and obedience. ^0
Others focus upon the additional factors which must have contri-
buted to the rise of modern technology, placing less of an emphasis
upon the role of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Santmire,^! for
example, feels that the real problems began with the rise of modern
natural science, the formulation of Kant's mechanistic philosophy
of nature, and the development of modem industrialism. Similar
arguments have also been made against Descartes and his philosophy.
Writing in more political and economic terms, Moncreif has argued
that there are a multitude of variables involved. These include
economic, political, sociological and population factors. Ex-
panding upon bliite’s three-step progression from the religious
tradition, to technology, to the environmental crisis, he constructs
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the following four-step model.
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Probably the most sophisticated critique, reformulation, and
expansion of Vfliite’s thesis appears in William Leiss’ book. The
Domination of Nature
. He begins with White’s thesis, but finds
that, while it locates the tradition in which the idea of domination
may have first been formulated, it does not adequately explain how
it achieved its present form. Leiss’ thesis is that;
The vision of the human domination of nature becomes a
fundamental idealogy in a social system (or of a phase
in the development of human society considered as a
whole) which consciously undertakes a radical break with
the past, v;hich strenuously seeks to demolish all
’‘naturalistic” modes of thought and behavior, and which
sets itself as a primary task the development of pro-
ductive forces for the satisfaction of human material
wants.2U
These tendancies, he argues, are first found in Western capi-
talism. Although each precapitalist society had its own distinctive
characteristics, all of them sensed a moral order in the universe.
Nature hau an enduring order, which one must act to preserve.
This included prescribed social roles of political power, class
standing, and occupaoion. The existing social order was accepted as
the natural social order. It is in this sense that Leiss refers
to them as being naturalistic.
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In traditional cultures, God was found in nature. This rein-
forced the naturalistic notion that the existing state of nature
vjas good and should be preserved. Judeo-Ghristian theology, however,
toc-K Cod out of natui-e and placed him elsewhe.-e. The universe became
split; there was God, there was nature, and man stood in between
the two. Prescriptive statements of what was right and wrong came
from God, not from nature. Thus, nature becaine something that
^ould change, and be changed as God willed it. Man dominated nature
as a privilege shared with God. The fact of domination was something
shared by all people, because they were all part of the creation and
received the ability to dominate as a gift of God. This philosophy
was essentially anti-naturalistic, but many naturalistic elements
remained vrith it; for example, the naturalistic social structure of
feudalism.
Leiss further argues that as the naturalistic social structure
broke down in the seventeenth century, and the idea of humn
equality arose, people recognized the potential to improve their
material lives. The idea of dominating nature became linked to the
struggle for social and material progess, Francis Bacon strongly
advocated the value of science in this effort. By understanding the
laws that govern nature, he argued, \ie would be able to control
nature and use it toward h\imanly desired ends. The laws that we
had to operate under became technical, material laws, rather than
moral laws. Bacon felt that the power thus gained would be used
wisely, under the guidance of reason and religion. But he failed
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to recognize the faultering nature of the religion of his time.
Religion now plays a very small role in shaping our individual
behavior and public policies.
iurthcrraore. Bacon failed to distinguish between uhe two
meanings of "nature.*’ The scientist, writes Leiss, tries to
distinguish the reality that lies behind appearances. This is
what they mean when they speak of nature, and it is over this
nature that they are trying to achieve mastery. But \ifith the
decline of religion, people ceased to be joined by a common
spiritual bond in the exercise of mastery. The desire for mastery
became linked to the desire for social and economic progress as
desired by each individual. In a world of limited resources this
desire for individual progress necessitates a competition for, and
conflict over these resources. It is this reality, the reality as
conceived by people in conflict and not that of the scientist, to
which the products of science are applied in the technological quest
for mastery (see figure 3), Leiss argues that in our time the quest
for the mastery of nature has become integrally linked to the mastery
of human beings, "Domination over nature is wrongly represented as
an achievement that will bind together a bitterly divided species;
conversely, the abstract idea of man (in the phrase 'man's conquest
of nature*) hides the fact that the actual agents in this process are
pcf
individuals and societies in violent conflict among themselves,"
The domination of nature, then, involves both the domination of
the bio-physical world in order to satisfy material wants, and the
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Figure 3. KODERN KiATERIALISTIC WORLD-VIE’.-/. This view was shaped by
the Judeo-Christian tradition, but does not retain its spiritual
elements, Kamans are still set apart from nature, because they have
minds (rather than because they have souls). Their relationship
with natural objects is non-reciprocal. (The ”+" indicates the
presence of mind. The single-headed arrows indicate a non-recipro-
cal relationship.)
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domination of people (human nature) in order to compete successfully
for the material wealth that is required to satisfy these wants.
Weapons technology and behavior control are as much a product of
the aominaLion theme as are strip mining and air polluoion. T.el..3
fears that this will remain so until there is an equal distribution
of resources and a socialist society.
He does not believe that the present approach to domination
can continue, because of what he calls the ”revolt of nature,”
This term can be understood in two ways. In one sense it refers to
the developing revolt of human nature against the oppression that
has resulted from the quest for mastery of people. The revolt of
nature, also, refers to the breakdown of our ecosystem in the face
of irrational exploitation, vjhich threatens our biological survival.
Leiss fears that if there is a major social rebellion, it may
be of an irrational sort, which will turn against and reject science
and technology. But this would mean the loss of the vital strengths
of science and technology, as well as their drawbacks. VJhat he
feels needs to be done is to change the role of science and techno-
logy in our society.
The idea of the mastery of nature must be reinterpreted
in such a way that its principal focus is ethical or
moral development rather than scientific and techno-
logical innovation. In this perspective progress in
the mastery of nature will be at the same time progress
in the liberation of nature .... The task of
mastering nature ought to be understood as a matter of
bringing under control the irrational and destructive
aspects of human desires , , . ,
Again a caveat: ethical progress and scientific
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tectaolopcal progress are not simple opposiLes. V/hatIS 01 value in each depends in some measure on the
accomplishments ol the other. The development of
scientific rationality, as I sugges.ea earlier, is one
^cial presuposition of any ethical advance, in thatIt colters the human propensity to project irrational
structrre into external nature ana to be tyrPimizedby those projections.
He concludes that our understanding of the mastery of nature must
become "one in which mastery of nature is understood as an advanced
stage in human consciousness wherein intelligence is able to
regulate its relationship to nature (internal and external) in such
a way as to minimize the self-destructive aspects of human desires.
Only in this way can mastery of nature be accomplished as a means of
achieving positive human goals.
The very idea that our attitudes toward both people and nature
are somehow connected seems absurd to many people. That we have so
much difficulty in recognizing the connection between the two may
point to the sharp dichotomy between the two which characterizes our
culture. Nevertheless, the attitudinal connection has been made
before, although generally in a vague, intuitive manner. Thomas
Merton, for example, has noted that:
The ecological conscience is also essentially a peace-making
conscience. A country that seems to be more and more oriented
to permanent hot or cold war-making does not give much
promise of developing either one. But perhaps the very
character of the v;ar in Vietnam—v;ith crop poisoning, the
defoilation of forest trees, the incineration of villages
and their inhabitants with napaLm
—
presents a start enough
example to remind us of this most urgent moral need. ^
Examples of the connection between the domination of both nature
and people are numerous. Manufacturers who pollute a town's air and
water have threatened to close their plants and move elsewhere if they
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were required to clean up their effluents. If the manufacturer is
a major employer in the town, the threat amounts to economic black-
mail. Feeling that they have the right, or necessity to pollute
(domination of nature) and, thus, pass the cost of waste disposal
on to the townspeople in the form of health hazards and increased
maintenance costs (domination of people), they threaten their
employees and their town with severe economic hardship if required
to stop (domination of people).
The green revolution provides another example. This method of
agriculture provides high yields through the combined use of large-
scale, mono-crop planting, hybrid seed, and the intensive use of
fertilizers, irrigation, and machinei^. Exporting this technology
to the Third World involves a radical disruption of the traditional
agriculture, society, economy, and power structure. Yet little or
no effort is made to help the people to understand the wider
implications of the new methods, or to give them any voice in making
the decisions of whether or not, or how, to employ it.
Modern warfare, as Merton suggested, provides some terrifying
examples of the connection between the two forms of domination. In
Vietnam, defoliants were widely used in order to deprive the enemy
of cover beneath the forest canopy. Large areas of forest were
defoliated without regard for the possible impact upon the local
ecology, the national economy, or the health hazard to the local
populace. In addition, a massive program of crop destruction by
the use of herbicides was instituted in order to deprive the enemy
2h
of food. This imposed a greater deprivation upon the local peasants,
leading to starvation, and contributing to their forced urbanization.
The ultimate synthesis lies in the potential for thermonuclear
war. In this situation all distxncc-ion between people and Ipnd-
scape, social institutions and ecosystems, combatants and noncom-
batants, warring nations and neutrals disappears. The relatively
small number of people directly involved in the dispute employ a
tecnnology which has the potential essentially to destroy
everything on the earth. At this point, domination becomes indis-
tinguishable from insanity.
Alternatives to Domination
As our power to influence nature has increased, we have been
forced to realize in very pragmatic terms that are nature
. As
we strive increasingly to dominate nature, v;e must increasingly
dominate our fellow human beings. If we destroy nature, we will
destroy ourselves as well. The old dichotomy between man and nature
is breaking down. In our present cultural context we possess
enormous powers to shape the world and control people. These powers,
such as nuclear, information processing, and behavior control tech-
nologies, are greater than anything that could be conceived only a
century ago. They have been developed in a matter of just a few
decades; almost instantaneously in the perspective of the history of
V/estern civilization. While the technique has changed, though, our
social, political, and economic institutions have not changed apace.
Before we had the power to destroy both humanity and nature, it
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aid not really matter whether we viewed our role as that of domination.
Ethos and behavior, although connected, are not identical. The recent
changes in our technology have led to a radical change in our
behavior, even though the ethos of domination may not have changed
in recent decades. But the object of domination is to create a good
life for ourselves. In the present context, however, this ethos is
not leading to the good life. Instead, it is leading to overpopu-
lation, starvation, pollution, totalitarianism, exhaustion of our
resources, degradation of the ecosystem, and nuclear holocaust.
The increased power that has come to us through our new technologies
has led to the obsolescence of the domination ethos. By continuing
to adhere to it, we threaten to lose whatever chance we may have
to live healthy, meaningful, smd reasonably secure lives.
But what are the alternatives to domination? A number of alter-
natives have been proposed. Many authors have suggested that the
Vest adopt one of the religions of the East, or of one of the tradi-
tional cultures. Lynn White, Jr., has argued that, "religious
problem is to find a viable equivalent to animism. "30 paul Shepard
believes that we must revive the hunter-gatherer traditions of our
ancient forebearers. And there has been a great deal of popular
experimentation with various life-styles and religions, and a
revival of interest in m.agic and witchcraft.
Two Eastern religions which are often cited as particularly
goo'^, ecologically responsible models for the West are Taoism, and
Buddhism (particularly Zen). Both teach that humanity and nature
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are an integral part of each other and that our authentic selves can
be found only by living within the spontaneous, harmonious rhythms
of nature. When we act self-consciously, when we try to impose our
wjll upon the woi-la, we split ourselves from the world, and from Ihr
true nature of our being. In so doing, we create a false reality
and live incomplete, benumbed lives. They maintain that in order
to shed ourselves of this false, debilitating way of life, we must
shed ourselves of our self-consciousness and live spontaneously in
accordance with the rhythm of the true way, which lies within us
and the rest of the universe. Success comes only by v;orking with
the world, not by imposing our egos upon it.
There are those who will conquer the world
And make of it (what they conceive or desire).
I see that they will not succeed.
(For) the vrarld is God's own Vessel
It cannot be made (by human interference).
He who makes it spoils it.
He who holds it loses it. 32
This approach to the world is often symbolized by water, which
although it is capable of eventually overcoming and wearing away any
obstacle is fluid and yields to the contour of the land and whatever
impedes its progress. It is also symbolized in the grass which, by
bending before the wind, is able to survive storms which topple trees.
A number of Eastern martial arts embody this principle in their
technique of yielding before an opponent's attack, and turning his
momentam against him. This stands in marked contrast to the Western
approach of meeting an adversity head-on, and countering force v/ith
force.
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The impact of Taoist and Zen philosophies upon human interaction
with nature can be seen in the horticultural arts. The following
description of a Taoist hermitage in China of the 1930 's illustrates
the v<ay in which the gardeners worked within the context of the
natural forms of the location, rather than attempting to wholly
impose their will upon the landscape.
The steep path crawling up [the mountain'
s| westernface followed the convolutions of a torrent winding
through a series of dark chasms. Not far from where
the hermitage clung to the steep rock-face, these
miniature cataracts were fed by a high fall; a long
slim column of opal-coloured water thundered into a
churning pool obscured by rainbov;-tinted spray. Here,
where the path took a sharp turn towards a stone
stairv/ay leading to the main gate, it could be seen
that the recluses* love of unspoiled beauty had not
deterred them from lending nature a helping hand.
The immediate environs of the Valley Spirit
Hermitage gave the impression of a series of rocks
and caverns, overhung by ferns and luxuriant plants,
which just happened to emerge from the undergrowth
in this vicinity, adding enormously to its pictures-
queness, What aroused my suspicion was that no
other section of the mountain, apart from the chasms
and waterfall, looked so exacly like the original
of a Taoist painting. There was, of course, no
obvious symmetry, but yet a sense of \inderlying
harmony that was just a shade too pronounced to
be altogether natural. Whoever had been respon-
sible for making the 'guided wildness* of the approach
to the hermitage even lovelier than nature's untouched
handiwork has surely been a master of subtlety, for
there was not an object within sight of the stairway
of v/hich one could confidently affirm it had been
tampered with. 33
This scene is quite different from the ornamental gardens of the
European tradition. The Taoist and Zen Buddhist gardeners view their
role as that of drawing out the potentials which are already inherent
in the landscape and plants. They continually prune and plant, but
?8
their intention is to act as if they are agents of nature itself,
This is not to say that the garden can not be an artificial creation.
Every stone and plant in a tea garden, for example, may have been
trrinsporbed to tie site. The effect, of the garden, howe/er, is to
create, in a very small space, the impression of a rustic retreat
from the rest of the world. The landscaping and all of the materials,
from stepping stones, to lanterns, to bamboo fences, are designed to
give a sense of being natural to the place. Even a very formal,
abstract garden consisting of moss-covered boulders on a field of
raked sand is based upon organic, flowing forms, which reflect
nature.
But not all is well in Eden, In his. The Book of Tea, Okakura
Kakuzo recoimts the following story.
In the sixteenth century the morning-glory was as yet a
rare plant with us, Rikiu had an entire garden planted
with it, which he cultivated with assiduous care. The
fame of his convolvuli reached the ear of the Taiko, and
he expressed a desire to see them, in consequence of
which Rikiu invited him to a morning tea at his house.
On the appointed day the Taiko walked through the garden,
but nowhere could he see any vestige of the convolvulus.
The ground had been leveled and strewn with fine pebbles
and sand. VJith sullen anger the despot entered the tea-
room, but a sight waited him there which completely
restored his humour. On the tokonoma, in a rare bronze
of Sung workir.anship, lay a single morning-glory—the
queen of the whole garden! 35
Kakuzo tells the story with great appreciation, and speaks of the act
as a "Flower Sacrifice," To me, however, it sounds like the plants
were destroyed for the sake of a sense of aesthetic taste which had
lost touch with its religious and philosophical roots.
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Proponents of Eastern philosophies as solutions to our environ-
mental problems often lose sight of the fact that one's behavior
need not be in keeping with one's idealogy, and that this is no less
true of the East than it is of the West. The fact that some Eastern
religious and philosophical texts stress harmony with nature does not
necessarily mean that Eastern societies live in harmony v/ith nature;
nor does the fact that the New Testament stresses brotherly love
mean that the West is replete with brotherly love. In both cases we
are dealing with ideals--not with actuality. In a similar vein,
the gardens of a social elite are not necessarily representative of
the manner in which the majority of the people tend their gardens,
Yi-Fu Tuan has pointed out that, "A culture's publicized ethos
about its environment seldom covers more than a fraction of the total
range of its attitudes and practices pertaining to that enviroriment.
In the play of forces that govern the world, esthetic and religious
ideals rarely have a major role. "3^ The early Christians, for
example, did not produce any great changes in their environment,
compared to those made by the Romans. The Romans had a centralized
administration, which permitted them to conduct large scale projects,
such as the construction of aqueducts and road systems. So too,
despite Taoist and Buddhist attitudes of harmony with nature, China
suffered a great deal of environmental damage over the past tv;o
thousand years.
The Taoist hermitage described so glowingly by Blofeld rested on
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the side of a „.ountain which had previously been completely deforested.
This was only one example of a large pattern of deforestation described
by Tuan. He argues that there had been considerable deforestation as
earry as 800-:,00, B.G. There eve., aj.pears to have been professional
conservation officials working in the service of the rulers. People
were allowed to out trees only at certain times of the year, in an
apparent effort to control the nimber of trees cut. This suggests
that there was considerable concern about the rate of deforestation.
It also argues that an attitude of harmony v;ith nature was not
sufficient in itself; it had to be enforced through regulations.
From the fourth century, B.C., onward, the peasants made a
practice of burning over forest areas in order to destroy the habitat
of dangerous animals. Around 960-1279, A.D., the charcoal demand of
the country exceeded its timber resources. In the period spanning
the tenth century through the fourteenth century, the Buddhists
introduced the practice of cremation, which led to timber shortages
in the southern coastal provinces. The extensive use of v;ood in
the construction (and reconstru.ction, after fire and battle) of their
cities placed heavy additional demands upon their forests. Finally,
Tuan writes that the Buddhists have been blamed for seven-tenths of
forest consumption during the seventeenth century. One reason for
this, he suggests, ”v;as that instead of living in 'grass hermitages'
they built themselves huge halls and temples. "37
He points out that China was an empire supported by a vast
bureaucracy. It is not surprising that the approach of domination
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was found alongside that of harmony with nature. This is not to deny
the value of Chinese philosophy, rather it is an attempt to place it
in perspective. It may well be that the presence of the idea that
humanity and nature are a harmonious whole helped to direct th-m, away
from the extreme of domination which characterises the West. On the
other hand, China's impact upon its environment was no loss than that
of the West prior to the development of modern Western technology.
We are not likely to solve many of our problems, if any, by
trying to transplant Taoism or Buddhism to the West. The rapidity
v/ith which Japan industrialized, and the concomitant degradation of
of its environment only support this notion. In addition, these
philosophies are not rooted in our cultural heritage and, thus,
are not likely to become integrated into our culture without conside-
rable modification. Nevertheless, these philosophies can be of great
value to us. First, they represent meaningful and significant options
for those who wish to adopt them as models for their own lives. The
fact that they can not be adopted on a large social scale does not
reduce their value to individuals. Even in the East, few people fully
commit themselves to the religious life. To most, it provides the
backdrop, rather than the focus of thei^' daily lives.
On the larger social level, Taoism and Buddhism are of great
potential value, because they provide an alternative to domination,
which can be examined and adapted to our cultural context. The idea
of harmony with nature is not new to the VJest, but it is subordinant
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to that of domination. The East provides a richer variety of models
of harmonious relationships with nature. These may be of help as
guides as we try to f .)rge a new pattern of interaction with our
etrn ronment
.
V/e must, however, create our o\m patterns. In a real sense, we
are all on a vision quest. We are seeking a new vision of our world
and our place in it, vjhich we can hold before us as a guide. It is
very tempting to grasp hold of the vision of another people, but
this will not work. Barring a holocaust, we can not go completely
back to a previous pattern of living. Neither the old, nor the new
ways of doing things are working, V/e must save what is valuable of
our past and our present, and create a new way of doing things—a new
world-viev7, and a new ethos. The process, though, is not wholly (or
even largely) one of conscious planning and design. Vie do not know
exactly v/hat we are trying to build. The process is more one of
emergence and evolution. The acts and visions of each of us
contribute to the larger, organic process.
A number of authors have suggested alternatives to the ethos of
domination. Their conclusions are surprisingly similar, and bear
some resemblance to the Taoist view. G. Tyler Miller, Jr.,^® argues
that our hunter-gatherer ancestors lived, as do contemporary hunter-
gatherers, in a state of ”man in nature.” In this state, people are
essentially powerless in the face of natural events. With the develop'
mert of agriculture and, later, industry we gained power to shape
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our environBient to meet our needs. No longer were people emersed in
nature, rather they strove to control it. Miller calls this stage,
"man vs. nature.” Non, however, we are discovering that the man
vs. nature relaV onship has seveiv^ drawbacks. At the sa.ne tLme,
we do not wish to return to the man in nature stage. He suggests
that we, instead, develop a "man and nature" relationship. In this
stage we would recognize that the world is too complex to control
and that: "Everything is connected to everything and our job is to
preserve stability, ambiguity, diversity, and human dignity and
freedom by harmonious cooperation with nature. Because we can
never know how everything or even most things are interconnected,
[we must act withj restraint and humility. "39
Looking back across our history, E. A. Gutkind^O found a some-
what similar pattern. He believes that there are two fundamental
ways in which hum.an beings can be in relationship with their
environment. Borrowing Martin Buber’s terminology, he calls them
I-Thou, and I-It. Originally people lived in close contact with
nature. V/e were dependent upon the natural v;orld and its
vicissitudes. V/e were in close touch with it and responded to its
subtle changes. In this I-Thou relationship, everything v;e saw in
nature had meaning to us. As our technology and analytical methods
developed, however, we became increasingly distant from nature. In
the past few centuries we have become isolated from nature and the
human conimunity. Gutkind believes that this has happened in large
3i4
part because the cycle of our existence has become centered around
mechanically regulated activities, (such as work regulated by clock
time), rather than around the natural cycles of sun, seasons, animal
ana plant activities, and our owt. biology. ^'Today the transfo notion
from the hesitant and whispered dialogue between man and nature to
the aggressive and loud exploitation of nature and from closely
knit communities to atomized societies is complete. Nature and
our fellow human beings have become alienated from us—things with
which we exist in an I-It relationship.
In addition to these two relational patterns, Gutkind has
identified four attitudinal approaches to the world, each of which
characterizes a different stage in our historical development. The
first stage, ’’fear and security,” was characterized by a fear of
the unpredictable, mysterious forces in both nature and people, and
by a desire to protect oneself from them. Nevertheless, people
lived in a direct I-Thou relationship with nature. V/ith the develop-
ment of agriculture and the techniques of terrace farming and
irrigation, we entered a stage of ’’confidence and adjustment.”
There was a greater degree of planning and a more rational shaping
of the environment. Adjustment to environmental changes, though,
was immediate and reciprocal. In the third stage, ’’agressiveness
and disintegration,” adjustment turned into exploitation as our
power to change the environment increased. Our objectives have
become both diverse and disjointed. For the first time an I-It
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relationship has become prominent, and
characteristically domination-oriented
Looking toward the future, Gutkind
tude of "responsibility
-ind urlfloation
society has acquired its modem
approach.
sees the rise of a new atti-
," which will reestablish an
I-Thou relationship.
Ej^ansive ruthlessness is gradually merging into a careful
adjustment to environmental conditions and new possibi-
lities. Man begins to be aware of his real responsibilities
and of the limitations which the closing frontiers of the
v/orld impose upon him. The objectives are gaining in
precision, foresight, and co-ordination. Unity in
diversity and unification are emerging as the main tasks
in the next stage of development in which man must act
as a co-ordinator, guided by social awareness and insight
into the v/orkings of nature,
Along with the coming change in relationship and attitude, he
also sees an emerging change in the scale of our projects. This,
again, is part of a larger historical pattern of development. The
geocentric world-view v;as quite bounded, arid the projects under-
taken by the people who dwelled within it v.'ere generally small.
With the rise of the heliocentric vieif, Gutkind notes that there
was an accompanying development of greater expansiveness in
architectui-e and cities, and a scattering of colonial possessions.
The unbounded nature of our present cosmology has brought on great
expansion and grovrth as we continually push at the frontiers of
the world. Now, hovrever, our frontiers and resources are running
out and we must recognize the finiteness of our earth. Bigness
is not necessarily goodness, He argues that we must reestablish
a realistic and human scale in our enterprises.
Both Miller and Gutkind reach similar conclusions. Both argue
that we must give up our attitude of domination, and develop one
favoring reciprocity and cooperation. Gutkind takes the further
step of stating >hat this attitude must guide not only cur inter
actions with nature, but with people as well. Jonas Salk, too, has
arrived at this conclusion, although he argues it in a different
v;ay.
If human life is to express as much harmony, construc-
tiveness, and creativity as are possible for fulfilling
the purpose of life, as "required" by llature, and the
purposes iri life, as "chosen" by Man, an attitude v/ill
be needed, not of Man "against" Nature, but of Man
"inclusive with" Nature. A more reasonable attitude
V7ould be for Man to "serve Nature" in order to serve
himself, rather than to "serve himself" v/ithout
regard for, or at the expense of Nature and others.
Salk believes that the recent centuries of increasing growth in
population, resource consumption, environmental degradation, and
violence are characterized by social attitudes based upon exclusion.
Either one idea, thing, or person is correct, or acceptable, or
another is. Each excludes the other in a combative struggle for
domination over the other. In order to reduce the growth rate and
head-off a major social and environmental catastrophy, we must
change our attitude from one of "either/or" to one of "and,"
The "and" attitude is inclusive. It accepts conflicting, but
complimentary values in a state of dynamic tension. This attitude
even allows for the presence of either/or attitudes when they are
app'^opriate.
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One way to determine which attitude underlies a particular action
IS to ask the question, «who wins?" Under the attitude of domination
(either/or) there are clear winners and losers. Under the inclusive
attitude there are generally not clear losers. Rather, an efTcr:
is made to meet the needs of all parties involved. Instead of a
win-lose attitude, there is one of double-v:in. Salk beljeves that
once we develop an attitude of inclusiveness v;e will be able to play
* the game of life for v/hat can be given to and received from it,
nuch can be taken and how little can be given.
This applies to our interactions with both our social and our bio-
physical environments.
Mutuality
Florence Kluckhohn^^ has developed an anthropological theory
which v/ill he].p to clarify the viev;s that I have been reviewing.
She believes that within each culture there are three fundamental
value orientations^*^ governing human interaction with nature; "Sub-
jugation-to-Nature, " "Harmony-v;ith-Nature, " and "Mastery-over-
Nature." These options are similar to Miller's stages of Man in
Nature, Man and Nature, and Man vs. Nature, respectively. Her
statement of the concept, however, is far more sophisticated than
is his. She argues that this range of values is al’ways present in
all cultures. No culture can be viewed as being governed by only
one of the value orientations. What characterizes a particular
culture is the emphasis placed upon each orientation. Kluckhohn
and Strodtbeck conducted comparative field studies of Zuni, Navaho,
Spanish-taerlcan, Mo™an, and Texan con^nities, which aeon, to aopport
her theory.
It IS, then, a gross oversimplification to state that the
tac.lcan ethos is simply one of I-'astery-over-hatnre, or that the
traditional Japanese ethos is that of Harmony-with-Nature. Rather,
we must recognize that, although these may be the dominating value
orientations, the alternative orientations are still present in each
culture. This is encouraging, because it means that if we wish to
change the dominant value orientation of our culture we do not have
to introduce a totally new set of values. There appears, then, to
be a greater likelihood of bringing about such a change.
Leiss, Gutkind, and Salk have pointed out that the change in
our ethos must include a change in the way in v;hich we interact
with people, as well as with nature, Kluckhohn, however, places the
value orientations associated v;ith interpersonal relations under a
different category. These orientations are; Lineality,” "Collatera-
liby,” and ’’Individualism,” Lineality involves an hierarchical
relationship between people. The higher one’s position in the
hierarchy, the greater one’s pov/er and authority. This is charac-
teristic o^ military and corporate organization, as well as of
traditional societies in v:hich one turns to the elders when decisions
must be made. Collaterality involves an interest in the welfare of
a group of people who share in a lateral (as opposed to hierarchical)
relationship. ’’Biologically, sibling relationships are the prototype
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or the Collateral relationship. "'>8 v^en decisions are made, they are
made with the Interests of the entire group in mind. Individualism,
on the other hand, emphasizes the welfare of the particular individual
who IS making the decision. Vft.en group decisions must be made,
rather than reaching a consensus in a collateral mode, they are
reached by a vote. The majority rules, regardless of the desires or
needs of those who lost the vote. Again, she points out that all
three relational value orientations are present in each culture,
and that each is characterized by vrhich orientations are particularly
emphasized,
I feel that the split between the man-nature and the relational
values in Kluckhohn's scheme is a product of a cultural bias. It is,
I believe, a product of the human nature dichotomy of the Judeo-
Christian tradition, I propose to combine the tv;o sets of value
orientations under the terms; "Submission," "Mutuality," and "Domi-
nation," Under the Submission orientation, one senses oneself as
being powerless before the forces of nature, or human authority.
Mutuality involves a concern for the welfare of all parties involved
in a situation, be they hujnan or non-human. Domination emphasizes
the welfare of the individual at the expense of nature or other
people. In this view, her two categories involve the same
relational stnicture, but differ in terms of what parties are
involved in the relationship; human-hiiman in one, and human-nature
in the other (see figure ii).
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This IS not to say that any culture in which domination of
people IS emphasized will also emphasize the domination of nature.
Indeed, Kluckhohn’s and Strodtbeck's results suggest that the
Spafiish-American community that they studied emphasizes Indivi-
dualism (Domination) in human relations, and Subjugation-to-Nature
(Submission) in man-nature relations. V/hat I am arguing is that
the relationship between self and other in both cases are
structurally sim.ilar and, thus, should be referred to with similar
terminology. However, one’s relations to people, and to nature
may be governed by different value orientations under different
circumstances.
It is interesting to note the similarity between Domination
and Submission. The difference betv/een the two seems to lie
primarily in x^here power is believed to lie, not in the v;ay in
which power is applied. That is, they differ primarily in v;ho or
what is seen as dominant, and v;ho or what is seen as in submission.
The two are opposite sides of the same coin. Only the Mutuality
orientation involves a fundamentally different relational structure.
V/ith the exception of Kluckhohn (who has taken a descriptive,
rather th-'n an adversary’’ role) all of the authors reviewed have
argued that we must move from an orientation of Domination to one
of Mutuality. It is this task v/hich I believe is at the root of
the environmental movement. It is a social as well as an ecolo-
gical challenge, because our cur^^ent patterns of interaction with
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our non-human environment are Integrally entwined with our interactions
with other individuals, institutions, and nations.
The ethos which is characteristic of a predominantly mutualistic
value orientation is a logical ar.i necessary extension of the emerging
world-view in which we are all interconnected with, and dependent
upon the ecology and peoples of the world. Our science and technology
have brought us to the point at which the old ethos which emphasizes
Domination has lost survival value.
liftiat we are dealing with is Mutuality as both a world-view and
an ethos. The former involves an image of a world in which we each
exist in a reciprocal, interdependent relationship vdth both people
and nature. The latter involves an ethic based upon a mutualistic
reciprocity, requiring that we work for double-win, rather than
win-lose solutions. Each, the world-view and the ethos, is in
harmony with the other. This points to the emergence of a nev;
moral order, which is implicit in the dynamics of the mutualistic
universe. Once this happens, if it happens, we will once again
recognize ourselves as occupying a position of significance in the
universe and Holtz’ new sense of the tragic can emerge.
This can not happen, though, until the mutualistic world-view
and ethos become a predominant part of our culture. The process has
begun. Take, for example, the problem encountered v;hen a river
floods and destroys homes in its valley. A submissive approach to
the problem v.'ould be to say, "these things happen and there is
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nothing I can do about it,” and rebuild at the same location. A
dominating approach would be than of saying, "Damn it, this flooding
has got to be stopped,” and build flood control dams upstream. The
mutualistic appr )ach would involve the realization that it is tr
,
nature of a river to flood its flood plain—that the flood plain
is a part of the river, although it most often occupies a narrow
channel. The solution to the problem, then, would be not to build
homes in the river; that is, in the flood plain. This kind of land
vjould better, and more safely, be used for agriculture and
recreation. Such an approach is increasingly being taken and
instituted in the form of zoning regulations and flood insurance
rate schedules.
Our social, political, legal, and economic institutions are
likely to become increasingly mutualistic as v;e are forced to deal
vn.th international tensions and environmental degradation. The
process needs to be helped along, though, through the clear arti-
culation of a mutualistic philosophy and the development of a body
of people who are consciously committed to this approach. In
addition. Mutuality must become an integral part of education.
One’s ethos and v/orld-view are not inherited genetically. They
are learned. It is through education, in the broadest sense of the
term, that a new ethos and world-view vri.ll be spread. It is
important to realise that a society's formal educational insti-
tut'^ons probably play a relatively small role in this overall
process. Nevertheless, they can help to preserve the genninal ideas
until the society is ready to accept them. And they can play a part
in helping to crystallize the general mutualistic orientation that
students are likely to learn as their social environment becomes
increasingly mutualistic.
The major task of environmental education is, as I see it, to
foster a mutualistic v;orld~view and ethos. Most environmental
educators have viewed their role through a very narrow window and,
thus, the role of environmental education has been narrow. However,
the perspective that I have presented joins it with humanistic
education, international education, and others, in a common task.
I wish to focus upon the role that environmental education can
play in promoting a mutualistic value orientation. In particular,
I will deal vdth mutualistic interactions with our bio-physical
environment. Nevertheless, since our attitudes toward both people
and nature are interconnected, I must deal ^idth social mutualism
as well. Before dealing specifically v/ith education, we must
take a closer look at the characteristics of social and environ-
mental mutualism. To v/hat extent are they similar, and how do they
differ?
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CHAPTER II
LIFE, ETHICS, AND INTRINSIC VALUE
The distinction between Mutuality and Domination value orien-
tao^.ons is subtle, lying in the values which nnderly an act,
rather than in the act itself. In order for people to engage in
a genuinely mutualistic interaction, each must grant the others
autonomy and regard them as having something cf genuine value to
contribute. Although different people may not all make contri-
butions of equal quality, they are, nevertheless, granted an
equal right to participate. However, a number of authors have
suggested solutions to our environmental problems which lack
this important element of Mutuality.
In his essay, "The Human Prospect," Robert Heilbroner found
himself compelled to vn'ite that, although he dislikes dictator-
ships, ".
. .
our analysis forces us to consider the possibility
that the passage through the gantlet ahead may be possible only
under governments capable of rallying obedience far more effec-
tively than v/ould be possible in a democratic setting."^ He is
not alone in reaching this conclusion. Others, too have argued
that in order to solve our global social and environmental problems
we must first establish a global government with enormous,
perhaps dictatorial powers. This is an extreme example of a
general approach to solving environmental problems which, although
widespread, does not seem to have been clearly labelled; this is,
li9
solving environmental problems through the domination of people.
Another example of this method is the recommendation that the
United States foreign aid, particularly food aid, be sent only
to countries x.ni.h have instituted a strong policy of population
control. This is, essentially, a policy of starving countries
into submission to our solution to their problems. Their
population problems eventually have an impact upon the United
States and, thus, become our problems as well; but this does
not make the policy any more attractive to me. Keeping in mind
the question of who is it that wins, and who loses, it is
interesting to notice that the people who must be dominated almost
invariably are members of a group other than the one to which the
person proposing the policy belongs.
If, indeed, ecological problems are in part the product of
an attitude of domination of nature, which in turn is connected
to that of domination of people, can the problems be solved through
further domination? There seems to be some evidence to the contrary.
A number of Third V/orld nations, for example, have viev;ed our
population policy recommendations with great suspicion. They have
been repeatedly exploited in the past and it is easy to understand
why they would hesitate to trust us nov/. It makes no difference
whether or not a policy theoretically can work, if it is not
accepted (or is violently rejected). The attempt to establish a
population policy through nutritional blackmail is liable to lead
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only to further hostility.
In addition, the attempt to solve problems through domination
actua]ly reduces the likelihood of finding a solution. The dominator
approaches the ,problem vrith arrogant certainty of the solution, but
the problems we face are so novel and complex that no one can really
be certain of any solution until it has been tried. By denying the
others the right to full participation in the process both of
identifying and solving the problems, the dominator limits his access
to important information and advice. Each country, each part of a
country, differs in landsacpe, people, and social institutions.
These unique qualities are often of great importance in determining
whether or not a given policy will work, and it is the people who
live in these areas who are generally the best qualified to identify
and deal v/ith them.
In his seminal article, "Living on a Lifeboat," Garrett Hardin
has argued that Kenneth Boulding's "spaceship earth" metaphor is
not an appropriate description of our situation.^ The earth can be
viewed as a spaceship only if it has a captain making decisions
and allocating the limited resources of the vessel. In the absence
of such a centralized authority, Hardin proposes that the metaphor
of a lifeboat is more accurate. Each coimtry is a lifeboat vjith
limited space for passengers. The poor of the world are those
who have fallen out of their country’s boat, and novi they are
crying to the large wealthy boats for help. But if the wealthy
were to help, the additional burden of people would narrow their
own margin of safety, or even swamp their boat. Thus, we find our-
selves in the classical ethical dilemmaj how do we decide who to let
into the lifeboat, and who to leave in the water to drown?
Under normal conditions, vrho.. ine population of a country ex-
ceeds that country's ability to produce food, the population falls
back down to a lower level. Hardin points out, however, that the
proposed World Food Bank would just keep increasing the population
level by pumping additional food into the country each time it
exceeded its resources. When the inevitable crash finally comes,
it would be disastrous. He argues that under programs such as the
Bank, "wealth can be steadily moved in one direction only, from the
slow-breeding rich to the rapidly-breeding poor, the process
finally coming to a halt only when all coijintries are equally and
miserably poor."^ The end result, then, would be both mass
starvation and universal poverty.
Hardin believes that rights and responsibilities go hand in
hand. "VJhen human survival is at stake, the acceptance of respon-
sibility is a precondition to the acceptance of rights, if the tv;o
cannot be introduced simultaneously."^ The right to food entails
the responsibility to curb population growth. If a country requests
food, but refuses to institute strong population control measures,
the normal population cycle should be allowed to take its course,
because a comparatively few deaths now is preferable to a great
many in the future. He concludes by pointing out that:
No v/orkable ansv:ers can be found if we ignore population
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problems. And—if the argument of this essay is correct—
ILlT/ government to conl^orreproduction everywhere it is impossible to survive indi^ity If we are to be guided by spaceshio ethics.Without a world government that is sovereign in reoro-ductive matters mankind lives, in fact, on a number ofsovereign lifeboats,
’^he foreseeable future
survival demands that we govern our actions by the
ethics of a lifeboat. Posterity will be ill served if
we do not.^
Hardin's thesis has been the subject of a good deal of contro-
versy. Basically, although coarsely put, he is saying, "If they
don't shape up, let them starve." This is a disturbing recommendation
which many people have been unable to accept, in part because it runs
counter to their basic sense of what is ethically proper. For this
reason the critiques of his lifeboat ethic tends to be clouded by
unexamined assumptions and a high level of emotionality. I,
personally, hope that he is wrong in his conclusions. Nevertheless,
his argument deserves careful consideration.
The argument that continuing to provide food to a nation which
is unable to control its population vrill only lead to a larger
disaster, is persuasive. It is based upon the concept of the "tragedy
of the commons," which Hardin had developed in an earlier paper.
^
Any communally owned resource is a commons if the profits derived
from its use go to the individual users. Under these circumstances
an individual can make a profit even though his actions may lead
to the eventual destruction of the commons, because the expense of
his exploitation is borne by the entire community, rather than by
himself alone. This led to the destruction of the English comnions
a= individual, increaaed thoir herd size in order to maximize their
short-terra profits at the expense of overgrazing. Hardin argues that
the World Food Bank would turn the world's food resources into a
cobu.ions. Agr^co/Lturally poor ccvn^ories would be able to increci:>e
their populations at the expense of the v;orld community, which
would share the burden of feeding the additional mouths. Since
the poor nations would not bear the burden of the expense of their
actions, they v/ould not be motivated to restrain their rate of
reproduction.
This argument v/orks if the food supply is the only significant
-factor that might lead to the self regulation of the population
size. Others, however, have argued that as a country’s standard
of living increases, its rate of population growth decreases. If
this is true, then a redistribution of v/ealth may not lead to a
w'orld in which v;e are all "equally and miserably poor," At this
point, though, we do not have sufficient information to know which
theory is correct, Daniel Callahan believes that in the absence
of hard evidence that the situation is as bad as Hardin paints it
to be, "It is thus a perfectly moral course to act as ^ each and
every country can be saved, and ^ ^ vre can take at least some
minor steps to help Lbem (in cooperation v;ith other developed
ccujitries) . "7 At this point the debate seems to be based upon
optimism and pessjmism, rather than on hard data.
If v;e accept Hardin’s main thesis, we are still confronted by
seme difficulties in his approach to the problem. These are
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particularly gennane to the discussion of Domination and Mutuality
value orientations. The first lies in the nature of his analogy.
He IS equating each country's good resources with the passenger
rating of a lifeboat. The rating of the lifeboat is oetormir-.c In
terms of how many people it caii hold without capsizing, not by the
quantity of its provisions. Food resources, then are being
converted into spacial measurements; each passenger occuping so
much space, and each lifeboat having so much space for so many
people. But Hardin does not address the fact that each lifeboat
in his discussion is rated by a different system. Since the per
capita production and consumption of the rich nations (such as
the United States) is very large, their lifeboats are rated to
provide a great deal of space (quality of life) for each person.
The poor nations, on the other hand, are in lifeboats which have
been rated to provide a maximum passenger capacity. The decision
of v/hether or not the rich should let the poor into their life-
boats is initially based upon the level of the comfort of their
accomodations, not upon simple survival. The survival decisions
must be made only after many survivors have been brought aboard
and the vessel is packed to its true safety limit. His failure
to really deal irith this issue of unequal distribution of the
v/orld's wealth contributes to an underlying miserly tone in Hardinb
paper.
A second problem is that Hardin’s picture of the v;orld is one
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of separate nations, which exist in isolation from each other. The
food wealth of the rich, however, depends a great deal upon the
resources of the poor. For example, the production of fertilizer
places a heavy dt.aand upon petroleum resources, and a large part of
the huge anchovy catch of protein-starved Peru ends up as cattle
feed in the United States, He does recognize that the rich have
exploited the poor in the past, but writes that:
We are all the descendants of thieves, and the
vrorld's resources are inequitably distributed,
but V7e must begin the journey to tomorrow from
the point where we are today. We cannot remake
the past, V/e cannot, without violent disorder
and suffering, give land and resources back to
the '’original” owners—who are dead anyway,^
In rebuttal, Callahan vrrites that the issue is not that of
paying retribution for old injustices, but of ceasing to continue
perpetrating injustice. Writing in terms v/hich echo Puritanism,
Hardin condemns the poor for being poor and not doing anything
about it, without substantively addressing the issues of how it
was that they became and continue to be poor. It may well be that
the rich have enlarged their lifeboats by ripping planks from the
boats of the poor. In any event, under our present style of
living, the rich are not passengers in self-sufficient lifeboats;
they are enmeshed in a complex network of trade with the nations
of the v7orld.°
Hardin, also, seems to picture the poor nations as povjerless
pawns which the rich can push around as they please without
reprecussions. The oil producing countries of the Middle East
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have demonstrated this to be a false assumption. They have discovered
that by controlling the price and flow of their oil they can have a
great economic and political impact upon the rest of the world.
Other nations which have resource, that the rich want are lihely tc
discover that they have similar power. Those which do not have
valuable resources can still resort to terrorism and, eventually,
nuclear blackmail. We are no longer in a world in which Hardin's
starvation policy can be expected to work. The poor nations are
aware of the wealth of the rich and they are bound to band
together and demand a piece of the pie, vxhether or not they under-
take the population policies that Hardin recognizes as vital to
everyone's long-term well being.
Leiss has argued that domination of people and of nature are
linked. We have found domination of people in Hardin's thesis,
but what of nature? It turns out that he portrays nature only as
resources v;hich can be used to satisfy human needs; that is, as
something to dominate. Leiss' rationale for linking the two was
that in a world of limited resources, people can successfully
dominate nature only by successfully competing with and dominating
other people. This, too, is the structure of Hardin's argument.
In a v/orld of limited resources, the rich can remain rich only if
the poor either accept population controls, or starve.
Hardin's approach of, "you do it my way, or else," is reflective
of an underlying orientation of Domination. He views the problem
as that of the "haves" defending themselves from the irresponsibility
of the "have nots." As a member of the "haves" his view of the
situation is ethnocentric. The "have nots" can equally blame the
haves for squandering the world's resources, thus precipitating
the crisis before a proper solution to the long-term problems can be
found. In either case one group is trying to pin the blame on
another.
A Mutuality approach would be, "Look, we have some problems in
common which neither of us can solve without the help of the other."
In this case both accept responsibility for the problem (or at
least do not go out of their way to place blame) and recognize that
each can make a contribution toward its solution. Rather than being
two separate groups, they are two groups united in a common task.
It is a prerequisite of mutualistic relationships that one sense
oneself and the others as joined together as part of a larger group.
That we are all part of a larger group is inherent in the
concepts of the world community, and humankind. It is this view
of the world which underlies mutualistic international policy. But
to what group do we belong if we are to establish a mutualistic
relationship with nature?
Albert Schweitzer
When the First World War broke ont, Albert Schwoltser felt
himself forced to confront and attempt to explain the decay of
Western civilization. At first he intended to write a crUiqne
of civilization, but his work evolved into a philosophy which he
felt would lead to its restoration. His thoughts were built upon
the fundamental assumption that civilization is based upon ethical
ideals.
y essential element in civilization theethical perfecting of the individual and of society as
weii,^ But at the same time, every spiritual and every
material step m advance has a significance for civi-lization. The will uo civilization is then the uni-
versal will to progress which is conscious of the
ethical as the highest value for all. In spite of thegreat importance we attach to the triumphs of knov.'ledge
and achievement, it is nevertheless obvious that only
a humanity which is striving after ethical ends can in
full measure share in the blessings brought by material
progress and become master of the dangers v/hich
accompany it. To the generation which had adopted
a belief in an immanent power of progress realizing
itself, in some mea.sure, naturally and automatically,
^d which thought that it no longer needed any ethical
ideals but could advance to its goal by means of
knowledge and achievement alone, terrible proof was
being given by its present position of the error
into which it had sunk.^^
Before he could make any headway on his philosophy of civili-
zation, he had to identify the fundamental ethical idea upon which
civilization was based. He worked on the problem for months, but
with no success, until one day in 1915. V/hile traveling to see a
patient, his boat passed through a herd of hippopotami and there
flashed into his mind, the phrase, ’’Reverence for Life.”^^ He
recognized that it is progress toward the full realization of this
60
ideal which marks the genuine progress of civilization.
In Schweitzer
-s view, social progress was initially measured in
terms of the promotion of human solidarity. In antiquity the idea
of a brotherhood of man played cr.ly a small part in the shaping of
human conduct, because the concept of ‘.man- was narrowly defined.
Each group or tribe defined itself as being more human than the
others, which meant that one need not act in the same way to other
groups as one would to members of one's own group. Ethical progress
has consisted of widening the definition of the group with which
one feels a sense of solidarity and, thus, to which one feels a
sense of responsibility and duty. Even today, though, this sense
of one's group tends to stop at racial and national boundaries.
Person-t>person relations, however, do not encompass the v/hole
sphere of ethical concern. In reality, it is a subset of a sphere
which includes the question of right conduct in the entire world,
and toward all life in it. Schweitzer rejected Descartes' formu-
lation of the beginning sentence of thought, " cogito
,
ergo sum,"
which he believed led only to an ever-increasing abstraction from
the fundainental experience of being alive. Instead, he focused
upon the ever-present will-to-live, which he believed we all
experience and share v/ith all other life.
The elemental fact, present in our consciousness
ever^'’ moment of our existences, is: I am life that
wills to live, in the midst of life that wills to
live. The mysterious fact of my will to live is
that I feel a mandate to behave with sympathetic
concern toward all the wills to live which exist
side by side with my own. The essence of Goodness
is: Preserve life, promote life, help life to achieve
6l
The essence of Evil is; Destroyle, harm life, hamper the development of life.
The fundam.ental principle of ethics, then, is
reverence for life. All the goodness one displaystoward a living organism is, at bottom, helping itto preserve arJ further its existence.
The ethic of reverence for life is the product of a long process
of ethical evolution, which has been powered and guided by will-to-
live. At present, our civilization has not reached this stage, but
Schweitzer believed that it inevitably will, in a great
renaissance of the human spirit. The alternative is our destruction
by our own hands. The person-to-person ethic of the present, although
active and profound, is incomplete in that it can contain only a
fragment of the human experience of living, and can deal with only
a portion of the dilemma which confronts us,
Schweitzer found the world to be "a ghastly drama of will-to-live
divided against itself. »T3 gach animal, each life, exists by feeding
and inflicting suffering upon others, without self-conscious recog-
nition of the will-to-live in others. Only in people do we find
this consciousness, and only people are capable of developing
reverence for life. Once we have gained this consciousness of
other wills to live our ethical course is absolute; all life, every
plant and animal, must be preserved, ’whenever we kill or cause
suffering to other lives, even if it is done out of inexcapable
necessity, we incur a burden of guilt. Even the recognition that
we must eat in order to live carnot relieve us of the responsibility
for our acts. Thus, we must zake great care to do as little harm as
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is possible. In order to atone for our guilt we must devote
humanitarian attention to the world's suffering creatures. Only
the act or relieving others of their distress will help to relieve
ourselves of a portion of our buracn.
Since reverence for life extends to all life, it includes
reverence for human life; our own, as well as that of others.
Schweitzer wrote that the ethics of reverence for life,
forbid me to still my conscience with the reflection
that, as the more efficient man, by quite legitimate
means I am advancing myself at the cost of one v;ho
than I, In what the law and public
opinion allow me, they set a problem before me. They
bid me think of others, and make me ponder vrhether I
can allow myself the inward right to pluck all the
fruit that my hand can reach. Thus it may happen that,
in obedience to consideration for the existence of
others, I do what seems to ordinary opinion to be
folly. lU
Albert Schweitzer was a Christian theologian (as well as an
accomplished musicologist, musician, philosopher, and physician)
and his thinking is rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition. He
did not, however, write in the dom.inant Latin theological tradition
symbolized by St. Thomas of Aquinas, who taught that only man of
all the creatures on earth has a soul. Instead, he wrote more in
the tradition of St. Francis of Assisi who taught that all things
on earth are united in spirit. To Schweitzer, all life is united
in the common experience of a universal will-to-live. His is a
mystical philosophy which claims that the fundamental ethicizing
tinjth lies within each of us. He believed that civilization has
deteriorated, because people have become m.esmerized by matter and
have devoted their energies to the understanding and control of the
material world. This effort, however, is of little value to ethical
progress, because ethics strives to create something that is not
axroav.y in this world. Although ine will-to-live is u^iiversal,
the ability to revere life is uniquely human and not yet fully
realized. He asserted that civilization vail advance only after
we place the quest for moral progress ahead of our quest for
material progress.
This philosophy is mutualistic in nature. It requires that
our actions be judged in terms of the degree to v;hich we give aid
to others, rather than by how much v;e gain for ourse?-ves. It also
provides a mutualistic link between humanity and nature, all being
joined by the common phenomenon of will-to-live. Had Garrett Hardin
been guided by this philosophy, he might have recommended a
different solution to the world population problem, although his
perception of the nature of the dilemma might have remained the same
Schweitzer’s ethic, however, has its limitations. His work v;as
done in the early part of this century, long before the fledgling
science of ecology became widely knovm. He wrote from the perspec-
tive of a dedicated physician and humanitarian, who had devoted his
life to saving individual lives; not from the perspective of a
person who was aware of ecological processes or population dynamics,
H33 is not an ecology ethic, but a life ethic. It is concerned viith
the promotion of life on an individual basis; each and every life
is of intrinsic value.
His ecological limitations are demonstrated in tv;o ways. First
he viewed the non-humvji world as one of a savage conflict between
sepaTo.te wills t> ..ive. This seems to reflect the nineteenth
century conception of nature as "red in tooth and claw," in which
all creatures lived by the Law of the Jungle—"kill or be killed."
Since he was not aware of the complex patterns of ecological
relationships which link all living organisms, it was relatively
easy for him to project unknowingly his image of immoral man upon
the entire living world.
Schweitzer’s second limitation is a bit more ambiguous. When
he wrote that the essence of goodness is to promote life, he
failed to define "promote." If he meant by this that we must do
everything possible to increase life, his ethic can lead us into
very serious trouble. Under such an interpretation, his desire
to "help life to achieve its highest destiny" comes dangerously
close to a position that might substitute density for destiny.
Alternatively, what we are to promote may be the quality of each
individual life. This interpretation is less likely to enhance
our population problems.
But how would Schweitzer deal with the dilemma with which
Hardin confronts us?—that by feeding people who are starving we
allow them to reproduce, and thus, increase the misery and degra-
dation of human life. His works fail to provide clear guidance
in dealing with this problem (one of the most profoundly tragic
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elements in our world today). Certainly, he would have hesitated
to condemn the starving to starvation, and would have been less
miserly in his approach, but it is difficult to guess what he would
do in this situation, since it wa- something which he never had to
confront.
A nmber of hmanitarians refuse to grant anyone the right to
take a life through either action or inaction .15 in practice this
refers to our interactions with animals, rather than plants.
Schweitzer, however, wrote that we must act with reverence for all
life, but recognized that it is impossible to live without taking
some life and, thus, assuming some guilt. His philosophy, then,
does not ban killing or causing suffering, instead it mandates
1 esponsibility. It is, thus, conceivable that a policy-maker v;ho
j-ollowed Schweitzer *s ethic could come to the same conclusion as
did Hardin, although the resulting anguish v/ould be overwhelming.
Aldo Leopold
Aide Leopold brought to ethics the ecological understanding
v/hich Albert Schweitzer lacked. He was a forester, ecologist, and
one of the founders of modem game management. Although his background
and ethical language v;ere very different from those of Schweitzer, a
number of their conclusions are similar. Leopold’s thinking,
though, was in terms of ecological units, rather than in terms of
suffering individuals.
In Leopold's view, ethics can be approached from both an
ecological and a philosophical perspective. In both cases, the
concern of ethics is that interdependent groups and individuals
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cooperate with each other. Philosophically, this involves defining
the limits of what is and what is not proper social behavior.
Ecologically, this is defined in terms of what kind of behavior
IS or is not allowable in the st.,-ggle for biological existence.
Until recently the ecological concept was not a practical ethical
concern, because our impact upon our environment was limited
technology and population. Now, however, we have the ability to
radically alter our environment and we must give careful thought
to the problem of what kinds of alterations are allovjable.
The fundamental premise of all ethics, as Leopold saw it, is
that we all are members of a community. Originally, ethics in-
volved only interpersonal relationships, but as the human popu-
lation increased and complex social patterns evolved, ethical
systems became more complex. They had to evolve to provide a
mechanism for integrating individual and social behavior. The
result of this evolution was an expansion of the definition of
the realm of ethical concern from one of simply individuals to
one which included society. V/ith the more recent increase in
population and technology, and our resulting ability to alter
greatly the ecological pattern of the earth, we are faced with the
need to expand further the realm of ethical concern. No longer
is it sufficient to confine ethics to questions of proper social
conduct. We must also deal with the question of what is proper
human conduct with respect to land. However, the ethics which
would legitimately include such a question has yet to evolve.
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The new
-land ethic" will rest on the same premise that we are members
of a community. What Leopold proposed, though, is that we change
our definition of community, enlarging the concept "to include
soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively; the land."^^
Ihis does not mean that we must cease viewing the land as a
resource. To do so would be impossible, since it provides the food
and materials v/hich support our lives, ^ihat it does imply is that
we must value the land not only as a resource, but as something
of intrinsic value; something which can be valued on its o\^m merits,
rather than in terms of some other value, such as economic V7orth,
"In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo saoiens from
conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it.
It implies respect for his fellovi-members, and also, respect for
the community as such. "^7
In human communities we accept the existence of communal obli-
gations v/hich extend beyond simple self-interest. For example,
taxpayers are expected to pay for schools, road, and other public
services, regardless of whether the individual taxpayer will use
them all. The criterion is that of the public good, not just the
self-intei 3st of the individual. If our concept of community
expands to include the biotic community, then the definition of
the public good must also expand. It must include the welfare
of the land, our fellow-member of the community. Under the land
ethic, the co’onterpart of social cooperation is conservation.
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But consei'vation means different things to different people.
Leopold pointed out that there was a major division between the
conservationists who regard the land as something of extrinsic
va]--. ^valued as a means to some other end, soch as wealth), an^
those who regard it as being of intrinsic value (valued as an end
in itself). He called this split, the A-B cleavage in conversation.
The A-B cleavage is of more than academic interest, because the
tension between the tv;o views underlies the history of American
conservation, and helps to explain a great deal of the controversy
associated v/ith contemporary environmental issues.
If land is viewed as being of extrinsic value, as a means,
to some other end, whatever 1 do to the land can be justified
only in terms of that other end. If, for example, I consider land
to be of value only as a means to gain economic wealth, I can
justify conserving it only if in so doing I increase my wealth
(or, at least, do not suffer a loss). If land is viewed as being
of intrinsic value there is no need to justify conserving it,
because the act of conservation conser\’'es that value. If I v;ish
to alter the land, the burden falls upon me to demonstrate that
whatever I do will not threaten that value.
The conservationists of Group A, vrho see land as being of
extrinsic value, are the ones who have held the greatest influence
and power in the conser'/ation agencies of our government, Gifford
Pinchot, for example, was one of the strongest forces for conser-
vation in the United States during the first decades of the twentieth
century. In his capacity as the country's Chief Forester, and with
the strong support of Theodore Roosevelt he publicised the need to
conserve o'lr natural resources in the face of massive, destnicti-e
exploitation by private monopolies. His policies played an
important part in changing the pattern of national resource usage
from one of rapacious consumption to one of management for sustained
use. The idea that conservation consists of managing resources in
order to satisfy continuing national economic need, was central to
Pinchot’s philosophy.
Conservation stands for the same kind of practical
common—sense management of this country by the
people that every business man stands for in the
handling of his ovm business. It believes in
prudence and foresight instead of reckless blind-
nessj it holds that resources now public property
should not become the basis for oppressive private
monopoD.yj and it demands the complete and orderly
development of all our resources for the benefit
oP all the people instead of the partial exploi-
tation of them for the benefit of a few.
. . .
Conservation has much to do with ^he welfare of
the average man of today. It proposes to secure
a continuous and abundant supply of the
necessaries of life, which means a reasonable
cost of living and business stability. It
advocates fairness in the distribution of the
benefits which flow from the natural resources.^®
From this perspective people have ethical responsibilities
toward each other, but not toward the land itself. Land is an
instrumental value, a means to an economic end. The ethical goal
is that of insuring uhe democratic distribution of the wealth of
resources to all of the nation's citizens, both now and in the
future. Pinchot asserted:
duty, and that
protectthemselves against the uncontrolled monoooly of the
natural resources which yield the necessities of lifeWe are beginning to realise that the Conservation
question IS a question of right and wrong, as any ques-tion ira r.t be vjhich may involve the differencer beUv^enprosperity and poverty, health and sickness, ignorance
and education, well-being and misery, to hundreds of
thousands of families. Seen from the point of view ofhum^ welfare and human progress, questions which
begin as purely economic often end as moral issues.
Oonservation is a moral issue because if involves
the rights and the duties of our people— their
rights to prosperity and happiness, and their duties
to themselves, to their descendants, and to the
whole future progress and welfare of this Nation. 19
Pinchot was not without his opponents, perhaps the most vocal
of which was John Muir, Muir and Pinchot met in the Summer of I896
when they began touring the Western forest as members of the
Forestry Commission of the National Academy of Science, They
became close friends and discovered that they both shared a common
love of the forest. Over the course of the following year, though,
Muir realized that they differed in their understanding of what v.^as
the role of conservation, Pinchot' s emphasized economic use, and
Muir's, preservation
.
This realization crystallized during the
debate over the purposes of the forest reserves v/hich were being
created at that time. Although he continued to support the
establishment of reserves, Muir fought a losing battle to win the
country to his preservationist views.
Muir felt the wilderness to be of tremendous spiritual and
aesthetic significance, which should be treated with reverence, awe
and humility. In his view, morality lay in preserving the things
which are wild, and preventing their desecration, Trr.s did not
mean that the forest resources could not be used, but he refused
to allow their quality of wildness to be destroyed in the process.
Thus, he became symbolic of Group B, those v/ho viev/ed land as some-
thing of intrinsic value.
Aldo Leopold realized that as a result of the prevailing
economic definition of the good, it is very difficult to justify
the preservation of anything that is not of immediate economic
value. In order to preserve things of dubious economic v/orth
we must invent methods of economic justification. An important
argument used to justify the preservation of song birds, for
example, was based upon their role in keeping dovm the population
of insects pests. Sometimes these arguments may become tenuous as
the economic importance of the birds, or plants, or insects are
blown out of proportion, because Group B is trj^ing to fabricate
a justification for preservation which is congruent with the values
of Group A. What Group B really values, though, is the integrity
of the biotic community, hut it is nearly impossible to argue for
its preservation without getting into what would sound to Group
A as idealistic abstractions. As a result, many organisms are
lost, or defined as not worthy of consideration.
Similarly, it is difficult to justify the preservation of
specific biotic communities. Those which are not of obvious
economic worth (such as bogs, swamps, and dune areas) are not
considered worth presei-ving. Some of these are preserved by
searching for less immediately recognizable economic
value, as
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was done when wetland preservation was argued on the basis of their
importance in providing water supply and flood control. In order
to conserve others, we define them as parks, arguing that they have
soi.ie vaguely defined cultural val.e. Their integrity, though, is
continuously in danger unless they are further justified in terms
of tourism, watershed, and timber crop values.
The value of parks in preserving important biotic communities,
though, is limited, because they are of greatest value in preserving
large tracts of land. But most of the areas that are still worth
maintaining in their unaltered state are mixed in with economically
valuable land and cannot be easily preserved. If private land
owners regarded the land as being of intrinsic value they v;ould be
proud to act as trustees of these unique and beautiful spots. In
general, though, they do not and the job of insuring their their
preservation must be done by the government, if it is done at all.
In the long term, Leopold vrrote, this may not be the kind of control
over our land which we would v/ant the government to exercise, but
the task has been forced upon it by the private citizen's failure
to practice conservation on a volunteer basis.
Roderick Nash has pointed out that, "For all his love of the
woods, Pinchot’s ultimate loyalty v/as to civilization and forestry;
Muir's to wilderness and preservation."^^ This seems to have been
generally true of Group A and Group B, respectively, Paul Santraire
has argued that this split between nature-oriented and civilization-
oriented people became obsessive in the nineteenth century and has
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led to the present “cult of the simple rustic life," and "cult of
compulsive manipulation. "^2 recent years, hovjever, we have come
to recognize that the natural resources upon v/hich we depend are
enmeshed in a complex system of tv,ological and geological process.
We are beginning to realize that in order to make use of our
resources we must be sure to sustain the systems of vxhich they are
a part. This perception may lead to a synthesisj our economic
well being is dependent upon the well being of the larger system.
It is vital, then, that we change the basic concept of v/hat
should be conserved; individual resources, or the larger system.
Also, v;e must do av/ay vfith economic self-interest as the sole, or
even primary criterion for conservation, and substitute a land
ethic. This involves developing a new public concept of what is
the land, and vjhat should be our relationship with it. Leopold
suggested that the master image v/hich should be employed in con-
servation education is that of the biotic pycamid. He argued that
this image can be more dynamic and personally meaningful than that of
the "balance of nature." The image of the biotic pyramid portrays
land not just as soil, but as a layered grouping of organisms.
At the bottom is the soil, then the producer organisms (plants),
then the animals in their ranks of primary and secondary consumers.
Linking all of these layers is a "fountain of energy" flowing along
the intricate paths of the food web. At the top of the heap sits
man, receiving life-support from the multitude of organisms in the
lower layers. The nature of the flow of energy between these layers
is dependent upon the structure of the biotic community. When a
change is made in one part of the energy oircuxt,
^ ^ J- '
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also affected as they adjust to the change. Any change that v,e ma'.e
in the biotic pyraiaid affects us. We must, then, treat the land with
great respect and with as little violence as is possible.
The concept of the biotic pyramid provides a rat j oral fovr.dpfion
for a form of conservation which is not based upon economic arguments.
It links the general human welfare with that of the entire biotic
community. Each affects the other. The role of conservation
becomes that of promoting the general health and welfare of the
enlarged community of both man and land. Leopold defines health
of the land as "the capacity of land for self-renewal . "23 with
this concept of biotic health in mind, Leopold offers the following
definition of right action with respect to the land: "A thing is
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty
of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.
Leopold once wrote, "One of the penalties of an ecological
education is that one lives alone in a world of wounds, In
the face of such a world, he believed that ecologists had the choice
of either hardening themselves, or becoming healers. He chose to
be a healer. In his role as a forester and a founder of profes-
sional game management, he tried to bridge the worlds of the
exploiters, and of those who rejected civilization in favor of
wilderness. Central to his work was the notion that when one is
managing a forest, or wildlife, one is dealing with a community of
organisms, not with just a single species. Beginning vdth a solid
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foundation in ecology, he attempted to unite the ethical and aesthetic
perception of John Muir with Gifford Pinchofs desire to use natural
resources to meet humc.n needs. 26
Aldo Leopolc wrote his essay,
-The Land Ethic," shortly het.re
death in 19l;8.27 since it v;as written over tv;enty years before
the development of a widespread recognition of environmental
deterioration it reflects great vision, but lacks the breadth of
perspective which we might wish for today. Its perspective is
limited, also, by the focus of Leopold’s interests. Nevertheless,
the depth of his insight and the sensitivity of his witing have
made this one of today's most widely-read essays on environmental
ethics.
The key concept in his ethic is that of expanding our sense of
community to include the land. It is important to determine just
v;hat he means by this, and vj’hether it is possible to do. Are the
two concepts of community (biotic and human) compatible and, if
so, can they be joined in practice? At times he seems to use his
concept of land and the concept of biotic community as if they are
synonymous. They are not, but he does not make the distinction
clear. Odum defines "biotic community" as follows;
A biotic community is any assemblage of populations in a
prescribed area or physical habitat; it is an organized
unit to the extent that it has characteristics addi-
tional to its individual and population components
. . .
and functions as a unit through coupled metabolic
transformations . 28
A biotic community, then, includes only populations of living
organisms.
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But Leopold defines "lend” as "soil, vaters, plants, and aniir.als."
Since this includes non-living components, it is a different concept.
It IS clear that he intends to deal with an ecological concept,
and the ecologic .1 unit which sce„.s to come closest tc ris d»fi,dtJon
of land is "ecosystem,'*
Any unit that includes all of the organisms (i.e., the
"community") in a given area interacting with the
physical envirorunent so that a flow of energy leads
to clearly defined trophic sti'ucture, biotic*
diversity, and material cycles (i.e., exchange of
materials between living and nonliving parts) within
the system is an ecological system or ecosystem
.
Since he wrote that our sense of community should be extended to
include the land, I must assume that he meant that it be extended to
include the ecosystem.
What does it mean to extend our concept of community to include
the ecosystem? trom a sociological perspective, "community" has been
defined as:
A community is an inclusive group with two chief
characteristics: (l) within it the individual
can have mosx, of the experiences and conduct most
of the activities that are important to him; (2)
it is bound together by a shared sense of be-
longing and by the feeling among its members that
the group defines for them their distinctive
identity. 30
Im.plicit in the sociological definition is the assumption that the
group is composed solely of hiunan beings. Before Leopold's concept
can be developed, the group must be redefined in terms of hiiman beings
and their ecosystem. This expanded definition of group would not
alter the first sociological characteristic; the events which are
important in the Hfe of the individual would, indeed, take place in
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this setting.
The second characteristic, that of a shared sense of identity
with the gro-up, presents more of a problem. People can share a
sense of identity among themselvc^ and vdth their environment, b’’t
the non-h\iman components of their ecosystem are unconscious (in the
normal sense of the term) and mute. On the other hand, although
they cannot consciously experience a sense of identity vn.th the
human components of the group, this does not mean that they do not
participate in the creation of the identity of the larger community.
Humanity and its environment comprise a unit within which each
influences the development of the other in a complex feedback
relationship. As a result of this process, the distinctive identity
of both is defined.
The new concept of community, then, would alter the sociological
definition in tv/o ways. First, the groups v/ould be redefined to
include the ecosystem. Second, the latter characteristic of
community v;ould be redefined to include both the shared feeling of
identity by the human members, and the shared participation of all
members in creating the distinctive communal identity.
But there are many ecosystems, V/hat is the particular ecosystem
that Leopold v;ished to include in his expanded definition? Tradi-
tionally, human communities are located v/ithin specific geographical
areas. It seems reasonable to assume that the community would
embrace the ecosystem of its particular area. High technology
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conmmities, though, present a problem. Their human members, trade
routes, communications systems, and pollutants circle the globe.
They are no longer confined within narrow geographical bounds.
Under these circ unstances the ecosystem of the communit: is the.
entire ecosphere.
The pragmatic problem of feeling a communal bond with the
ecosphere seems akin to that of feeling a communal bond with all
of humankind. The unit with which we are dealing is so large that
io is an abstraction, something intangible and outside of personal
experience. Pnotographs of the earth taken from space have
provided an important graphic representation of our community, but
this is not enough. Perhaps our larger community will always
remain an abstraction. Perhaps we should devote particular attention
to our local cornmiinity; the plants and animals, ponds and streams,
rocks and weather, people and institutions, which have an immediate
impact upon our senses and lives. On a personal, psychological
level, the values and attitudes which develop through this local
interaction may become generalised on a larger scale.
On a larger social level, v;e must alter our legal, political,
and economic institutions in such a v/ay as to grant intrinsic
value to our ecosystem. A simple change in our individual environ-
mental consciousness is not sufficient to solve our problems,
because our institutions exert a great deal of control over our
lives. In an article which originally appeared in the Southern
California Law Review, Christopher Stone argued that natural objects
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should be granted legal rights, including the right to sue for
damages in court. This appears to be a way of introducing Leopold's
Ideas into our legal system. Stone suggested that since natural
objects are not capable of speaking in their behalf, they should
be treated as the court would treat any other legal incompetent.
People should be able to apply to the court for the creation of a
guardianship of the species, ecosystem, river basin, or other
natural object in question. The appointed guardian would then be
allowed to argue his ward's case in court, or sue on its behalf.
The whole idea of granting legal rights to non-humans may
sound absurd to many people. The process, though, is very similar
to that which occurred as women and racial minorities, who previously
were not granted any legal right, were granted rights before the
law. It was only in I87U that a substantial movement began to
grant rights to children, v;ho had previously been considered the
property of their parents. 31 This finally led to the creation of
laws which made cruelty to children a crime. Inanimate objects,
such as ships and corporations, have also been given standing in
court.
The fact is, that each time there is a movement to
confer rights onto some new "entity," the proposal
is bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable.
This is partly because until a rightless thing
receives its rights, v;e cannot see it as anything
but a thing for the use of "us"—those v.'ho are
holding rights at the time. . . . Such is the way
the slave South looked upon the Blacks. There is
something of a seamless web involved: there vri.ll be
resistance to giving the thing "rights" until it
can be seen and valued for itself; yet, it is hard
to see it and value it for itself until we can brine
ourselves to give it "rights'*— which is almostinevitably going to sound inconceivable to a lareegroup of peor)le.32 ^
The importance of granting rights to natural objects lies in the
fact that at present a person can sue for damages only if that
individual can demonstrate a personal loss. This means that one
can sue a company that is polluting a river only if one can demon-
strate that one has suffered a loss (generally an economic loss) as
a result of the pollution. The effect of the pollutants upon the
health of the river ecosystem cannot, in itself, provide a basis
for suit. Once natural objects receive rights, however, a person
could petition the court for guardianship of the river, or
drainage basin, and then file suit in the name of the riverine
ecosystem. It would then be left to the court to resolve the
conflicts between the rights of the polluter and the river.
The act of granting rights to natural objects does not require
that they be given the same rights as human beings. Stone argues
that an object has received rights when three criteria have been
met: "first, that the thing can institute legal actions ^ its
behest; second that in determining the granting of legal relief,
tlie court must take injur;/ to it into account; and, third, that
relief must run to the benefit of it. "33 What he is essentially
saying is that a thing receives rights when it is granted intrinsic
value,
Although Stone is addressing legal issues, and Leopold was
concerned v;ith forestry and game management, both seem to be arguing
the same general point; when we make decisions which involve our
environment, we should be concerned about its interests as well as
about our own. Neither is arguing that we should live in subju-
gaoion to nature and do nothing t'.at would alter our environment.
Our environment is a dynamic system, which has undergone a great
deal of change in the past, and will continue to do so. Instead,
they are pointing to a new, mutualistic, decision making process.
Whereas Schweitzer's philosophy dealt solely with the
individual life, Leopold's is grounded in the concept of the eco-
system within which the individual is embedded. Although most
of his essays display a great deal of sensitive av/areness of
individual lives, his land ethic does not address the issue of
individual significance at all. The two men sj’Tnbolize the two
sides of the perennial conflict between the welfare of the
individual and the welfare of the group; the love of individual
lives in particular, and of life in general. Each person, each
society is caught in this tension, which it must resolve in its
own characteristic manner.
The two men also differ in their conception of the bond that
exists between people and other lives. P'or Schweitzer this bond
is spiritual and is expressed through reverence. In Leopold's
view we are all joined in a great pattern of ecological
processes, the integrity of which must be loved and respected. The
emotional expressions of their philosophies, however, are very
similar.
appreciate Garrett Hardin's
I suspect that Aide Leopold would
lifeboat ethic much more readily than would Albert Schweitzer.
Leopold was a biologist and understood population dynamics. Hardin-
J.a’^.2uage and mode of thought woulH, for the most part, have been
familiar to him. However, he was working witn the issues of an
earlier period in our history, and did not address the issues of
population and world hunger. I will speculate, though, that if he
were to address the issue, he would have approached it as one of
world ecosystem dynamics. He placed great value upon the beauty
and diversity of ecosystems and, I suspect, would have turned a
cold eye upon the role of the United States in reducing the biotic,
cultural, and economic diversity of the world. He is likely, also,
to have written more harshly of our excessive consumption of the
world's resources.
The substance of Hardin's point, though, is that population
cannot increase indefinitely, and whatever v/e do to permit further
increase will only enlarge the magnitude of the inevitable crash.
I am sure that neither Schweitzer, nor Leopold would disagree with
this point. They v;ould, however, be less willing to quickly agree
to his proposed solution. Unlike the Domination orientation.
Mutuality forces one to first attempt a solution which meets the
needs of all parties involved. Once these avenues have been
exhausted, however', rautualistic decision makers might find them-
selves forced to accept Hardin's conclusions as a last resort.
Mutuality does not preclude decisions such as those proposed by
Hardin, but it does make one resistant to quickly accepting them.
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If they had to be implemented, it would be dor-e in a manner which
would promote the greatest welfare of the global community. Hardin’s
statements, on the other hand, tend to be nationalistic-failing to
intrinsic value 1o the peer of the world.
Rene Dubos
It has been strongly argued that people shape their environment,
but in what ways does their environment shape people? This kind of
question has been of particular importance to Rene Dubos. In his
attempt to arrive at an answer he has articulated a far more subtle
and complex view of the ways in which people and cultures interact
with their environmeno than did either Schweitzer or Leopold.
Habos recognizes that as our environment changes, we are able
to adapt to it. But in this process of adaptation, he fears that
we will lose the qualities that he feels make life meaningful and
worth living.
Man can learn to tolerate treeless avenues, starless
skies, tasteless food, a monotonous succession of
holidays which have bcccme spiritless and meaning-
less because they are no longer holy days, a life
without the fragrance of flowers, the song of biros,
the joyous intoxication of spring, or tne melanchoI.y
of autiziin. Loss of the amenities of life may have
no obvious detriraental effect on nan’s physical
>:ell-being or on his ability to perforn effectively
as part of the economic ci- to^isnsiogica} machine. 35
But the quality of our lives is measured in more than simple physical
well-being. He fears that our great adaptability v.l]l lead to an
adjustment to iinproverished, regimented environments which are devoid
of the traditionally human values of our past. "Tnere will be no
place for sensitive literature, intensely personal aj t, or unorthodox
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science In the hiunan ant hill of the future; not even room for
primitive Christianity. What meaning can the parables and poetry
of the past retain if there are no lilies in the field? We must
hope that there ,111 still be rebels to champion freedor..v36
In a sense Dubos is calling for a new concept of ecology which
integrates the traditional biological conception of the term with
an understanding of the dynamics of human culture and the need
to maintain continuity with the best features of our past. The
Idea of continuity is very important to him. He does not argue
that either our ecosystem, or our society should remain unchanged.
Both are dynamic systems which are in a continual state of change.
What he does argue is that the change must be harmonious, without
major ecological, social, or psychological dislocations.
In Dubos* view, the predominant orientation of scientific
technology is magical; it focuses upon the application of power
to specific problems, without reference to the larger structure
of human needs and aspirations. In his fine book, A M Within,
he argues that science should become more theological in nature
and emphasize the underlying processes which integrate h\ur.ar.ity
with the larger world. He does so with the conviction that our
environmental problems are the product of a piecemeal, magical
exercise of our powers. The alternative that he proposes is
that we exercise our power with the full realization of our place
and role in the ecosphere.
86
without a respect for the spirit of the place can result in unan-
ticipated, perhaps disastrous, impacts upon ourselves. In this
sense, we reflect the environments which we create for ourselves.
At the moment,, vie do not know how to make a recognition of the
spirit of place a part of our technological process, but v;e must
learn quickly.
Respect for the spirit of place cannot result in a passive
relationship with our environment. All organisms alter their
environment, people included. Dubos rejects Lynn V/hite, Jr.'s,
suggestion that St. Francis become the patron saint of ecologists,
because Francis provides too strong a model of a passive accep-
tance of one's fate. Instead, he suggests St, Benedict for the
role. The Benedictine monastic rules empnasized that the monks had
to work with their hands and that the monastaries had to be
self-sufficient. This led to the evolution of a practical system
of land management and development, Ths most infiuencial of the monks
following Benedict's rules were of the Cistercian Order. They
generally built their monasteries in lowlands, which they had to
drain and transform into fertile land, Kcw, hundreds o± years
later, these lands are still fertile and productive. Dubos recog-
nizes that Francis is an important siTnbol of mystical rapport
with nature, but argues that he cannot provide a model
upon which
to base culture. Benedict can, however, because his
emphasis upon
self-sufficiency makes it imperative that ecological
concepts be
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adopted in order to allow the land to replenish itself continually.
Dubos argues that we should not be afraid of altering and
humanizing the earth, 38 There are, however, constraints within
wh^cb we must work if we are to '^^uoceed at creative intervention.
The first is that inherent in the concept of spirit of place.
When we alter the biophysical parameters of our environment, we
also alter the cultural parameters. VJe must determine the limit
to vrhich we want to alter both. The second constraint is that
which comes with the recognition that there is a limit to how
much a place can be modified and still maintain ecological
stability, Dubos recognizes that each location has an ecolo-
gically limited number of possible "vocations;" alternative biotic
communities which might be valued by man. Some, such as arctic
areas, are severely limited in what can be done with them. Others
can be adapted to a number of possibilities. For example, different
areas in the Northern hemisphere which had similar primeval forests
have been converted to agricultural land—each with its ovm
unique agricultural style and crop specialty. On the otlier hand,
some areas, such as the Mediterranean region, have not responded
favorably to the agricultural practices that have been employed.
This is not to say that the whole world must fall under che
plow, or some other form of intensive human use. Some areas, such
as the arctic tundra, may never be adaptable to a different
vocation, and other areas which might have other vocational
potentials may be left in a wilderness state for moral, aesthetic,
and biological reasons. In practice, though, it is impossible to
achieve complete preservation, because of the pressures of human
needs and the ubiquitous nature pollutants. Given that there
are environmental problems which touch all ecosystems, our problem
is that of determining how to improve them all. Variety, however,
must be maintained for reasons of ecological stability, cultural
diversity, and personal taste.
Different people find value in different landscapes. Some
find beauty in topographic and climatic peculiarities that provide
a magical splendor and magnitude (e.g., the arctic. Grand Canyon,
and Painted Desert). Others find beauty in a close, intimate
relationship betv;een themselves and nature. In both cases, there
is a sense of fitness between the people and their environment.
Host, however, find that the greatest fitness lies in the
intimate relationship. Dubos points out that, "The ecological
crisis will continue to increase in severity if we do not develop
positive values integrating human nature and external nature. "39
This involves integrating the needs of our ecosystem with those of
our psychological and physiological being.
D'abes’ philosophy is anthropocentric in nature, but of a kind
much broader than the anthropocentrism characteristic of our day.
"An enlightened anthropocentrism acknowledges that, in the long
run, the world's good alv/ays coincides with man's ov;n most meani
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good. Man can manipxilate nature to his best interests only if he
first loves her for her own sake."^^0 it is a mutualistic philosophy.
Leopold called for an expansion of our concept of community to
include the ecosystem within which it is set. He was motivated by the
recognition that this is vital to the continuing stability of our
ecosystem and, thus, to the continuing availability of natural
resources for human use. IMbos’ concept of the spirit of place,
though, goes still deeper. He recognizes that the human environment
interaction is a lundajmentai element in the development of human
communities and culture. He suggests that the quality of this
?-nteraction has much to do with the development of the human condition.
Neither seems to argue that we must create a wholly ne\j
relationship between people and their land. Rather, they argue
that v/e must recognize the bond that is already there. Dubos adds
that v;e already share a vague recognition of this bond, which is
expressed in the idea that a place has its own spirit, or genius.
Ho asks that vje become more consciously av;are of this spirit, and
that v;e examine and respect its dynamics.
At one point, though, Dubos is critical of Leopold. He points
cut thiat, '’Conservati(.-ri, according to Leopold, teaches what a land
can be, v/hat it should be, v/hat it ought to be. Although this
aphorism has much appeal, it is misleading because it implies a
questionable philosophy of ecological determinism and of man’s
relation to nature. These words echo David Hume’s comment in
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his A ^^atise on Human Nature (1738) that statements about v;hat is
or ^ not often lead into statements of what ought or ought not. The
assumption here is that an analysis of wha-. will reveal v;hat
ought to be. Hume argued that one cannot leap directly from an is
to an ought
. Schweitzer was making a similar statement when he
argued that the decline of civilization is associated with the
attempt of the V/est to find moral guidance in the external physical
world
.
One cannot discover fundamental ethical principles solely
by studying the world external to ourselves. Ethics involves conscious
choices between conflicting values. The non-human world is what
it is, and what happens there happens because it is in the nature
of things so to do. The closest thing to valuing that appears in
the biotic v/orld is natural selection, and that does not occur
by choice in the ethical sense, but by circumstance. Ethics is
characteristic of that subset of nature called Homo sapiens .
Just as transistor radios, automobiles, and books are human
creations which are nev; to the vjorld, so too are ethical systems.
This is important to recognize, because iu is very easy to project
unconsciously an existing ethic upon the world and then ''discovei-"
that ethic through the lens of our ethos. The effect is that v/e un-
vdttingly discover only ourselves, and use that discovery to
reinforce our ethos. The result is a distorted viev7 of the
world and a mistaken belief in the source of our ethic. It is
a comforting mistake, though, because it relieves us of the
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responsibility for our ethic. But, the ethic we discover is actually
a reflection of our own unexamined desires and beliefs.
It is not very surprising that the social Darwinists
dxscc-.ered that they were members uf the most highly evolved
Their notion of survival of the fittest also gave sanction to
the policies of empirialism and the business practices of robber-
baron industrialists, Peter Kropotkin objected to this view
of evolution, arguing instead that mutual aid and assistance
was also present in nature, and that the history of humanity has
been one of an expansion of mutual aid, which will eventually
bond all of the people of the earth. ^2 ^he ethic which he based
upon this viev; of evolution was particularly congruent with his
political commitment to anarchist-communism.
In addition to the problem of unconsciously creating the
world in one's own image, the attempt to derive an ethic from
an understanding of ecological or evolutionary processes tends
to lead to a very conservative ethic, which supports the status
quo and projects today's trend as tomorrow's destiny. This is
quite understandable, since the ethic is based upon an analysis
of what exists at present. The following quotation provides a
fine contemporary example of this approach.
At present a system of power and social control seems
to have emerged in which anonymous bands of specialists
detemine the priority of questions of social policy
and the best means of implementing policy. It is
easy to understand the feeling of alienation on the
part of humanists and the radical left. Nevertheless,
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the new industrial state, like the old agricultural
state, has functional and adaptive value for the
reason that it makes possible the solution of
problems that involve man's relation to his total
environment, problems that can be solved in no
other way. The nostalgic appeal of participatory
democr acy is regressive in the curx'ent redefinition
of the locus of power and responsibility. If the
great problems that concern the Quality of human
existence are ever to be dealt with, it will be
through Galbraith's technostructure rather than
by the contemporary Thoreau's who reject any
system that curtails individualistic freedoms.
In the Cenozoic, the thing to be v;as a mammal
rather than a reptile. Today, freedom and
responsibility are realized through the emergent
organization, or not at all. New opportunities
for creativity and responsibility exact a heavy
toll in moral suffering and frustration. And
this is the sum and total of the consolation
offered by the evolutionist in the face of the
problem of evil. ^3
Such an approach to the problems of our day has the ring of a
failure of imagination, and of nerve. Unknowingly, the author
is saying, "Dominators we have been, and dominators we shall always
be." He represents humanity as being completely powerless, in a
deterministic world which is without options. V.'e must go vdiere we
are taken,
A nujnber of other authors, though, have tried to employ ecology
and evolution in their search of guiding principles which will be
of help to us in selecting from the behavioral and policy options that
are available to us. Such principles tend to be very broad and vague;
telling us, for example, that we must act to maintain maximum
diversity within the limits of stability. These principles are
often called evolutionary, ecological, or environmental ethics.
I do not, however, consider them to be ethical statements. Rather
than being ethical statements of what ought to be, they are
descriptions of the implications oi biological processes. Tips
knowledge, hovrever, is important.
Once v;e develop an ethic and consciously take responsibility
for it, we must determine what conditions the world imposes
upon our efforts to act upon it. Once I decide to move,
rather than sit still, I must negotiate the terrain. Once I
decide that I v;ish to live, rather than die, I must meet
the biological conditions of life. And once I have decided that
I wish to live a life of a certain kind and quality, I must
determine v/hat I must do in order to realize that ideal. An
ethic helps us to select which of our enormous variety of
potentials we ought to try to actualize, A scientific analysis
of ecological and evolutionary processes can help us to determine
what we can and carnot do in order to realize our goal. It may
even demonstrate that our goal cannot be achieved, given the
realities of our world. A major element leading to our environ-
mental crisis seems to be the fact that cur tacit cultural goals
are unrealistic within the constraints defined by our ecosystem.
The task of environmental analysis is to lay dcvm the framevzork
within which v/e can reformulate our goals before either our
cultural or biophysical systems alter disastrously. It cannot,
hov/ever, select our goals for us; it can only offer alternatives.
9h
In the past and in the present, our goals have been selected in
accordance with a tacit value orientation which has been predominantly
one of Domination. I contend that we should strive to reshape our
value orientation to emphasize Mutuality. Schweitzer, Leopold, and
Dubos have provided glimpses of what kind of a relationship with our
environment may emerge through such an orientation. Schweitzer
would enlarge our definition of the group to v;hich we belong, to
include cxll lives, Leopold enlarged the boundaries of our community
to include our ecosystem. Dubos, although not vjriting in specifi-
cally ethical terms, enlarges the concept of human welfare to
include the welfare of the earth. The important effect of these ex-
pansions is that land, life, and the earth are granted intrinsic
value. Mo longer, if one accepts these approaches, is it neces-
sary to justify their preservation solely in terms of human, self-
centered values, such as economic profit and loss. The question
is changed from, ”can we justify preserving them,*' to, "can \-ie jus-
tify endangering them?"
In order to deal with our environment as something vjhich is
valued as an end in itself, we must overcome our self-centeredness and
develop a strong, positive emotional response to it. Dubos has
pointed out that we "cannot effectively manipulate nature without
loving riature for her ovm sake." Leopold vrrote that, "It is incon-
ceivable to me that an ethical relation to the land can exist
v/ithout love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard
for its value. Years earlier, Albert Schweitzer anticipated
these views when he made his humanitarian call for reverence for
life.
These affective values rest at the foundation of the subjective,
personal experience of nature which is truly mutualistic. Thi"!
new, outreaching response to life must motivate the manner in
v/hich we undertake ecological research and employ our technology.
It must inform a new vision of what our goals ought to be.
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CHAPTER III
FOUR APPROACHES TO SOCIAL MUTUALISM
A rock rests in my hand as I write these words. It has an
ancient history, and reflects the long gone life, of which it is now
a mere ghost. This piece of petrified wood embodies the structure
of a tree so well that, with a magnifying glass, I can see the shape
of cells despite the fact that nothing remains of its living
substance. Minerals filled its pores and, atom by atom, molecule
by molecule, the wood itself v;as replaced by silicon and oxygen.
Here, halfv/ay between its center and bark, is a knot; the remains
of a branch that died in the tree's youth and was surrounded and
engulfed by living, growing tissues. Kovj, thousands of years
later, its life and all of the remnants of its organic substance
are gone. But the record remains in stone, in colors of rich
browns and tan, and in concentric bands that tell of each year of
its grov/th through dry seasons and wet.
I love this stone; its color, texture, patterns, and history.
I have held it, fondled it, and contemplated it for ho\irs—turning
it into poetry, paintings, and sculpture. But this love is not
the same as that which I feel for a friend or lover. This rock
cannot protest my probing, nor can it complain at being left
unnoticed and forgotten in a box. It does not place demands upon
my ]ife, or appreciate my joys and sorrows. It is incapable of
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sharing the experience of waking to a room filled v;ith the gold of
an early sun, and the warmth of skin against skin.
Rocks and people are not identical j there are obvious and
profound differe. \ces between the uwo, I can empathize fjid
communicate with another person far more easily than I can v/ith
other animals, and more readily with animals than with plants
and inanimate objects, I am able to share pleasure and pain,
hope and despair, friendship, suspicion, and fear, with other
people. But what can I share with a rock, tree, mountain, or
drainage basin?
I must draw a distinction between social mutualism and
environmental mutualism. Both are based upon the value orien-
tation of Mutuality, but the former involves our attempt to
understand and interact with other people, while the latter
applies to our attempt to understand and interact with our non-
human environment. In many ways this distinction is an arbi-
trary one, because the two areas overlap; for example, when
v/e compete v;ith other people for the use of limited resources.
The distinction is based primarily upon the presence or absence
of the potential for conscious reciprocal communication. In
some people this potential is quite limited, as in the severely
retarded. In others it is absent, as in chronically catatonic or
camatose patients. On the other hand, some animals demonstrate a
rel'^tively high potential for conscious communication with us;
chimpanzees, for example, and perhaps dolphins. Although the
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distinction is somewhat arbitrary, it is useful, because the demar-
cation between human and non-human generally distinguishes between
those who can and that which cannot engage in this quality of
commuiiication.
People are generally quick to react to the manner in which we
treat them. They tell us whether or not they appreciate our
actions, often in ways vjhich are not very subtle. Since we
receive rapid responses in forms which we readily understand, we
interact with people in a reciprocal manner; each notices the
responses of others, and adjusts his actions accordingly. The
idea of mutuality appears most often in discussions p.bout
interpersonal relationships, because they are so obviously reciprocal
in nature.
The literature of social Mutuality is very large, that of
environrriental Mutuality is extraordinarily small. Perhaps we can
learn more about the nature of Mutuality by examining its application
to social interaction. What we learn of this kind of Mutuality may
be of some use in our attempt to understand the nature of environ-
mental Mutuality.
V/e do not live in a simple social world; one of clearly
defined issues and universal agreement. Rather, we live in a v/orld
of complexity and ambiguity. It is difficult for individuals,
much less groups of people, to arrive at mutual agreement about
the nature of a problem, its relevant elements, and the actions
which v;ill lead to its resolution. Yet, it is often very important
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bhat p^oplG coiTiG "bo a coimnon rGsolubion of bhsir problornDj and many
of our activibies require cooperabion, which requires some sorb or
consensus aboub objectives and mebhodology. We are social beings
and agreernenb is one of bhe elemenbs which binds our socieby.
We can, and do, respond bo bhe social problems which confronb
us from bhe perspecbive of each of bhe bhree value orienbabions.
VJe can be submissive, acb powerless, and hope bhab everybhing will
bake care of ibself. We can each formulabe our solubions and
sbrive bo impose bhem upon obhers bhrough dominabion. And we can
work bogebher bo reach a mubually valued resolubion. The roubualis-
bic approach is ofben described in berms of dialogue, because ib
involves reciprocal communicabion bebween bhe parbies involved.
The Dominabion approach can be described as analogous bo a monologue,
because each parby believes bhab he has possession of bhe brubh, which
cannob be quesbioned. Thus, albhough bwo people may be balking bo
each obher, bhey do nob lisben bo each obher and are acbually
conducbing simulbaneous monologues. Submission is analogous bo
silence.
The philosophies and mebhods of E. A, Burbb, Martin Buber,
Mohandas Gandhi, and Paulo Freire provide fertile ground for our
attempt to further understand bhe mutualistic, or dialogical,
approach to understanding and interacting v;ibh other people.
Each of these men provides a unique perspecbive on the problem
whi' h is characteristic of his special background and
concerns;
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those of a philosopher, theologian, social activist, and radical
educator, respectively.
Edwin A. Burtt
As a philosopher, Edwin A. Burtt was interested in promoting
the progress of our philosophical understanding of ourselves and
our world. 1 He noticed that although there are methods for pro-
posing truths about ourselves and our universe, there is no uni-
versal agreement among thoughtful people upon the validity of
the proposed truths. Philosophers disagree with each other at
any single point in time. They also disagree historically,
as can be recognized v/hen we see the continual change in the
balance of philosophical views over the years. VJlriat Burtt set out
to do was to identify the factors which inhibited agreement, and
to discover an approach which might enhance our search for a
common understanding.
Over the history of VJestern thought, three major methods
have evolved which help to verify and correct common sense
knowledge. Each, hov/ever, has its limitations. The first,
intuitionism, is the most limited. Historically, no single
intuitive understanding has developed, oecause the source of
intuitive knowledge lies in each individua]., and intuitionism does
not provide a means of reconciling the conflicting intuitions
of different people. Rationalism sought to eliminate these
conflicts by linking truths within a web of logical thought, ihe
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goal was to develop a logically infallable system of truth. The
problem, however, was that although a statement may be logically
true, it does not necessarily correspond with the world external
to uhe thinker. The statement that, "All men ^re dogs. Socrates
is a man. Therefore, Socrates is a dog," is logically valid. The
error of the statement becomes evident only when we check to see
whether all men actually are dogs. Rationalism, however, does
not include a mechanism for checking factual truth.
The third method, empiricism, corrected this by employing
systematic observation and experimentation. Modern empirical
science is the most povrerful method known for achieving agreement
about tne world outside of the observer. But when examined his-
torically, even empirical truths are seen to be in a constant
state of flux. The changing nature of scientific understanaing
is the product of one of the great strengths of empiricism; its
dynairdc ability to grow by permitting tne refinement and revision
of oux‘ view of the world as we gather new’ data and propose new
theories. Never uneless, this frustrates us in oui- search for
universal agreement about the nature of the world. VJe are faced
with the realization tnat today's facts are tomorrow's fictions
and, thus, we can accept nothing ’with certainty.
In his effort to understand the nature of philosophical progress,
Burtt studied the history of several recent philosophical movements.
This led to his discovery that such movements appear to evolve throngh
three developmental stages.
In the first stage the champions of a new philosophy,
confident of its soundness, toss out bold assertions
of the position they adapted without realizing its
limitations or embarassments.
...
In the second stage the proponents of the new vievT^oint
begin to be troubled by [outsiders*
J
criticisms, but
believe that any difficulties can be met by drawing
a fev; distinctions.
. . .
In the third stage, champions of the new way of
thinking are forced by continued criticism to face
the question of whether these distinctions and
reinterpretations are consistent with what they had
asserted in the beginning, and to reformulate that
original doctrine so as to reconcile it vzith them.
. .
.2
This process can be understood, in part, when one is aware of
the nature of philosophical presuppositions. Burtt defined a pre-
supposition as, "a hidden or tacit premis underlying any statement
or piece of reasoning. "3 One can do science, for example, only
if one accepts three major presuppositions: that the external v/orld
exists, that some part of it is ordered, and that we are capable
of understanding some part of that order. The scientist is not
necessarily cognisant of these presuppositions, but they are im-
plicit in the enterprise of science.
One's presuppositions prefigure one's understanding of the
world. Burtt argued that disagreements often arise as a result of
the fundajTientally different presuppositions upon which different
philosophies are based. A capitalist and a communist, for example,
may talk together at great length without reaching agreement.
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because each is speaking from a different presuppositional base.
For this reason, the same words (e.g.; worker, labor, and history)
may have very different meanings to each. They are, then, speaking
different languages even though tne'^ are using the same v/ord-roniids.
In order to establish some sort of positive communication between
each other, they must establish a common base of presuppositions
from which to begin.
The three stages in the development of philosophical movements
appear to be associated with the establishment, shoring up, and
reexamination of the movement’s presuppositions, Burtt noticed
that the process seems to take about thirty years to complete a
cycle, and was curious about why it v;as that it took this much
time. Why does not a m.ovement quickly respond to criticism by
reexamining its assertions, thereby omitting the second step of
the cycle? He suggested that there are tv;o reasons for this. The
first is a product of the mechanics of the process of doing
philosophy. It takes time to formulate and publicize a philosophy,
for others to criticize it, to gather and examine the criticism,
and then to reformulate the philosophy. There is probably a
poirit beyond which this process can not be hurried.
There is, hov/ever, a second reason for the delay; one which
Burtt found particularly intriguing. It appears that the members
of a movement share a pov/erful emotional attachment to the funda-
mental presuppositions of their m.ovement. As a result, it takes
a
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long period of criticism and controversy to challenge and loosen
their attachment,^ These philosophers may be umdlling to face the
humiliation of publicly recognizing that they were wrong. Perhaps
ei .ven greater importance is the possibility that the philosophy
may have reflected unconscious motives of the philosophers; its
presuppositions morroring the philosophers* unconscious needs and
convictions. In this situation a criticism of the philosophy
would be unconsciously perceived as a criticism of the philosophers.
In Burtt’s view, the second stage in the developmental cycle is one
of defensive reaction on the part of the philosophers. In order
to enhance philosophical progress, then, we must reduce the level
of second stage defensiveness.
The phenomenon of projection has been well established by
psychologists. People’s fears, desires, and expectations strongly
influence their perceptions. Under pathological extremes, these
factors can completely dominate a person’s mind, rendering him
unable to perceive anything else, Burtt pointed out that:
In the psychoanalytic era every thinker must ask, in his
ovm case as in that of others, v/hether an ultimate
presupposition is not in essence an emotionally
buttressed and molded conviction that, while it
dominat.es a person’s thinking, is but half-conscious
at best; only when he suspects that it is inadequate
and begins to envision alternatives is it likely to
be clearly recognized.
The decisive consequence of this realisation is that
v;here such a presupposition is concerned the existen-
tialists are right; our conscious intellect, however
sincerely truth-seeking, cannot alone fill the role
that philosophers have expected it to fill.^
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The challenge faced by philosophers is that of dealing with this
issue. Although presuppositions may be the product of unconscious
motivations, they may still be cognitively adequate. The
philosopher, however, must take g.-eaL pains to see beyond his
unconscious blinders and determine whether or not the presupposition
is indeed adequate to the philosophical task at hand. Burtt has
argued that once w-e become aware of this issue we are enabled to
adopt motives which do not conflict with our conscious committment
to truthfulness. The implication of this view is that, "a crucial
part of the philosophic quest—indeed the foundation of every other
part— is the quest for truth about oneself. "6
This means that philosophers must confront and clarify their
motives, and if necessary adopt nev/ motives which are more
consistent with truthfulness. This is not an easy task. It
involves a deep, searching personal analysis. Burtt has suggested
that Eastern meditative techniques and the developing methods
of Western psychoanalysis may help foster this confrontation with
self.
It is impossible to commit ourselves to a consistent course
of thought v/ithout committing ourselves to some presuppositions.
But there are two veiy different 'ways of making such a commitment;
one of dogma, the other of accepting one's presuppositions as
guides v/hich although adequate at present, are likely to change
in the future. The latter approach turns disagreement betvjeen
philosophers into a posj.tive opportunity to examine one’s motives
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and philosophical presuppositions and, perhaps, to formulate new,
more adequate presuppositions which will promote philosophic
progress.
‘ihe search for truth is a social enterpiise, and the act oi
mutually resolving disagreements is a vital step in this quest.
It is, hov;ever, a step fraught vdth difficulty, because it
necessitates a positive state of communication between the
people involved. How we speak the truth shapes the truth as it
is heard and understood by others. In the attempt to communicate
with others it is not enough to just know oneself; one must
communicate one’s self to the other person, and one must v;ork
to understand the motives and presuppositions of the other.
This is important, because if we view disagreement as an
opportunity, the resolution of which v;ill help us go beyond our
present state of understanding, we have a vested interest in
promoting the fullest communication. If one is trying to
communicate one’s vision of the truth to another person, it must
be done in such a v;ay as to be understandable to that person.
One must be sensitive to the reality experienced by the other.
It 5.T- not sufficient, however, merely to be open to others.
One must respond to them in a manner which vdll elicit their
fullest positive response and, thus, their fullest attempt toward
tiTthful communication. The outcome of interpersonal relationships
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J.S very much a self-fulfilling prophecy. People are influenced
by the way in which others respond to them. They tend, for example,
to be less communicative and hostile toward those whom they feel
are hostile towa--d them. Even a neatral approach is liKely to
be interpreted as hostile; and, in any event, it is not likely to
foster a full, positive response. In order to foster the fullest
positive communication with others, we must approach them in the
fullest positive manner. We must viork to understand each person
with v;hom we are in disagreement, and act to promote his or her
full growth and actualization.
The fundamental psychological motive, or value, which promotes
the fullest positive response to others and, tiius, the fullest
communication, is love. This, however, is not love in the sentimental
or romantic sense. As Burtt defined it, "Love is freedom from
self-centeredness, and hence from the demands and limitations
that self-centeredness involves."'^ Love seems to be the dynamic
value that Burtt sought as the foundation of his search for
philosophic understanding. In approaching an object of study,
be it a person or a philosophy, with love one is able to reach
as far as possible for tinith unobstructed by negative motivation.
Also, love is the value which can bind individual seekers of
truth in a common search. In this sense it is a creative medium.
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It is also creative in the way it promotes the growth of the
person who is loved. Love, v;hen recognized and emoloyed as a
fundamental value underlying the total sphere of human activities,
leads to our progress as a specie^. It creates a situation which
promotes the maximum of creativity and diversity which is consistent
with social stability in the broadest sense of the term,
Burtt’s book, Search of Philosophic Understanding
,
is a
brilliant v7ork which spans a broad range of philosophy's history
and concepts. At its core is a model of communication which I
accept as an important ideal. It is a model which is thoroughly
imitualistic in nature. All philosophers, in his view, are
members of a community which is engaged in the pursuit of under-
standing, Each person is of intrinsic va?Lue and must be approached
in a mutualistic manner. They interact through dialogue, but
Burtt has extended the concept of dialogue to include non-verbal
communication as well. He also refined our conception of dialogue
by pointing out the great importance of unconscious psychological
factors.
In order to engage in true dialogue the speaker must be both
free of self-interest, and motivated by a desire to help the other
person realize his or her fullest grovrth and, thus, fullest com-
munication. Most people are not able to engage in this form of
communication, because of Intervening unconscious motives. In
order to dialogue, in the fullest sense of the term, *<6 must
prepare ourselves by internalizing love as a motivating value.
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Burtt suggested that this requires some sort of therapy or meditation.®
In addition, we must strive to become devoid of dogma. V/e must
recognize the changing nature of knowledge, that the future is
likv^iy to hold a more adequate ccncepticn of the nature of the «orld
than we now have. Thus, v;e must not bind ourselves to our limited
knowledge of the present. This implies that we can have no
assurance that we will ever attain knowledge of absolute truth,
V/e must search for an increasingly adequate understanding, rather
than for truth.
^
Dialogue is generally thought of as a state of mutual com-
minication between t\TO or more people. In Burtt*s concept, though,
one must assume that the other person is capable of reciprocity
—
even if this does not happen. To assume otherwise would be to
percipitate a self-fulfilling prophecy. For this reason, and by
the nature of the value of love, the speaker must act as though
the other person were capable of dialogue, and bear the burden
of establishing it. In the best of situations, the state of
mutual dialogue will be established. The individual act of
dialogue, though, is not dependent upon that statej otherwise
it is not likely to be realized.
At this point it is possible to assemble a partial list of
the characteristics of social Mutualism. First, it involves
the recognition that the people involved are each a part of a
larger group. In the case of philosophy, the philosophers must
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recognize that they each depend upon the others, particularly upon
those who disagree with them, if they are to progress in philosophic
understanding. With this recognition comes the need for mutual
^liaiogue. In addition, in order to engage in a mutualistic
relationship, one must be free of dogma. This comes from the
recognition that certain knowledge is unattainable. To assume
that one has possession of certain knowledge is to limit one's
potential to progress in philosophic understanding. Dogma closes
one to others, and predisposes one to impose the dogma upon others
through domination.
Third, in order to engage in a mutualistic relationship, we
must be free of self-interest. This requirement is bom of the
recognition that unconscious motives can interfere v;ith dialogical
communication. The task of recognizing and transcending our
unconscious motives is a difficult one, and requires special
effort. We must free ourselves of self-interest, also, as a
precondition to establishing a positive relationship with other
people. The process of freeing ourselves of self-interest is
closely linked with that of overcoming dogma.
Fina''ly, we must recognize that means and ends are inseparable.
The way in v.'hich we interact with other people determines a great
deal of what will be the outcome of that interaction. This is
implicit in the nature of self-fulfilling prophecies. We must
approach others in the fullest positive manner if we wish to realize
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the fullest positive mutual communication. This and freedom from
self-interest are jointly associated with the value of love.
Although Burtt’s analysis v;as directed to philosophical
activities, these characteristics can be generalized to apply
to dialogical activity of all kinds, as we shall see.
Martin Buber
Martin Buber's concerns were different from Burtt's. He wrote
from the perspective of a philosopher and theologian who was
interested in the religious significance of human relationships.
Although he wrote of dialogue, it was a dialogue which was more of a
spiritual, than of a linguistic, significance. As a Jevdsh
theologian he was embedded in the Judaic tradition, v;hich recog-
nized that people v;ere bonded together by their commonly shared
spiritual relationship with God. Buber's thought and language
was quite abstract and require effort to \inderstand, but they are
both of great significance.
Buber believed that there are two fundamentally different
v/ays of approaching the v;orld, including other persons. One way
is embodied in the basic word "I-It," the other in the basic v/ord
"I-You,"^^ They designate two states of being. In the I-It
approach to the world, the I stands apart from the It. The It
is confined by borders and can be set in order and classified.
The I can possess the It. The I experiences the It as something
separate from the I. The word I-It, then, establishes the world
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of experience. VJhat Buber was saying v;as that in the I-It approach
to things (people, rocks, trees, etc.), the thing with which I come
in contact is defined as an object; something separate from me,
v/hich I can phys-.'cally or cogniti\ely manipulate and dominate.
In so doing, I also divide myself, because it is impossible to
enter such an experience with my full being.
In contrast, an I-You approach involves my whole being.
In this situation, the You has no borders and the I does not have
possession of the You. The I stands in relation to the You. I-You
establishes the world of relationship. The I does not experience
the You, because it is not isolated from the You. The You is a
subject, not an object. The You cannot be set in order, because
to do so would be to limit its possibilities. Experience is
characterized by limits, relationship by reciprocity. VJhen, viith
my being, I say You to another being, that person ceases to be one
of many Hes or Shes, but fills the universe. This does not mean that
he blinds me to everything else, but that everything else shares
of his being. As soon as I abstract qualities from the You, he
becomes an It. It is, then, impossible to consciously experience
a You; one relates to a You. There is no self-consciousness, or
even other-consciousness in I-You, only relationship,
Buber recognized three roles that we can assume v/hen we
perceive a person. One is that of an observer, wno intently
studies a person in order to fix him in mind. The person is an
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object with traits, which are noted. The second role is that
of the onlooker who, with unimposing disinterest, watches to see
what will present itself. Both of these ways are I-It approaches.
In the third, trat of "becoming a./are," the person is not an
object. He says something to us (verbally or non-verbally) which
we feel we must answer. We feel personally addressed. This is
the relation of I-You.
Our world, then, is split into two aspects. The first is the
It~v;orld of experiences, borders, order, and patterns. This is the
aspect about which people can share a common understanding. The
other is the You-world of unity, wholeness, and uniqueness. The
v/orld appears eternally new and unique, beyond ordering and pre-
diction, V/e are alone in this v/orldj alone in our individual
relationship with it. It exists only in the present. Unlike the
It-world, it does not have a past or future, because in order to
contemplate past or future we must step back from the total
relational I-You of the present, and at that moment the You
becomes It,
Since the You exists only during the time of the full involvement
of our being with that of the You, the moment we respond to the You,
the You becom.es an It. This is so, because we can direct our
response only to a part of the other, nob to his full being.
"The more powerful the response, the more pov/erfully it ties dovrni
the You and as by a spell binds it into an object. Only silence
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toward the You
. . . leaves the You free. ... All response binds
the You into the It-world. That is the melancholy of man, and that
is his greatness, ”12
For these reasons, the I-Ycr. relationship is doomed to be
fleeting. VJe are doomed to return to, and spend most of our lives
in the It-world, because direct relationship cannot last forever.
Love, Buber believed, can only exist in the relationship between
I and You, Thus, it too cannot last, VJhen we return to the It-
world, though, we are charged with a new knowledge which cannot
be explained in psychological terms--it has been received. It is
a presence and a strength which is devoid of content and, thus,
cannot be communicated. Nevertheless, it gives our lives meaning
and confirms meaning in everything. The proof of this meaning is
found in the actions, which are unique to each person that grow from
it. These actions are vital, because only through them can the
You-world of relation become embodied in the It-v:orld of experience,
Buber believed that the relation we encounter v;hen we enter
the You-world is a glimpse of a more fundamental, eternal You—God.
All relationship exists through the Being of God and it is through
our brief I-You encounters that we have knov;ledge of Him. It
is only through this encoiinter that we can begin to address other
persons as anything other than objects. The reciprocal I-You
relationship between people, and between them and Goa is a pre-
condition to the realization of human community.
The moments of I-You relationship so^uid much like moments of
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mystical experience. Buber, however, did not want this to be
equated with mysticism. He distinguished between two kinds of
events in the mystical experience. The first is that of the
creation of inner unity, or who]e’"5Ss. This occurs vnthin the
i
person, not in a relationship with God. Buber accepted this
element of mysticism, and believed it to be a necessary pre-
requisite for establishing an I-You relation. The second event
is that of union between the person and the other, v/ith the
lose of personal identity as the two become fused. Buber v;as
opposed to the ideal of mystical union, or annihilation of the
self, because it emphasizes the relationship to the exclusion of
its members. This devalues, deactualizes, the members v:ho are
in relation. When one returns to the It-vjorld, there is a sense
of lose of being; the relational Being of God is split. Buber
will accept mystical union only if it allows the members to
retain their identity while they are in relation. In lived
actuality the relationship and its members are of equal importance.
The whole self is involved, not a destruction of self. Devaluing
the members in favor of the relationship is an It-act.
People who have an It as the focus of their life goals, cannot
be brought to God by telling them to focus on God, They would
then try to possess God by making Him an It. It is not just the
goal, but the method of reaching it that is important. The motive
and method of possession must be changed to that of relation.
In Buber’s theology, our relationship vrith the eternal You,
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God, is what, enables all that, is timely human.
Out of life with nature we take the "physical” world,
that of consistency; out of life viith men, the
"psychical" world, that of affectability; out of
life with spiritual beings, the "noetic" world,
that of valiu'&y, [Wi'^uoat the one Presence
shining through each world, they ] become usable
and murky, and remain murky even if v/e endov;
[themj with shining names: cosmos, eros, logos.
For in truth there is a cosmos for man' only when
the universe becomes a home for him with a holy
hearth where he sacraflces; and there is eros
for him only beings become for him images of the
eternal, and community with them becomes reve-
lation; and there is logos for him only when he
addresses the mystery viith works and service of
the spirit, 13
In my attempt to understand Buber, I fear that I fall victim
of what he called the "psychological delusion." This is the
attempt to understand my relationship with the v/orld in psy-
chological, rather than spiritual terms. Buber believed such an
attempt to be meaningless.
The man who steps out of the essential act of pure
relation has something More in his being, something
nev/ has grown there of vihich he did not know before
and for whose origins he lacks any suitable words.
Whereever the scientific world orientation in its
legitimate desire for a causal chain without gaps
may place the origin of vmat is new here: for us
being concerned v/^ith the actual contemplation of
the actual, no subconscious and no other psychic
apparatus will do. Actually, we received what we
did not have before, in sucn a. manner that v^e know:
it has been given to us.lU
I am not sure whether I agree or disagree with him on this
point, largely because I am not sure what is his point. His
statement can be read in two ways. One is that regardless of
psychological explanations, we ^ receive something from outside
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of the world and scientific explanations are not capable of ex-
plaining Its origin. The other reading is that regardless of the
psychological explanation, we have the feeling of having received
something from outside the v/orld—and scientific explanations
cannot embody, or do justice to the personally felt meaning of
this knowledge.
This distinction is important. The first interpretation means
that God stands outside of the world and that we receive gratuitous
knowledge when we come into relation with Him. This knowledge is
certain knov/ledge, even though it is devoid of content. If this
is Buber’s meaning, and his philosophy rests upon this understanding,
I feel that I must either reject his ideas, or reinterpret them in
light of the second possible reading of his statement. I argue
this, because my presuppositions are based upon a recognition of
the fallibility of human knov;ledge. I agree with Blaise Pascal,
who wrote that, "Every religion that does not say that God is
concealed is not true
. . .
Psychological explanations do not devalue religious experience,
if one takes care not to confuse the explanation with the experience.
Once we make this mistake explanation bpcomes knov;ledge alienated,
which can be used to debunk, or "explain away" the experience.
But a knowledge of the physical processes which creates a rainbov;,
or of the psychological processes underlying a mother's love does
not devalue the sight of a rainbow, or the expression of love.
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Explanations are based upon abstract, generalized models which do
not include the individual, feeling person who stands in relation
Mlth what is being explained.
In the psychological, interpretation of Eiber’s statement.
Goo does exist in the reality of the person who returns from the
I—Thou encounter. This reality, though, is the world as perceived
and made real by man. In this view, God lies within the vrorld,
not outside of it. We are able to discover Him in the world if
we address it in the proper manner. But whether God exists in
the Reality we assume to exist behind the world as i^re know it, is
a question beyond our ability to ever answer with certainty.
Psychologically speaking, the question of whether or not
God exists is secondary to the fact that the felt relationship
fosters psychological integration with the world; the v/orld
becomes meaningful. Religiously speaking, whether or not the
psychological explanation is correct is secondary to the felt
relationship with God. Together, both approaches merge as a
larger whole, rather than conflict. To accept this view, one
must be free of dogmatic certainty of one’s present knowledge of
God, and ^f abstract explanations. It requires great courage in
order to embrace this kind of freedom; both to face the uncer-
tainty of the world that this view creates, and in the face of
this uncertainty to hold on to one’s faith as a tentative truth
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which can guide one’s actions in the world.
Buber’s theology provides a meaningful, positive image of the
nature of the world, within which we can act. It is positive in
thy^ i+ promotes growth in relation with a larger whole. Buber’s
concept of love is one x^rhich, by definition, requires that we en-
counter the full nature of other persons; both their good and
their bad. Love, by its very nature, cannot be blind. An I in
love has a clear av;areness of, and feels responsibility to a You.
The idea of responsibility is to be brought back from
the province of specialized ethics, of an "ought"
that svnngs free in the air into that of living life.
Genuine responsibility exists only when there is
real responding.
Responding to what?
To vj’nat happens to one, to what is to be seen and
heard and felt.l^
This value of love appears to be very similar to that of Burtt.
Both require that one be free of influences that might block or
misshape one’s perceptions of the other person. The value Buber
saw in the mystic’s act of achieving inner wholeness may be
related to the value that Burtt placed upon dealing with one’s
unconscious motives and achieving freedom from self-interest. Both
Buber and Burtt i-equired that one have a positive interest in the
fate of the other. To Buber, love and I-You encounters are to be
valued, because of the very nature of our v:orld; a v;orld in which
cosmos, eros, (md logos are inextricably entoined. For Burtt,
love, which promotes a relationship akin to I-You, is a value
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necessary for progress toward philosophic understanding and the
promotion of human growth.
The I-You relationship is a relationship of dialogue. Dialogue
cannot take place in the kind of mystical uni in of which Buber
disapproved, because the members lose their identity in the union.
In the I-You relationship both the I and the You maintain their
separate identities while they engage in a relationship which
involves their whole selves in the present, the here-and-now.
Rather than joining in a self-destroying union, they participate
in communion.
What is communicated in Buber’s dialogical relationship is
being, not information in discrete units. Knowledge of You is,
then, the fullest kind of knowledge, because it is not interpreted,
categorized, or reshaped in any way. Similarly, Burtt argued that
knowledge of persons is the most concrete form of knowledge,
because each individual is full of surprises and does not fit
into any abstracted pattern. He believed that such knowledge is
the richest in content. Buber, however, carried his analysis of
relationship still further, asserting that a complete relationship
is devoid of content. Any time the I attempts to achieve a goal
other than then relationship as an end in itself, the You becomes
an It. This is true of any goal, be it philosophical, psychoana-
lytical, or educational. But we live in a world in which we must
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deal with content if we are to survive and, thus, true dialogue must
always be fleeting. Buber’s views provide us with an image of
social mutualism at its extreme.
Buber's theology and philosophy is intuit ionistic in natuie, as
V7as Schweitzer’s. He asserted that we each have access to personally
revealed knov/ledge. But there are serious problems inherent in
intuitionism. Historically, it has not led to widespread agreement
among people, and one’s intuitions need not correspond with the
v/orld at large. Burtt has suggested a cluster of values which
may help lead us out of these difficulties. These values are
implicit, also, in Buber’s viork. The nature of these values makes
them safeguards against the dogmatic imposition of one's intuitions
upon others. Buber's interests were not directed toward pragmatic
activity in the It-world, and he did not examine it in great
detail. Mohandas Gandhi, on the other hand, provides an example
of a man v;ho used these values to guide action on a massive social
scale.
Mohandas Gandhi
Tn complete silence the Gandhi men drew up and halted
a hundred yards from the stockade, A picked column
advariced from the crowd, waded the ditches, and
approached the barbed-v/ire stockade. . . .
Suddenly at a v/ord of command, scores of native
policemen rushed upon the advancing marchers and
rained blows on their heads with their steel-shod
lathis. Hot one of the marchers even raised an am
to fend off the blows. They went down like ten-pins.
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From where I stood I heard the sickening vrhack of the
clubs on unprotected sl<ulis. The ^^raiting crowd of
marchers groaned and sucked in their breath in
sympathetic pain at every blow. Those struck down
fell sprawling, unconscious or writing with fractured
skulls or broken shoulders. ... The survivors,
without breaking ranks, silently an ^ doggedly marched
on until struck dovm.
. . .Although everyone knew
that within a few minutes he would be beaten dovm,
perhaps killed, I could detect no signs of wavering
or fear. They marched steadily, with heads up,
without the encouragement of music or cheering or
any possibility that they might escape serious
injury or death. The police rushed out and method-
ically and mechanically beat dovm the second
column. There vras no fight, no struggle; the mar-
chers simply walked foi’ward till struck dovm. 17
This journalistic account of one of Mohandas Gandhi’s nonviolent
resistance campaigns against the British in 1920 stands in stark
contrast to the glowing abstractions of Burtt and Buber. Beneath
the p\iblic surface, though, Gandhi’s philosophy was very similar
to theirs. Iiis approach to social action was mutualistic; indeed,
it was dialogical communication on a massive political and social
scale. Mis political action, interpersonal relations, and inner
religious quest v;ere all facets of the same thing. In order to
discover what this was, we must look beneath the surface of his
political activity, v;hich was designed to free India of British
rule, and exaraime its guiding philosophy.
In the introduction to his autobiography, Gandhi told of his
j.ppoT'vatlops about v/riting such a book. A friend had asked him
why he wanted to write an autobiography (v;hich is in the Western,
rather than Eastern literary tradition) and cautioned that
although his views may change after the book v;as written others
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might still accept the authority of those which he had solidified
in writing. Gandhi replied, "I simply want to tell the story of
my numerous experiments with truth, and as my life consists of
nothing but tnose experiments, iL is true that the story will taxe
the shape of an autobiography. His world, politics, personal
life, and religion were intricately interwoven. His entire life
was a religious quest—aseries of experiments through which he
hoped to find ’’truth," which he believed to be synonymous with
•’God."
These experiments were conducted in the form of social action,
but their importance to him lay only in the spiritual search,
of which the political activity was simply a reflection. It was
through the spiritual quest that he derived the pov/er to engage
in politics.
What I want to achieve,—what I have been striving and
pining to achieve these thirty years,—self-realization,
to see God face to face, to attain Moksha [ freedom
from the cycle of birth and death]. 1 live and move
and have my being in pursuit of this goal. All that I
do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures
in the political field, are directed to this same end.
Lut as I have all along believed that what is possible
for one is possible for all, my experiments have not
been conducted in the closet, but in the open; and I
do not think that this fact detracts from their
spiritual value. There are some things which are
known only to oneself and one’s Maker. These are
clearly incommunicable. The experiments I am about to
relate are not such. But they are spiriUial, or
rather moral. : for the essence of religion is
morality. 19
To Gandhi, Truth was God (rather than, God was Truth). It was
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one of God's many faces. In order to see the face of God he had to
find Truth, but he could not do this passively. It required that
he be personally able to speak, act, think, and embody truthful-
ness. Knov/ledge of truth was inseparable from a truthful life.
He could not distinguish between private and public, secular and
sacred spheres of activ?..ty--all four blended together. Religion
was not simply private, politics not just secular. Although he
felt that a belief in God was a prerequisite to the practice of
his political technique, he was not bound to any established
religious dogma. He did not feel that anyone had to believe in
the same god as he, because no one could be absolutely certain
of their knowledge of God.
The recognition that we cannot know absolute tmith in our
lives is central to Gandhi's philosophy. He felt that we must
cling to, and continually revise and improve the relative truth
as we know it. His experiments were his lifelong process of
personal revision and improvement of his own relative truth. He
referred to his philosophy and political technique as
Satyagraha
. The word sat means "Being," "Truth," or "God." Satya
refers to the relative truth, which is all that we can know.
"Satyagraha is literally holding on to Truth and it means, there-
fore, Truth-force, Truth is soul or spirit. It is, therefore,
known as soul-force. It excludes the use of violence because
man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth and, therefore,
not competent to punish.
When one holds on to the truth, one's life embodies truth and
one must act in a truthful manner. Truth as an idea and as an
acuxon are inseparable. V/hen cor fronted by a situation which is
contrary to the truth, one is compelled to change it. This was
the motivation behind Gandhi's politics. But it is difficult to
know what the truth is. Since we can have no certain knowledge
of truth, we must not act in any way which will harm others.
To do so would be to cause irrevocable injui'y on the authority
of an uncertain truth. It is vital, then, that Satyagraha be
grounded in ahimsa
,
nonviolence, Ahimsa is a prerequisite for
the discovery of truth, and the two are so closely interwoven
that is is difficult to separate them. "Nevertheless, ahimsa
is the means; Truth is the end,"^^ Satyagraha is the
unwavering pursuit of personal and social truth in a nonviolent
manner.
The satyagrahi (one who practices Stayagraha) is true to
himself and to humanity only when he has tested his relative
truth through action. This is so even if the test leads to his
death. Gandhi emphasized that nonviolent resistance not
passive resistance. It is not a passive form of resistance
which the weak must employ because they are too weak to succeed
by other methods. Rather than being submissive, it is an active,
militant approach, which requires great moral strength and
courage.
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The satyagrahi is opposed to evil, not to the evil-doer. This
means that he must not think ill of, or do violence to the evil-
doer. The nonviolence of ahimsa. I’s not related just to nhysical
violence, but to any kind of violence; including hatred of, evil
thoughts about, ill will toward, and even lying to a person.
It requires that one refrain from mental as well as physical
violence, Ihis demands a high level of concentration on the
part of the satyagrahi, and that he maintain a clear under-
standing of what are his innermost motives,
Gandhi felt that the best English translation of ahimsa
is "love,” or "charity." Since this is the value which guides
Satyagraha, one must love one's opponent, regardless of his acts.
Love of the evil-doer requires that one try to win him away from
evil, even unto one's own death.
Love is reckless in giving away, oblivious to what
it gets in return. Love wrestles with the world
as with the self and ultimately gains a mastery
over all other feelings.
. . .
The law of love will work, just as the law of
gravity vdll work, whether we accept it or not. . . ,
The more I work at this law the more I feel the
delight in the scheme of this universe. It gives
me peace and a meaning of the mysteries of
nature that I have no power to describe. 22
In order to practice ahimsa, one must undergo an inner self-
purification. This is a life-long process, which must be con-
tinually practiced. The object is to achieve utter humility—freedom
from every trace of self-interest.
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Identification with everything that lives is impossible
without self-purification; without self-purification
the observance of the law of Ahimsa must remain an
empty dream; God can never be realized by one who is
not pure of heart. Self-purification therefore must
mean purification in all walks of life. 23
In practice this generally involved taking vows of poverty,
chastity, and abstaining from a variety of things which Gandhi
lelt either did injury to oneself, or represented submission to
one’s passions. Vows were very important, sacred acts which were
not to be lightly taken or broken.
Another important element in Satyagraha is suffering. The
satyagrahi must be willing to suffer, for three reasons. First,
suffering is viewed as a purifying act. Also, the nature of
Satyagraha requires that one be prepared to enduring suffering
resulting from the actions of one's opponent. Since Satyagraha
cannot involve violence, it must rely upon patience and sympathy
in an effort to win over the opponent to one's view of the truth.
In the interim, however, one is likely to suffer at the hand of
one's opponent. This reverses the usual pattern of confrontation,
which generally involves the attempt to P(#'.ke one's opponent suffer.
Finally, suffering is a tactic designed to convince the opponent
of the sincerity of the satyagrahi 's purpose. Gandhi's position
regarding suffering is similar to that of any leader of militant
action. The participants, or soldiers, are asked to prepare for
suffering and sacrifice. In the practice of Satyagraha, however,
the magnitude of the injuries and loss of life that will be
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incurred is likely to be considerably less than that associated
with violent militancy,
Gandhi believed militant Satyagraha to be a very powerful tool,
which should be employed only as a last resoru. When faced with
a social injustice, the satyagrahi must first employ^ available
avenues of relief. Only when he was exhausted all other options
will he resort to civil disobedience, or non-cooperation with an
unjust law or social situation. The satyagrahi is basically a
law-abiding person, V/hen a law must be broken as a very last resort,
the act is done with a clear understanding of the underlying
issues at hand, and with great care to break only the specific
law in question. Also, the opponent must be informed of one's
plans and motives. Great care must be taken to prevent the
issue of law-breaking from masking the fundamental issue which
led to the act. The action must be directed not against the
opponent, but against the situation in which both parties are
caught. The law of love requires that the satyagrahi continually
strive to reach, with his opponent, a mutually just resolution.
Great care irnst be baken to insure that the action not be
taken for 'easons of self-interest. Also, care must be taken
not to do any vio3.ence to the opponent—including taking advantage
of the ooDonent during a moment at which he is particularly weak.
One must not try to make the opponent feel fear or guilt. Instead,
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the satyagrahi must continually appeal to what is best in the
opponent, from a co-equal position. The objective is to win the
opponent to the satyagrahi 's views, not to defeat him.
On March 30, 1919, Ctandhi Caxled a day of national strike.
The strike unified and electrified the Indian People against the
British, He had intended a one day, symbolic work stoppage during
which the people vjould pray and fast. In the following v;eeks,
hov/ever, there was rioting, arson, sabotage, and murder
directed against the British, In one case, the British responded
by firing into a peaceful gathering of 10,000 Indians; injuring
1,500 people, of whom 379 died. Appalled by what had happened,
Gandhi suspended his campaign against the British on April l8th.^^
What Gandhi called his Himalayan Miscalculation, which led
to this disaster, lay in his assumption that the mass of Indian
people was ready for nonviolent resistance. He realized that it
could not be, without the preparation necessary to understand the
underlying philosophy and methods of Satyagraha, The people had
to be prepared to obey the laws, not because of fear of punishment,
but of their own free will. Only then would they be prepared to
selectively break specific laws in a nonviolent manner. Before he
reinitiated his carr.paign he had to train a corps of volunteers who,
in time, would spread across the country and educate the people.
He found, though, that few people were interested in the peaceful
aspects of nonviolence—particularly as practiced under his
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rigorous training. Nevertheless, he eventually built a cadre of
skilled Satyagraha leaders, vjhose activities paved the way to
freedom from British rule, almost thirty-five years later.
Nearly twenty years after his campaign in South Africa, during
/
which he had first developed Satyagraha, Gandhi met his former
protagonist. General Smuts. During their conversation. Smuts
remarked
;
’I did not give you such a bad time as you gave me.’
’I did not know that,’ Gandhi replied. The remark
is illuminating. He was so utterly wedded to his
concepts as not to recognize that there had been
a real fight involving the hurting and humiliation
of an enemy. He insisted in thinking that the end
was a conversion. Here he was wrong. The prevailir^g
white attitudes [in South Africa J had not altered.
After he left South Africa, the Indian community there lost most,
if not all, of the ground it had gained under Gandhi’s leadership.
This points to a problem in his approach to social change.
There has been a good deal of criticism of both the man and his
technique. Some have said, as in the passage quoted above, that
he misread his political success as verification of his philosophy.
This may well be the case. It has often been said, for example,
that his success in India was made possible only by the inherent
selT-restrain of the British authorities, v;hich prevented their
use of extremely oppressive countermeasures. His critics have
argued that as a result of his pleasant experiences in England as
a young law student, Gandhi tacitly assumed an element of decency
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on the part of the British and other foreigners. But the success
of his campaign was not just an historical fluke. His techniques
have been used in other countries with some success.
Gandhi died believing himself to be a fail^ire. He saw
Satyagraha as a v;ay of living, a way of reaching a mutual truth
with one's opponent. In his last years, though, he recognized
that he and his method had been used by the Indian politicians
to oust the British, regardless of its moral influence upon them.
It had been used as a means to an end and then, when the end
had been achieved, discarded. V/hat he had thought was militant
nonviolence had actually been practiced as passive resistance;
a weapon of the v/eak, who would turn to violence as soon as they
gained the strength. His failure lay not in a weakness of
Satyagraha, but in the fact that it had never been practiced.
It is perhaps wrong to describe my present state of
mind as depresssion. ... I am not vain enough to
think that the divine purpose can only be fulfilled
through me. It is as likely as not that a fitter
instrum.ent will be used to carry it out and thau I
was good enough to represent a v/eak nation, not a
strong one. May it not be that a man purer, more
courageous, more far-seeing is wanted for the final
purpose? This is all speculation. Mo one has the
capacity to judge God. V/e are drops in that limit-
less ocean of mercy.
In Gandhi's viev;, success was not to be measured by the fact
that the British quit India, but by whether or not they left out
of a recognition of the moral soundness of his cause. If they had
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been defeated, rather than converted, then he had done violence
to them. In truth, this is probably vjhat happened, and Gandhi
did fail to achieve the mutually shared moral resolution of the
conflict, for which he had devoted his life. This, however,
does not devalue Satyagraha. In my view, a unique quality of
Satyagraha is the requirement that one behave as the opponent
can be v/on to the satyagrahi’s view, that one behave as if a
mutual resolution is possible. This approach reduces the likeli-
hood that violence will erupt, and leaves the possibility open
that a mutual resolution actually v;ill be achieved. To do
otherwise would increase the possibility of violence and severely
limit the likelihood of a mutual resolution, as is the case with
self-fulfilling prophecies.
It is ironic that under the leadership of Indira Gandhi
India has fabricated and tested nuclear explosives. India has
retreated from Gandhi’s ideals and is now moving in the illusion
that a strong military is of sufficient value to her to merit an
enormous investment of her very limited resources. Kenneth
Boulding has argued that this is a false belief, which India has
accepted because she has failed to test bhe reality of her sense
of truth. In his view, ’’the failure of Gandhism is not the
failure of ahimsa, but a failure of satyagraha. He suggested
that, in a system as complex as the modern v;orld, ve cannoc- rely
upon intuition or mysticism as sources of knov/ledge. Instead, we
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must turn to the social sciences. He did not place all of his hope
in the social sciences, but recognized them to be one of many
methods of improving our understanding of truth.
Gandhi used the social sciences in a rudimentary form, as a
part of his efforts to resolve labor-management disputes. He
often undertook an economic analysis of a situation in order to
determine what v'ould be the most equitable wage agreement. This
was important, to him, because his goal was to achieve mutually
advantageous settlements, rather than to maximize the profit of
one party over another. I am confident that he would agree with
Boulding about the value of the social sciences as a source of
pertinent information. I do not, however, believe that he would
place the burden of the search for truth in their lap. Although
they could provide him with information which would be of great
value in achieving his goals, they could not help him to identify
what those goals should be. Gandhi recognized the truth and ahimsa
to be joined as opposite faces of a coin. As we turn to the
sciences for truth, it is all the more important that we cling to
ahisma, the lav; of love.
Gand''l never articulated a coherent, consistent philosophy.
This has been the source of much of the difficulty that people have
had in interpreting his thoughts. He viewed his life as an
experiment with truth, and devised his experiments as the need and
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opportui-iity arose. His was a growing philosophy, as was his truth,
which he did not want to fix into a system. To do so v;ould have
been to kill and preserve it. He saw the value of his approach
as j.ying not ix: the completed product, but in the emergent process.
VJhen the views that he exi^ressed over the years are examined together
they are, for this reason, likely to conflict. But the image of
truth that he held in his later years was not necessarily the same
as the one he held in his youth. He viewed this as a sign of
positive groiiTth, rather than of inconsistency.
There seem to be four other reasons for the difficulty that
many people have encountered in understanding Gandhi's philosophy. 28
First, one must realize that he did not make a clear distinction
betvxeen ideas and actuality. He considered his mental, physical,
and spiritual facets to be integrally linked, as were his thoughts
and actions. Also, he was embedded in the tradition of Hinduism,
and his statements are completely coherent only within the light
of that world-view. In addition, his ultimate ideal cannot be
obtained on earth; the value of his ideals lies in the direction
that they provide for action, rather than in their actualization.
One cannot be criticized fer not being able to conform perfectly
to the ideal, only for not striving to do so. The fourth reason
lies in the fact that Gandhi spoke of truth from three perspec-
tives, which he did not alvxays clearly distinguish. He spoke of
the unrealizable ideal toward whi'^'h we should all strive, of
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truth as he had actualized it in his ovm personal struggle tov;ard
the idea, and of the truth as embodied in the struggle of the Indian
masses.
brae brikso.’. recognized that Satyagraha is based upon
combination of clear insight into our central motives and persuasive
faith in the brotherhood of mankind. '*29 One of Gandhi's basic
presuppositions was that humanity is not, and must not be divided
into separate camps. Rather, he saw us all as parts of a larger
whole. Social conflicts, then, are akin to family squabbles, v^^hich
must be resolved to the benefit of all members of the family.
It is inconceivable that such a conflict should be resolved by
destroying a member of our family. Erikson believed that the
saintliness of Gandhi can be explained through the psychological
observation that "the true saints are those who transfer the
state of householdership to the house of God, becoming father and
mother, brother and sister, son and daughter, to all creatures,
rather than to their own issue. "30
The value that enables this to happen is ahimsa. This is
probably the closest thing to dogma in Gandhian philosophy. He
did not, hov;ever, eliminate the possibility of employing violence.
He realized that it takes great personal strength in order to
employ Satyagraha, and that some people may not find such strength
within themselves. In such a case, when the only choice lies
betu’cen cowardice and violence in the face of injustice, Gandhi
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recommended that one choose vio].cnce. His hope was that people
would be able to find the strength to recognize and employ the
third choice, that of love and nonviolence,
Gandhi’s concept of ahiiasa seems very close to Burtt’s
concept of love. Both involve freedom from self-interest and
a positive interest in promoting the growth of others. Also,
both require inner preparation as a prerequisite for their
actualization. Tn psychoanalytic terms, this preparation involves
gaining insight into one’s unconscious motives. In Gandhian
(Hindu) terms, self-purification is required. I believe,
though, that the Gandhian approach to self-purification sometimes
conflicted with ahimsa, because of its emphasis upon extremes of
self-suffering. This, and Gandhi’s extreme dietary practices,
seem like acts of violence directed against the self which are
beyond what is required by ahimsa. This may be a product of tension
between his love of all life, and Hinduism’s goal of escaping
from the cycle of life. I, personally, believe that self-puri-
fication should be understood in psychoanalytic, rather than in
Hindu terms.
Anott'^r important Gandhian presupposition is that means and
ends are synonymous.
Ileans vii-d ends in Gandhian satyagraha are disting^ai-
shable only temporally. Both means and ends partake
^
of a continuous process. The means precede the end in
time, but there can be no question of moral priority.
Truth is inseparable from non-violence, and the method
of achieving and clinging to the truth in non-violence.
Non-violence becomes both the means and the end, and
the terms become convertible. 31
The Gandhian viev; of the law seems to be that each law is a
question, rataer than a oommand, .aiich has been placed before the
people. The resolution of the question of 'whether or not it is
a just lav/ ultimately lies in their hands, 32 Satyagraha is a
method of putting the question to them, and enacting an answer.
John Rawls has argued that if the body of people to whom the
dissenter addresses himself does not share his sense of justice,
the dissenter is likely to fail and civil disobedience will not
be an effective technique. 33 The Gandhian philosophy, then,
presupposes a universally shared sense of justice. The satyagrahi
must cleanse himself of self-interest in order to recognise a
just cause, and to properly address it to the people.
Joan Bondvirant has pointed out that Satyagraha is an approach
to resolving dialectical conflicts between the satyagrahi and
his opponent. The object is to achieve a synthesis, which does
not do violence to the grovdng truth of either party. The
synthesis, then, is not a compromise. Neither is expected to
abandon his core of truth. The satyagrahi must, however, be
continually attentive to his opponent's argument in order to
determine whose views, his or the opponent's, most nearly embody
truth. At the same time, he must employ only those political
techniques which help his opponent to become open to his own under-
standing of truth. Gandhian dialectics are devoid of any vestige
of determinism, such as the historical determinism of Marx. To
claim a certain^ knowleage of what the dialectical synthesis
will be, is to claim knowledge of absolute Truth, rather than
to claim a relative truth. ’’The Gandhian dialectic, v;hich lies at
the heart of satyagraha, is a process to be made explicit by human
action, not to be found as implicit either in the nature of things
or the process of time. It partakes of prescription, rather than
description.
With the exception of the overt religious elements, Gandhi’s
philosophy appears to be very close to Burtt’s. The difference is
that Burtt’s approach is from the perspective of resolving
philosophical disagreement, while Gandhi's is from that of resolving
societal conflict. Gandhism is built upon the same four elements
we identified in our examination of Burtt: membership is a large
group, which includes the opponent; an attempt to transcend dogma;
freedom from self-interest; and the recognition that moans and ends
are united. The Gandhian method for resolving dialectical conflict
is that of dialogue on a massive socdal scale. Through his acts
of nonviolent resistance, the satyagrahi attempts to establish a
state of dialogiie with his opponent, and achieve a mutually valued
synthesis.
From a psychoanalytic point of view, Erikson sees the process
as one of mutual therapy, the end result of which is a double
conversion of the satyagrahi (therapist) and the opponent (patient).
The Gandian method is in keeping \-7ith Eriksctt's psychoanalytic
interpretation of the Golden Rule: "a man should act in such a
way that he actualizes in both himself and in uhe other such forces
as are ready for a heightened mutuality. "35 Gandhi's approach v/as
one of "giving the opponent the courage to change, "3^ vjhich
required that the satyagrahi have the same courage.
Nonviolent resistance can be viev/ed as a form of symbolic
violence. 37 Through it, one forcefully confronts the opponent
with opposing views, but not in a destructive way. The object is
to force the opponent to make a conscious choice and, through that
choice process, to examine his behavior and values. This requires
that the satyagrahi appeal to what is best in the other, and
avoid an emotional polarization that may interfere with the
opponent's ability to make the best decision. This means that
one should not appeal to a sense of guilt within, or place guilt
upon the opponent. Guilt is often related to issues other than
the speci- Ic ones at hand. Since the object is to help the
opponent reexamine a specific issue, such indirect or unrelated
issues would only muddy the situation and, thus, interfere with
the purpose of the satyagrahi.
The nature of self-fulfilling prophecies requires that the
satyagrahi deal x^rith his opponent on the basis of good faith. At
the same time, he must realistically be prepared to suffer if there
is a breach of tnat faith. By appealing to what is beso in the
opponent, one helps him to realize the elements of good intent
that he may possess. This kind of behavior on the part of the
satyagrahi, particularly when he accepts suffering v/illingly and
cheerfully, is likely to be quite contrary to the behavior
expected by the opponent. Bondurant argued that the result may
be sufficiently shocking to the opponent to break his normal,
stereotyped patterns of thought—allowing him to freshly examine
the dissenting views.
on
Throughout, the idea is to hold up a mirror to the opponent.-^
By clinging to ahimsa and, thus, presenting no threat to the
opponent, except to the extent that he projects a threat upon
them, the resisters become the mirror of his acts. Wien the
opponent eventually secs v/hat he is doing to them, he is able
to see himself and confront his truth.
Erik son has suggested that mankind is divided by its
attitudes into many separate groups, or ’’pseudo-species,*' which
define themselves by reference to such things as race, religion,
nationality, and ideaology.39 The members within each group
(define themselves as better than those of the other groups
5
they are the center of their universe. It is, then, permissible
to behave violently toward members of other groups, but not toward
members of one's own. He argued that in order to reduce violence
we must widen our identity to include what has previously been
defined as other pseudo-species. This is what Ghandi did in Ills
relationship with his adversaries. He refused to deal ;d.th them in
a manner which degraded them. "He refused, then, to permit that
cumulative aggravation of bad conscience, negative identity, and
hypocritical moralism which characterize the division of men
into pseudo-species."^^ In Boulding's words, he "refused to
exclude even the enemy from his community.
Thomas Merton eloquently summarized Gandhi's philosophy
when he vrrote that;
[GandhianJ non-violence implies a kind of bravery far
different from violence. In the use of force, one
simplifies the situation by assuming that the evil
to be overcome is clear-cut, definite, and irrever-
sible. Hence there remains but one thing: to eli-
minate it. Any dialogue v;ith the sinner, any
question of the irreversibility of his acts, only
means faltering and failure. Failure to eliminate
evil is itself a defeat. . . .
A violent change |_howeverJ would not have been a
serious change at all. To punish and destroy
the oppressor is merely to initiate a nev; cycle of
violence and oppression. The only real liberation
is that v;hich liberates both the oppressor and the
oppressed at the same timic fre.i the same tyrannical
automatism of the violent process v;hich contains
in itself the curse of irreversibility. ...
True freedom is then inescapable from the inner
strength xjhich can assume the common burden of
evil v;hich ireighs both on oneself and one’s adver-
sary. False freedom is only a manifestation of the
weakness that cannot bear even one's ovm evil unx.il
it is projected xinto the other an.d seen as exclusively
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his. The highest form of spiritual freedom is, as
Gandhi believed, to be sought in the strength of
heart which is capable of liberating the oppressed
and oppressor together. ^2
Paulo Freire
Paulo Freire’ s concerns have been similar to Gandhi’s. He,
too, has worked to free the oppressed from oppression, and he has
considered dialogue to be a vital element in this process. Unlike
Gandhi, he has considered dialogue to be of value primarily in
interactions among the oppressed and those who are working for
liberation, but not of great value in their interactions with their
oppressors. Also, he has approached the task as a radical educator
steeped in Marxist materialism, as opposed to Ghandi’s social
activism which was based upon a spiritual quest. Gandhi spoke
in terms of mutual evolution; Freire in terms of Social revolution.
While working in literacy education in Brazil, and for
agrarian reform in Chile, Freire had the opportunity to direct
a great deal of thought and action to the problem of oppression.
He developed an educational method, which he called the pedagogy
of the oppressed, designed to enable oppressed people to
recognize their state of oppression and act to change their
condition, Kis writing is difficult to grasp quickly, because
he has developed a personal vocabulary and style. In addition,
he assumed that his readers will be familiar with Marxian
dialectical theory~~a prerequisite to understanding the full
implications of his thinking.
Edwin Burtt summarized the core of Marxism as follows;
E/erjaning in the univei-se is chang.mg; there are no
static realities. But there are laws of change which
can be scientifically grasped, and v/hen they are
grasped, those who understand them are able to guide
the changes tov/ard humanly desirable ends. The
fundamental lav;s are dialectical—that is, they
reveal that the universe is a ceaseless process of
^
generation, interplay, and resolution of antagonisms
between opposing forces, ^3
This dialectical process is historically determined, inevitable,
and can not be altered from its course. The person who is aware
of this process, and who can identify the forces v;hich are in
dialectical opposition can work to hasten their resolution.
What is created through the synthesis of the opposing forces is,
in our historical context, necessarily good. The basic proposition
of Marxism is:
That in every historical epoch the prevailing mode of
economic production and exchange, and the social
organization necessarily follov:ing from it, form
the basis upon which is built up, and from which
alone can be explained, the political and intel-
lectual history of that epoch; that, consequently,
the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution
of nrimitive tribal society, holding land in common
vwnership) has been a history of class struggles,
contests betv/een exploiting and expMted, ruling and
oppi-essed classes; that the history of these class
struggles forras a series of evolutions in v;hich,
nowadays, a stage has been reached where the
exploited and oppressed class—the proletariat
—
cannot attain its em.ancipation from the sway of
the exploiting and ruling class—the bourgeoisie—
without at the same tim.', and once and for all,
emaj'icipating society at large from all exploitation,^
oppression, class distinctions and class struggles.
Freire believes that each period in history is characterized by
a series of generalized aspirations and values. ^5 in order to
exercise autonomous control over their lives, people imist have
ohe critical ability to I’ccognize these themes which shape their
reality. However, people can be, and are, diverted from becoming
aware of these themes through advertising, propaganda, and other
forces which foster uncritical thought. The result is that they
become objects; spectators unable to interact with their times.
During a period of historical change, the old themes lose their
importance and new ones emerge. These times in particular require
uhat people have a critical understanding of their reality if they
are to play a part in fostering the new values and concerns. They
must become integrated with their reality.
To be integrated with one's realityr means being able to think
critically. A person who is capable of critical thinking is able
to recognize the contradictions (dialectical conflicts) in his
life and act to resolve these conflicts in a meaningful way. Through
this dialectical synthesis he creates a new reality. Without
critical consciousness, he is a victim of reality and the new
reality th.'.t is created by others is an alienated reality. In
short, he is oppressed,
P'reire recognizes the key theuie of our historical period to be
that of oppression. The dialectical conflict is between the
oppressor and the oppressed. The synthesis which will be produced
m
when this conflict is resolved is liberation of both the oppressor
and the oppressed. In each country, state, community, and indi-
lifs there are a mu3.titude of other sub—themes. Each
situation is characterized by its ox-in unique assemblage. The
specific way in v;hich the major conflict will be resolved will
be determined by its interplay with the sub-themes in each
context. Social action designed to bring about a synthesis which
is not alienating, then, must be designed with reference to the
specific social and individual context in which it is set,
Freire's pedagogy is directed toward this end.
In Freire's view, the world and human consciousness are
integrally linked. Our consciousness comes into being in response
to the world around us, and as our consciousness changes, so does
our v/orld—reality is transformed. This is not a passive mental
process; "humans, as beings of relationships, are challenged by
nature, which they transform through their work. The result of
this transformation, which separates itself off from them, is
their world. This is the world of culture which is prolonged
into the world of history. One who is able to consciously
participat': in this process is a "subject." One who cannot, one
v;hc is acted upon, is an "object."
Animals, including man, can adapt to the realities of their
environment. Aniir.als, though, can only adapt and must do so to
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whatever the realities nay be. People are unique in their ability
to adapt and, through a process of critical choice-making, transform
that reality, Aniriials reflex—man reflects. Those who only adapt
are called adjusted. Those who critically reoel against their
reality and attempt to transform it are often called maladjusted,
[People] are able to detach themselves from the world
in order to find their place in it and with it.
Only people are capable of this act of "separation"
ixi order to find their place in the vrorld and enter
in a critical way into their own reality. "To enter
inuo" reality means to look at it objectively, and
apprehend it as one's field of action and reflection.
It means to penetrate it more and more lucidly in
order to discover the true interrelations between
the facts observed.
Freire believes that peasants are often so much a part of their
xvorld, so merged with it, that they are unable to conceive of
transforming it. They have no sense of history and, thus, of
the possibility of change. When people reflect critically they are
aware of their past and future. For those who do not reflect
critically (all animals, and many people) the v;orld is timeless
and there is no possibility of change. The educational programs
he developed were designed to help peas-ants grow out of their
"magical," timeless stage of consciouse, into a "critical,"
historical stage.
The importance of critical thinking to the peasants is
illustrated by the v/ork he did to promote agrarian reform in
Chile,^^ The government had recognised the need to introduce nevj,
more productive agricultural tec’nniques into the peasant
agriculture.
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Toward that end, they established an agricultural extension program.
But Freire objected to the idea of extension, arguing that the
approach was paternalistic, and that it employed persuasion and
propaganda, which are cppressi/o in nature. The extension agent
is considered to be better than the people he is helping. Since
the farmer is expected merely to accept and employ the agent's
advice, there is no improvement in his critical consciousness.
He is treated as an object, Freire argued that extension is not
education, but domestication. He believed that in order to be
effective as an agent for agrarian reform, the agent must be an
educator. He must work with the farmers to improve their critical
awareness and enable them to transform their agricultural reality
in a manner that is meaningful to them. The agent's task is
communication, not extension.
The effect of extension is cultural invasion. The techniques
that are introduced have not been a part of the peasant's culture,
and are likely to alter it tremendously. Their cultural reality v;ill
be transformed without their having been involved in making the
decision as to what changes to make, or whether they should be
made at all. Cultural invasion is an act in which a subject
imposes som.ething upon objects—including doing the thinking
for them. At its root "any cultural invasion presupposes conquest,
manipulation, and messianism on the part of the invader. It pre-
supposes propaganda v/hich domesticates rather than liberateo.
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Since cultural invasion is an act of conquest per se, it needs
further conquest to sustain it. '*^9
Historical and cultural continuity are of great importance and
can be maintained only v«hen changes in a society are shaped
forces within the historical and cultural context of that
society. The alternative is an alienated society. Crop yields
are not likely to improve when the farmers are alienated from
fanning. Even if they do increase, the process of alienation is
sure to eat av;ay at other parts of the culture. In order to
prevent this, the agricultural educator must help the fanners
to the critical stage at which they can examine the proposed
agricultural techniques, and decide whether or not to employ them.
If they do decide to accept the tectiniques, they must be allowed
to fit them within the context of the empirical traditions of
their past.
The process through which the educator must communicate with
the farmers is that of dialogue. In order to establish effective
communication, Freire believes, the subjects (educators and peasants)
must address ("enter into") the same object, and share the same
linguistic universe during the period cf communication. This
establishes "intersubjectivityj " the people snare similar realities.
The object of dialogue is to identify the coutraoic cions, or
dialectical conflicts, in their shared reality j they are "naming
the world." "Dialogiie is the encounter between men, mediated by
the world, in order to name the world. "50
152
The idea of naming the world is complex, and related to
Freire's concept of "praxis.” Praxis is the dialectical synthesis
of action and reflection. Action without reflection is activism.
Reflection without action is verbalism. Alone, neither can create
a humanly meaningful reality. Critical consciousness requires
both. Together they transform the world through work. By
naming the world, we identify the conflicts in our reality, vjhich
enables us to transform reality. Praxis, work, and true word
are synonymous. The true word is the essence of dialogue.
Dialogue in any situation (whether it involves
scientific and technical knowledge
,
or existencial
knowledge) demands the problematic confrontation
of that very knowledge in its unquestionable
relationship with the concrete reality in which if
is engendered, and on which it acts, in order to
better understand, explain, and transform thau
reality. 51
In addition to the true word, dialogue also requires a number of
other elements. It requires the humility which will allow the
dialoguers to speak on a co-equal level, and a faith in human
beings and their ability (when they are not misshaped by alienation)
to transform the world in a humanly fulfilling way, Hope of a
better future is also necessary, as is the ability to think
critically. Finally, dialogue requires love.
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The naming of the world, which is an act of creation
and recreation, is not possible if it is not infused
with love. Love is at the same time the foundation
of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is necessarily
the task of responsible Subjects and cannot exist
in a relationship of domination. Tomination reveals
the pathology of love: sadism in the dominator and
masochism in the dominated. ^2
In the process of dialogically transforming the v;orld, one must
> be extremely careful about what one is transforming. The object is
to transform the reality that is jointly shared by the dialoguers;
not the people who are in dialogue. To direct such an effort at
a person would be to treat him as an object. Dialogue cannot take
place in an oppressive condition, thus, dialogue cannot be used
as an instrument of oppression. The dialoguers are not out to
dominate each other, but to conquer the world about them in an
effort to bring about their liberation from oppression.
The characteristics of dialogical social action are: 1) There
is a cooperative effort to transform the world; 2) the leaders
work to unite the people; 3) Social organization is developed
around the concept of the leaders working with the people; and
U) Cultural synthesis. In contrast, the characteristics
of
antidialogae are just the opposite: 1) Conquest; 2) Divisiveness;
3) Manipulation; and U) Cultural invasion.
These points must oe
kept in mind when one is trying to educate for critical
consciousness. Such an approach to education requires
dialogue;
it cannot happen in a state of antidialogue,
or oppression.
Freire views most education as a narrative; a one-way extension
of information from the teacher to the student— the teacher
deposits learning in the student. He referred to this approach
as the "banking" concept of educaoion. The banking approach,
though, is inhibiting and restrictive, as opposed to the dialogical
approach, which promotes freedom and creativity. Those who are
threatened by the idea of teacher-student dialogue are those who
claim sure knowledge before ignorant students. To them, dialogue
is a threat. There is a dialectical conflict in the teacher-student
relationship. Freire argues that its resolution would place both
parties in the position of teacher and student, each learning
from the other.
In true education, as Freire views it, there is nou a split
between knowing and teaching. Education is not a transference of
knowledge, but joint cognition directed to a problem shared by
the educator and educatee. The educator does not first gain
knowledge and later transmit it to the educatee. Both discover
knowledge in the process of solving problems. If the education
involves learning previously generated knowledge, then it is to
be taught in such a way that one recreates the act of knowing.
Any action or reaction occurs within a larger reality construct.
In order to educate, one must place the learning within the
larger reality. The educator must help the educatee to
penetrate
the structure of reality, understand its pattern, and
place the
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l6&rning within it. True education (which always involves
critical thinking) involves the recognition of the dialectical
conflicts in one's reality. These conflicts require resolution.
Thus, education is a process of recognizing one's i-eality as a
problem which must be solved, or transformed. The larger
reality to which education must always be related is the dialectic
of oppression. The educational process must resolve the oppressor-
oppressed conflict; it must be dialogical. True education, then,
is preparation for, and the practice of, freedom.
True education involves both the recreation of the learned
knowledge and the application of that knowledge to specific life
situations of the learners; it involves praxis. If education is
to be dialogical it must pose problems, which the educatees
solve within their own existential context. This requires the
problematization of human beings in the world. It cannot deal
with persons and the world in isolation from each other. It is
through an analysis of the objective reality of the world and
the subjective reality the people involved, that the educator
is able to develop the content of his program.
Freire developed a technique which can be used to integrate
these elements with the teacher's other educational objectives.
In order to use it effectively, it is vital that one have a
close
knowledge of the educatee's aspirations and world-view.
With
this knowledge, working in dialogue with the students,
one ther,
identifies the dialectical tensions, the "generative
themes," which
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are central to the educatees* lives. It is these themes which
become the focus of the curriculum. Whatever is taught, bo it
reading skills or agricultural techniques, is taught with
reference to the themes. Initially, the burden rests upon the
educators to identify the key generative themes. Great care
must be taken to insure that they are the people's themes, not
those of the educators unconsciously projected upon the people.
As the educatees develop critical consciousness, though, they
are able to suggest additional themes. At this point, they are
generating the curriculum in dialogue with the students. The
image of students and teachers as co-learners and co-teachers is
very important here, because it is a prerequisite to the successful
identification and use of generative themes.
Once the generative themes have been identified, they are
codified into existential situations, which are shared in the
lives of the students. The codifications are generally visual
images (e.g.; paintings, photographs, posters) in v/hich the
dialectical elements can be found. The codification must not
be obviously related to what one is trying to teach. The
educatees decode the situation by discv-^sing the pictures among
themselves and with the educator; that is, they problematize the
world recorded in the images. Since the image is representative
of a part of their world, they are problematizing their owti
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world, as well. Through this process the students enter into
their world and develop critical consciousness.
There are four stages in the development of this kind of an
educational program. In the first stage, the educator sets out
to decode, or identify the dialectical themes of the group to be
educated. The overall project is carefully explained to the
group which will be educated, and a request is made for volunteers
who will assist in the first stages of program development.
With the assistance of the volunteers, a team of educators and
social scientists conducts a thorough study of the life of the
group. This includes living in close contact with the people.
The information that is gathered is then examined and the dialectics
of the group identified.
The themes are then codified for classroom use. They are
placed in a context that is familiar to the people, but neither
too explicit, nor too enigmatic. The object is to develop a
codification imagery that can be decoded by the students, but not
so easily that tney do not become deeply involved in the process.
The existential contradictions, or dialectical themes, which are
selected ior codification should be related to other themes which
have not been codified, but which are present in the culture. In
this way, discussion of the generative themes will branch out to
other themes.
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In the third stage, the generative themes are tested.
Representatives of the social group to be educated are presented
the codifications, which are then decoded through dialogue.
Everything that transpires in this study group is recurded,
and a sociologist and a psychologist are present to study the
session. In the fourth stage, a systematic, interdisciplinary
study of what went on in the investigation circles is conducted.
A determination is made as to which of the themes tested are the
best for use in the program that is being developed. The themes
are then ordered in a functional sequence. Some additional
themes may be introduced by the educators in order to link, or
introduce elements in the program. The themes are once again
codified and the completed package becomes the center for a mass
educational prograra, which is conducted throughout the area for
which the program was designed.
The Brazilian literacy program that Freire developed in this
way appears to have been quite successful. In village study
groups, or “culture circles,” all across the co\intry, peasants
were shown the codifications. In dialogue with their teachers
they decoded them and discussed the rar.lfications of the themes
in their own lives. Only after the discussion were they shovm
the vrritten words for the dialectical themes (e.g., work,
peasant,
land owner). The word was then broken down into its phonetic
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elements, which were rearranged by the peasants to form other
words. The peas.ants' interest in the words was so great that
many were able to read a newspaper after several weeks of study.
Throughout, Freire’s major objective is to enable people
to gain critical control over their lives. Inevitably, this
process is connected to the major dialectical conflict of our
'time, that between the oppressor and the oppressed. By his
definition, ”Any situation in i^hich 'A’ objectively exploits
’B’ or hinders his pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible
person is one of oppression. He realizes that any method
which is employed to resolve this conflict must not embody the
conf].ict. It must, if at all possible, be dialogical, rather than
oppressive. The true radical, in Freire's view, is a person
who is committed to this in the praxis of his life. He is
committed to dialogue, and his role is that of a liberator.
But Freire argued that dialogue is impossible between people
who are antagonistic to each other. Since the oppressor is
likely to respond to the liberation of the oppressed with
antagonism, it may be necessary for the oppressed to reluctantly
resort to violence in order to achieve liberation. The people
will not, however, be responsible for initiating the violence—it
was initiated by the act of oppression. The violence directed
against the oppressor, though, is not itself oppressive, because
its objective is to liberate the oppressor. The oppressor has not
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reached the state of critical consciousness which will allow him
to recognize and act to resolve the historical theme of oppression.
Liberation liberates the oppressors as v;ell as the oppressed. Thus,
acts performed by revolutionaries to promote liberation are not
oppressive, including any acts of social control v/hich prevent
the reemergence of oppression.
Consciously or unconsciously, the act of rebellion by
the oppressed (an act which is always, or nearly
always, as violent as the initial violence of the
oppressors) can initiate love. ... As the oppressed,
fighting to be human, take away the oppressor's power
to dominate and supress, they restore to the oppressors
the humanity they had lost in the exercise of oppresion.^°
Paulo Freire's writing communicates his great, loving concern
for the oppressed peoples of the world, and demonstrates his
commitment to helping them achieve liberation. His dialogical
approach to education as a form of social action appears to provide
a means for achieving social change without creating an alienating
world. His underlying philosophy is very similar to those of
Burtt and Gandhi. Freire argued that the educator must regard
the students as being of intrinsic value, and that the two must share
in a group identity. Also, he pointed out that the educator must
overcome his own self-interest in order to foster the fullest grov/th
and liberation of his students. Finally, he realized that means
and ends could not be separated j that the effort to overcome
oppression must not be oppressive.
However, Gandhi explicitly, and Burtt implicitly, extended their
161
sense of group identity to include all people, Freire, on the
other hand tended to identify with the oppressed in opposition
to the oppressors. Dialogue is the necessary mode of interaction
with the oppressed, but violence may be directed against the
oppressors. This does not mean that he totally rejected the
oppressors. On the contrary, his convictions about the value
of liberation were so great that he was able to view violent
revolution as an act of love tov/ard the oppressors, because they
too would be liberated. This means that the oppressors and the
oppressed can potentially become members of the same group,
although at the present they are not.
But really now; loving violence? Perhaps Freire is able to
violently liberate the oppressors for their own good, but can
we expect such altruism in a massive social movement of liberation?
Even Gandhi, who taught that the opponent should be loved, and
should not be treated with violence in any form, found that the
movement he had led v/as unable to hold to that ideal. Can we
expect better of a movement based upon selective, loving violence?
Perhaps a true movement of liberation would not even use the methods
of oppressors—violence,
A revolution is supposed to be a change that turns
everything around. But the ideology of political
revolution will never change anything except
appearances. There will be violence, and power
will pass from one party to another, but when the
smoke clears and the bodies of all the dead men
are underground, the situation will oe essentially
the same as it was before: there v;ill be a minority
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of strong men in power exploiting all the others for
their own ends. There will be the same greed and
cruelty and lust and ambition and avarice and hypocrisy
as before, 57
Ferxiaps we will never be able to ^ring about major social change
without violence. But let us not delude ourselves by calling it
love* Let us at least call it, as Gandhi did, weakness. The
vjhoie issue of violence occupies only a small portion of Freire's
writing, and it is possible to blow it out of proportion. It
does, however, point to a still greater problem, that of dogma.
If coercive techniques are justified in the face of an \inresponsive
oppressor, are they not justified in the face of an unresponsive
peasant? Is Freire not arguing, "I will dialogue with you so long
as you see the v;orld in my way, or can be educated to see it
my way," Throughout, Freire has written of helping people gain
critical consciousness of their reality, and helping them to achieve
liberation. But nowhere does he explicitly address the issue of
empowering them to reject his fundamental political and social
philosophy,
I have found the arguments of Burtt and Gandhi about the short-
comings of dogma too persuasive to allow me to quickly accept this
part of Freire *s theory, ’//hat is the source of his intransigence?
Marxist interest in dialectics is motivated primarily by an
interest
in the evolution of hiiman society. The historical
change that is
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brought about through the resolution of dialectical opposites is
viewed as historically inevitable. Although Freire is not a Marxist
in the traditional sense, he does seen to accept this view of
historical inevitability.
The motivating interests of Marxists, however, can limit the
range of dialectics which they see as relevant to their interpre-
tation of history and, thus, limit their interpretation of history.
There seem to be three major weaknesses in the Marxist view,^^
First, it gives rise to millenarian expectations of a liberated
society almost entirely devoid of human exploitation. This can
lead to a tendancy to deny or deemphasize the presence of oppression
in the post-revolutionary society. Also, Marxism gives rise to
the dogmatic delusion that one is not subject to delusion and,
thus, is best equipped to know vrhat is best for those who are
recognized to be deluded. Finally, the very intensity of the
Marxist's emotional commitment to his cause predisposes him to
unconsciously make everything fit his social theory.
Edwin Burtt has proposed four presuppositions which, if
adopted, would free Marxism from these weaknesses, yet preserve
its strengths.
1, There is a dialectic of histoi'y> which works
through
dynamic social forces as well as through lorces in the
individual recognized by existentialism. . . •
2, Th© lai'Ts according "to v/hich "those Torces operate
can be mderstood by the human mind, which thus puts
itself in a position to direct them tov/ard desirable
ends. Indeed, understanding and action are not
separable, as most theories of knov;ledge have
assuraeNi, ... The \mdei'standing thus gained is
alvjays capable of being improved, not only in
details of policy but also in the ultimate philosophi-
cal principles. Hence there is always more to learn
from growing experience, from other Marxists, and from
opponents of Marxism.
3» In the interplay of forces which constitute the
dialectical process, economic forces play a special
role so long as man has to live in a scarce
economy.
. . .
U. The ideal goal toward which this historical
process is moving, and v;hich v;e can help realize
by intelligent action, is a brotherhood of man in
which class distinctions will have disappeared suid
all persons vri.ll recognize by attitude and conduct
that they are members one of another. ... It is
vital to remember that the means to be chosen
in pursuing this goal must be in essential harmony
with that goal, otherv/ise v;hat is actually achieved
will be a different goal. Hence, wherever possible,
nonviolent must replace violent revolution as an
instrument of social change.
Freire subscribes to this last presupposition. The dialogical
methods he described are designed to achieve nonviolent social
change. His definition of the revolutionary is deeply embedded in
a recognition of the nature of self-fulfilling prophecies, and
requires that radicalism favor love and dialogue over violence. Both
he and Gandhi agreed on this point. They differed, though, in their
understanding of the extent to vjhich nonviolence is possible.
Gandhi believed it possible, and necessary, at all times, except
when the only alternative is cowardice. Freire believed that
it
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reaches its limit when one is dealing with the oppressor. In thi*'
case, he supported violence, because he v/as certain of the historical
inevitability, and the fundamental goodness of the social change
he envisioned, Gandhi did not grant truth to the idea, that \ie can
know such an absolute truth and felt compelled to cling to his
near-dogma of ahimsa, nonviolence.
The Marxist view of history strongly colored Freire's under-
standing of the nature of dialogue. He taught within the context
of an inevitable social evolution, and his pedagody was designed
to promote progress toward his image of liberation. His dialogical
approach, then, is designed tc integrate the program content (be
it reading, agrarian reform, or fly tying) within the existential
context of the student. There were no provisions, though, for
dialogically establishing the fundamental program objectives, be-
cause they were not recognized as being open to question.
He developed a pedagogic technique which employs powerful
psychological tools. Its tacit objective is to shape the student’s
world-view, and ethos. How, and whether, one uses these tools
should be a question of great moral significance. What they
create will reflect the values which mc-.ivatc their use, and
these values should be the object of continuous examination and
soul-searching. If one views the end to which the tools are
employed as inevitable and unquestionably good, though, there
is
no opportunity for mora3. examination.
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There are two ways in which Freire tacitly avoides moral
responsibility for his pedagogy of the oppressed. First, he
believes that as people increase in critical consciousness and
move toward liberation, they are becoming more fully human. This
would seem to be a worthy objective. But this implies that
people v/ho live in x^hat he calls the magical state of timelessness
are less human—their humanity is devalued. The world-view based
upon a sense of cyclical time is characteristic of primative,
or traditional, cultures. These peoples exist in a world in which
time is measured in terms of biological, seasonal, and astronomical
cycles. As a result of the cyclical, rather than linear, nature
of time in their existential reality, they are without history
in the Western sense, and do not emphasize the concept of progressive
change. The classical civilizations of the Far East also shared
this sense of time.^^ Are members of traditional cultures, and
ancient Chinese philosophers really less human than Freire?
I am not trying to argue that peasants should not be empov/ered
to influence the political and economic forces which shape their
lives. Nor am I tr;,'’ing to address the question of Xi/hether tradi-
tional cultures should be isolated and preserved, or absorbed into
the dominant world culture. Certainly, in the particular situations
with w’/iich Freire was working, the peasants were not isolated.
Rather, they were systematically exploited by a political and
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economic elite—and continue to be po exploited. Under these
conditions, their v;orld-view is alienated from the political and
economic realities of the objective vrorld in v/hich they live,
i, personally, am in agreement wiuh Freire's goals, I am,
hov;ever, tr^ang to point out that Freire’s understanding of
what is hraman is quite culture-bound and, thus, dogmatic.
Another way in v;hich Freire avoids moral responsibility for
his actions was through his use of the concept of "fear of freedom."
He argued that many of the oppressed are afraid of the respon-
sibility of freedom associated v;ith liberation and, thus,
tacitly help to perpetuate oppression. In addition, the oppressors
are afraid to give up their false freedom to oppress and accept
the true freedom of liberation. If this concept is carried too
far, it can be used to counter any criticism of his theories or
methods. Instead of thoughtfully dealing with criticism, it
becomes possible to unconsciously deflect it by labeling it as
defensiveness.
Freire wrote that, "Dialogue is an I—Thou relationship betvjeen
two Subjects. Each time the ’thou’ is changed into an object,
and ’it,’ dialogue is subverted and education is changed to
deformation. He used Martin Buber’s terminology and, I assume,
intended to use his conception of dialogue. But Buber pointed out
that in an I-iou relationship, one cannot approach another
with any
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intent in mind. The dialogical relationship is an end in itself.
He specifically stated that the intention to educate is incompatible
with an I~You relationship. Education, then, is always associated with
a deformation. This places the burden upon tiiO educator to decide
vihat kind of deformation to value, and to continually x/restle
with the question of the rightness of that value.
The idea of "consciousness raising" has become widely accepted
by educators and social activists. But v/hat does the tenn mean?
It implies that one kind of consciousness (the consciousness
raiser's) is higher, or better, than another (the consciousness
raisee's). The v/hole issue of what are the criteria by which one
can be established as being better than another is not generally
addressed. Indeed, the language masks the issue. I strongly
suggest that the tern "consciousness changing" be used instead.
It does not automatically imply that one kind of consciousness is
better, or worse than another, and makes it a little more difficult
to hide behind the dogmatic assumption of superiority.
By dwelling upon what 1 see as weaknesses in his philosophy,
I do not want to overlook the strengths of Freire's concept of
dialogue. I strongly support his objectives and I am excited oy
the potentials of his pedagogy. However, the use of generative
themes as psychological tools is not inextricably linked to
his
dialogical method. This realization has led many people to
express great concern about the potential m.isuse of his
methods.
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particularly by the United States Agency for International
Development which has demonstrated an interest in them. The
morality of Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed can not be judged
solely on the basis of written reports. It can only be judged in
praxis; in the synthesis of reflection and action. As with any
form of engineering or behavioral technology, the quality of the
world it creates will reflect the quality of the minds and
hearts that employ it. For this reason, I feel that Freire’s
technique must be linked with Gandhi's value of ahimsa, and
Burtt's approach to understanding.
Social Mutualism
Despite their differences, all four men approached their work
with a Mutuality value orientation, which found expression in their
dialogical methods and philosophies. An examination of their
methods and philosophies reveals a number of factors which are
characteristic of social mutualism. These can be arranged into
three clusters, which I will call the elements of social Mutuality.
Element One ; Mutuality occurs within a meaningful whole . Those
who are engaged in a mutualistic interaction are viewed as members
of the same group, not as members of different pseudo-species. As
such, each is of intrinsic value, and each occupies a meaningful
position within the whole. Mutualistic acts promote meaningfulness
and x>rholeness, raLher than alienation and fraginentaticn. Means and
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ends are not alienated from each other, but are joined end of
equal importance.
Element Tv;o ; Mutuality requires openmindednes
s
. This means
that one must strive to be free of dogma, which requires thau one
have the humility to recognize one’s limitations. It is also
necessary that one try to be aware of one’s presuppositions and try
to be free of self-interests which might distort one’s understanding
of others.
Element Three ; Mutuality promotes the welfare of others . One
acts not just to promote one’s own welfare, but the welfare of
others as well. The basic psychological motive which promotes these
acts is love.
Burtt, Gandhi, and Freire did not speak of dialogue in the
ideal sense established by Buber. They used dialogue as a means
to an end; philosophic understanding, social change, and education.
Their means however, embodied the three elements of social Mutuality.
The difference between them and Buber was that dialogue in Buber’s
sense does not involve a dialectic. True; there are two or more
parties involved, and they do maintain their separate identities,
but while they are in dialogue there is a full communion, without
tension or conflict. The others used dialogue as a means of
achieving a synthesis of differing ideas, or social forces.
The relationship betv/een these differing approaches can
be
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visuala.zed as a spect-ruin. At. one end of the spectrum is the
dialogical, or mutualistic state as formulated by Buber. It
is an ideal which cannot be actualized in this world, but tov;ard
which we may elect to strive. At the other end of this spectrum
is monologue, or domination. At the domination extreme there is
no possible synthesis of opposing forces, only perpetual anta-
gonism, The only resolution possible is the complete victory of
one, at the complete destruction of the other. Thus, a dialectical
synthesis is impossible at either end of the spectrum.
Dialectical conflicts fall between these extremes. Just where
they fall is determined by the methods employed to achieve a
synthesis. Gandhi, for example, would lie close to the Mutualistic
end, Freire might fall closer to the middle, but on the mutualistic
side. Adolf Hitler would rest far on the domination side.
If we take a closer look at this model, we will recognize that
the methods of dialogue and monologue are in dialectical conflict,
as are the value orientations which underly them. Mutuality and
DoiTiination.^2 The resolution of each dialectical conflict between
ideas or social forces, also involves a resolution of the dialec-
tical conflict between the methods and values v;hich might be
employed. It behooves us, in this day and age, to try to solve
our social problems by employing methods which fall tovjard the
DialogueAlutuality end of the spectrum. With the av;esome military
172
power that we now hold in our hands, monologue/Domination may not
mean the victory of one at the destruction of the other, but the
destruction of us all.
Thinking on a more humble scale, the seemingly perennial
human values associated with "good" tend to be identified with
dialogue, and those of "evil" with monologue. We will be known
and remembered by the synthesis of these two extremes as they are
actualized in the praxis of our lives.
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CHAPTER IV
ENVIRONMENTAL MUTUALISM
The fir.al victory of man’s machinery over natvres’
materials is the next logical process in evolution,
as nature's control of human society was the
transition from anarchic and pviny individualism to
the group acting as a powerful, intelligent
organism. Machinery, science, and intelligence
moving on the face of the earth may well affect
it as the elements do, upbuilding, obliterating,
and creating; but they are man's forces and will
be used to hasten his dominion over nature.
Simon N, Patten^
Man is amazing, but he is not a masterpiece. . . .
Perhaps the artist was a little mad. Eh? VJhat
do you think? Sometimes it seems to me that man
is come where he is not wanted, where there is
no place for him; for if not, why would he v;ant
all of the place? Why should he run about here
and there making a great noise about himself,
talking about the stars, disturbing the blades
of grass?
pJoseph Conrad
In defying nature, in destroying nature, in
building an arrogantly selfish man-centered,
artificial world, I do not see how man can
gain peace or freedom or joy. I have faith in
man's future, faith in the possibilities latent
in the human experiment: but it is faith in man
as a part of nature, v/orking wjth the forces
that govern the forests and the seas; faith in
man sharing in life, not destroying it.
Marston Bates^
To what extent are the three elements of social mutualism
relevant as guides for interacting with our non-human environment?
Obviously, there are enormous differences between human
beings and
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non-hvunan objects, which would appear to argue against the possi-
bility of ervironmental mutualism. One of the most important of
these is the impossibility of conscious, symbolic communication be-
tween humans and their non-human environment. We cannot talk
things over with our local ecosystem and reach a mutually
beneficial agreement.^
It is not at all surprising that many of the people who have
written about social mutualism have based their ideas upon the
process of dialogue. Language plays a central role in the exchange
of information between people, particularly on a conscious level.
Through language we are able to communicate our needs to others,
defend our interests, discuss the views and needs of others, take
steps to correct misunderstandings, and negotiate agreements.
Non-verbal communication has been increasingly recognized as
playing an important part in our interactions v/ith each other,
but two people in face-to-face conversation provide the basic
image of social communication.
If language is a prerequisite of mutuality, the attempt to
establish a mutualistic interaction with our non-human environment
is doomed to failure. However, language is not a prerequisite
of
mutuality. Under the guidance of the Mutuality value orientation
we can act to establish a mutualistic state. Such a
state can be
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defined by the presence of a reciprocal, double-vrin relationship
between the parties involved. The mutualistic process through
which this state is reached (if, indeed, it is ever actually
achieved for any length of time) involves an exchange of infor-
mation between the parties, and the selection of these actions
vjhich will foster the m.utualistic state. The great difference
between the tv;o is that humans can act with mutualistic intentions
and can exercise conscious choice. In general, our non-human
environment can do neither.
Language is the major means by which people exchange infor-
iTiation. In order to establish dialogue (a form of mutualism)
there must be a reciprocal exchange of information, and each
speaker must try to insure that the interests of the other are
satisfied, rather than each trying to insure their own interests
at the expense of the other. These characteristics of reci-
procity and double-win are not dependent upon spoken language,
and can be found in modes of interaction other than verbal com-
munication, Love-making, for example, at its best is a form of
non-verbal dialogue, or mutuality.
Despjte the fact that ve do not interact with our non-human
environment through speech or writing, we are engaged with it in
a complex exchange of information. Ecology is, in large part,
a study of these feedback systems, and evolution is the
selective
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change in these systems through time, lihat ve do influences our
environment j which in turn influences us, VJe have discovered that
the ways in which we interact with the world arouno us have
profound effect^ upon our health, the availability of resources,
and many other aspects of our lives. The very perception of our
environmental problems is, at its root, a perception of the feedback
relationship betv;een people and their environment.
People have always been involved in a reciprocal exchange of
information vri.th their environment, although generally only on a
tacit level, VJe are now trying to incorporate our growing aware-
ness and understanding of these processes into the ways in which
v;e consciously plan cir lives, VJe are discovering that our efforts
to dominate our non-human environment in order to achieve short-
term goals is having harmful long-term effects upon us. Environ-
mental mutualism will not establish a reciprocal relationship
between people and their envirorjnent; that already exists. VJhat
it will do is help us to make wise use of our awareness of
that
relationship, and foster acts which will be to the mutual
advantage
of both parties.
The u.-rm '-’environmental Mutuality" might be used in
tv;o viays.
The first refers to the value orientation which
underlies the way in
which people make decisions among themselves
with respect to the way
they interact with their environment. This
is a form of social
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mutualism. The only distinction is that they are dealing with
each other on issues related to the environment, I prefer not
to use "environmental Mutuality" in this sense.
The second- sense ox the term refers to the value orientation
underlying the ways in which individuals and groups interact
with their environment* It refers to interactions between humans
and non~humans. Envi.ronmental Mutuality in the first sense was
really dealt with in the third chapter, and I will not explore
it any further here, except as it is relevant to specific issues
v/hich may arise in ny discussion of our interactions with non-
humans. Rather, 1 iitll focus upon mutualistic interactions betvreen
Individual people and their non-human ecological environment, I
will emphasise individual, rather than societal or cultural
interact: ons with the environment, because a familiarity with
this level of interaction will be of a greater immediate relevance
to education. I will focus upon interactions with our ecological
environment, rather than v/ith individual objects or wholely non-
living aspects of our environment, because it is this level of
interaction v/liicn is iriost rcj-svant to the central issues of my
dissertation.
It is veiy important to keep in mind that I will not attempt
to advocate specifix. ways in vinich people should physically
interact vri.th their environment. Instead, 1 will try to identify
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the value orientation which should play an important part in
guiding them in their effort to gain knowledge about, and make
decisions concerning their environment and the ways in which
they ought to intei-act with it. If I give specific examples
of ways in which people can interact with and alter their en-
vironment, it is to illustrate the process involved, rather than
to recommend the specific result of the process. I will be
pointing to the values v:hich I feel should underly the ways in
which we decide hov; vie should act. My assumption is that in many
situations, if not most, there is a great variety of behavioral
options which may lead to a wise mutualistic interaction.
Different individuals, societies, and cultures may make very
different, but equally mutualistic and environmentally effective
decisions, which are in harmony with their own special character.
My proposal is that v/e foster the mutualistic approach to making
these decisions.
It is, also, important to keep in mind that all value
orientations are always present in a culture. This implies that
it is impossible to reach the point at which we are guided solely
by that of Mutuality. Both Domination sjid Submission value
orientations will always be with us, and may be the most
appropriate guides in some situations. Although I will be
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focussing aljnost entirely upon Mutuality in my discussion, I
do not propose that Mutuality should become our universal guide.
VJhat i^ Nature ?
VJhat is this non-human thing with which we are to interact?
Most people would call it "nature,” or the "natural viorld." But
VJhat is nature? In popuj.ar usage the word appears to refer to
that part of the world xvhich is not human. Thus, the world is
divided into tvjo parts: humanity and nature. This is the
distinction associated with the Judeo-Christian tradition, in
which people are viewed as the only creatures on earth which
share a spiritual link with God. In this sense, we are at
least partly supernatural. However, when we now speak of humanity
as distinct from nature, we generally do not mean to say that
we are supernatural.^
V/e can discover what we do mean by asking, "What about us is
not natural?" Our teeth, feet, eyes, and legs are natural.
So,
too, are our needs to sleep, eat, and excrete, and those
for
sex, shelter, and warmth. What of us is not natural?
In answer
to this question, people often point to our homes,
cities, art
machines, politics, books, sciences, religions, clothes,
music
hopes, and dreams. The distinction between
what of us is natural
and vhat is unnatural generally leads to the
distinction between
the blc-physical world and culture (in the
anthropological sense
of the word). What sets us apart from nature is the phenomenon
of culture.
Culture permits us to consciously act upon our environment to
get what we need in order to survive and, hopefully, to enjoy a
quality of life beyond that of mere biological survival. We
still suffer floods, crop fai].ures, diseases, droughts, rainy
days, and other calamities, but our ingenuity, forethought, and
technology allovr us to alleviate their full potential impact.
Many people, those who are strongly guided by the Domination
value orientation, believe that we will eventually be able to
completely control nature and become totally secure from its
vicisitudes. Movement in this direction defines their concept
of progress.
There is, hov/ever, a problem v/ith this view. It implies
that we are apart from nature and can do to it as we please without
repercussions. It further implies that we can ultimately achieve
complete separation from nature (see figure 5a). This view is
not in keeping with our ecological understanding of the world. It
seems to be strongly colored by a wish-fulfillment fantasy: ”If I
close my eyes real tight and wish with a.i.! my might, all the bad
things will go away and I can get everything I want." From an
ecological perspective we are not, and cannot be, separate from
nature. We are within it. We are a subset of nature, with our
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ovm unique characteristics (see figure I?b),
Some people might agree, "Yes, ve are animals and share a
common biological identity with the other creatures of this world.
As such, we also depend upon the life supporting ecological
processes, of course. But there is also something in us which
is outside of nature and uniquely human. That is our conscious
intelligence, and the cult\iral characteristics which SiB derived
from it," (see figure 5c).
There is a merit to this argument, because we have charac-
teristics which are truely unique. But if this is the case, then
why do we not also place the unique characteristics of other
organisms outside of nature? Spiders, for example, might
classify their webs as something outside of nature, as might the
beaver its dam, the archer fish its ability to spit water, and the
whales their sonar. Are v/e not being unnecessarily anthropocentric
in much the same way that a tribal group might ethnocentrically
call itself, "The People?" Perhaps all we are trying to do is
call ourself, "The Species." Why is it that we must invest so
much effort into trying to define ourselves as wholely unique and
superior beings?
It can be arg'^ed that the exaraples I just used are of innate
traits which are transmitted genetically, whereas culture
is learned
This would appear to make us different, but we are not
the only
animals capable of learning. We are discovering
that some of the
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elements of culture also exist elsewhere in the animal kingdom.
At one time v:e defined ourselves as the tool using animal, but
wo found sea otters using stones to open clams, and birds using
cactus spines to probe bark for insects. We then called
ourselves the tool making animal, until we found chimpanzees
fabricating clubs by pulling twigs and leaves off of branches.
We then said that we alo.-.* fabricate tools and save them for
future use, until we found chimps dragging their clubs around
with them. Even the argument that we alone are capable of
symbolic communication is being questioned.
The capacity for culture has been evolving for a long time,
and did not suddenly appear in our species. When we examine the
living and fossil records we can find many suggestions of emerging
potentials for culture, both in the line of our pre-human
predecessors, and elsewhere in the animal world. This is not
to
say that there is not something special about us. Our
capacity
for culture is far more developed than it is in any
other species
on earth, but this is a quantitative, rather
than a qualitative
difference. Let us, then, consider culture to be
a part of nature,
instead of something separate from nature.
Cultural processes are
exceptional in contrast to biological processes,
just as the
biological are exceptional in contrast to
physical processes. All
however, are of nature and are natural.
This may all seem to be a verbal game, but what is of
crucial importance is the world-views which underly the verbal
distinctions. In the view that I am proposing, the terms
"nature" and "natural" cease to have any obvious meaning,
and the human/nature dichotomy is weakened. Everything is
"nature" and is "natural," It will be a lot easier to approach
our non-human environment in a mutualistic manner if vc view
ourselves as linked with, rather than separate from it.
As our power to manipulate the world increased over the
course of the past few centuries, we increasingly saw our
destiny as that of subjugating nature, mastering it, and
forming it as we willed. The world was viewed as a stage upon
which we conducted the human dance. The objects in our ecological
environment were seen as stage props, v;hich could be pushed
around as we wished, VJe are now beginning to realize, however,
that they are not simply passive props; they are fellow dancers.
We are beginning to realize that the name of the dance is not
Humanity, but Life. The dance is too important to endanger by
upstaging the other dancers and making them miss their step.
The pattern is subtle indeed, and there is no chance of under-
standing it withouf-^ paying attention to the detailed interweaving
of choreography and music.
At one time our parts were small and it did not matter
much
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what we did, because our actions were of relatively little signi-
ficance, Now, however, we are primadonnas with the power to make
or break the show. But if the .-^how folds, so do we. But despite
our sense of self-importance we are not too sure just how the
dance goes. We search for the Choreographer, Director, or
Producer, but we do not know what they look like and cannot recog-
nize them in the crowd, if they are in the crowd at all. Our
only hope lies in the dance itself: a great production of music
and motion which could collapse at any moment.
Perhaps we can stumble about for a while, watching, listening,
trying to pick up the steps and rhythm. As we watch, we discover
that the other dancers seem to know their parts very well; steps
flow smoothly as they engage in a complex interplay of song
and
dance. We feel that if we were able to watch from a high
platform,
and listen with an omniscient ear, we could see, hear,
and under-
stand the grand, ever-changing design. But we are down
on tne
stage, jostled by the crowd as we improvise faltering steps
and
discordant notes.
We discover that if, in bluff and bluster, we
push and stumble
about, we create an expanding wave of confusion
around us, as
other dancers are bumped and knocked down,
and their songs are
interrupted. They get up and try to begin
again, but some have
difficulty finding the melody, and others
are limping. We discover
that if we remain silent and motionless,
we are overwhelmed by
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the others, knocked down ourselves and trampled. We must discover
the underlying, evolving pattern that unifies our performarices,
and develop our own unique vari-ibions which, although characteris-
tically ours, harmonizes with those of our fellow dancers. We are
learning slowly, but we are learning. Let us hope that we can
join the harmony before we have been so disruptive that there is
no dance left to join.
Our task is to learn to interact with our non-human ecological
environment in such a way that the outcome will be to our advantage.
Since we depend upon our environment for survival, and to maintain
lives of a certain quality (whatever that quality may be) the
outcome must also be to the advantage, or at least not to the
detriment of our bio-physical world. The pattern of interaction,
then, is very much like a dance. If we do not dance well, we may
find our feet trod upon. On the other hand, if we find the rhythm
and establish a mutualistic relationship with our partner, we can
enjoy the dance. We may even be able to change the step a bit and
lead our partner along with us. There is, however, a limit in the
variation which we can introduce, and to the rapidity with which
v/e can introduce it. This is the limit of the laws governing
life and ecological and cultural processes,
A point of clarification: Nature is not our partner. N_ature
is the dance; both dancers and choreography. The
dancers are the
plants, animals, rocks, rivers, and other objects of our world.
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including ourselves. We are in the dance with them, and are
equally a part of nature. We are a subset of nature, not distinct
from it.
It would be useful to abandon the use of the word, "nature."
It is a word with many meanings, and which conjures up the
dichotomous human/nature world-view. In one sense the word
refers to those portions of our v/orld other than humar.i ty and
human culture, I propose that we use "non-human environment,"
or "bio-physical environment" instead. They are much less
ambiguous terms. In a second sense, "nature" refers to plants
and animals in their "natural" environment without human inter-
ference. I find it difficult to discover a word which can
replace "nature" in this sense, "Ecological environment" is too
broad, because it would include people as well, "Non-human
ecological environment" is accurate, but awkward. In the balance
of this dissertation I will use the word, "nature," in this
sense, I will not use the word, "nature," to refer bo a system
separate from us, but to refer to the other parts of the greater
system of which we are a part.
There is still some ambiguity in this iise of the word,
because we are creating a dichotomy of convenience, rather than
one which is genuine. Is the non-urban landscape of New
England
nature? The agricultural land and second (or third) growth
forests
are the product of intensive human impact. Does the line lie
somewhere between cities and active farms, active farms and
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abandoned fields, or second growth forests and pristine wilder-
ness? Where do v/e place bald eagles which contain DDT in their
body fats? We are dealing with a continuuin between the extremes
of untouched nature and an environment of complete human
fabrication (e.g., a spc« e capsule). The dividing line is merely
a useful fiction, and we must not lose sight of this fact.
Another word which we should exercise great care in using,
if not cease to use altogether, is ’’natural,” First of all, if
everything is a part of nature, then everything is natural
(characteristic of, or a product of nature) and the word ceases
to have meaning. The greatest problem with the use of this word,
though, does not lie so much in our understanding of our place in
the physical structure of the universe (our world-view), but in
our understanding of the moral, or religious significance of our
environment (our ethos), ’l^^hat is natural, and therefore beautiful
and good, to one person may be uncivilized, and therefore
ugly
and bad, to another.
Paul Santmire has argued that there are two important,
but
largely unarticuiated religious cults within the
society of the
United States; the "cult of the simple rustic
life,” and the ’’cult
of compulsive manipulation.” The first, which
is a religion of
193
nature, is a curreiit expression of the nineteenth century theme.
Nature versus Civilization.
Thoreau’s philosophy—increasingly popular toda^
—
is the prototype of the first theme. Nature versus
Civilization, Positively, this theme means the
individual seeks Deity, virtue, and vitality in
nature, especially wild nature, and that he strives
for personal purity and vitality of soul through
communion with the v:orld of nature. So intense is
the relationship to nature which this theme
occasions that there is usually little psychic
energy left for sustained intellectual and moral
involvement in the practical political arena,
whether that be with a view to upholding, trans-
forming, or overthrowing the inherited order.
That is the negative side of the nineteenth
century religion of nature in America, a with-
drawal from the organized city of man. That
city is generally viewed as the godless, vir-
tueless, artificial arena of the m.echanized,
mindless, heartless mass-m*an,^
Although this statement does not adequately reflect the social
philosophy of Thoreau, the author of "On the Duty of Civil
Disobedience," it is an extreme statement of an attitude which is
vn.despread among members of the environmental, and back-to-the-land
movements. The v/ord "natural" thus acquires the meaning of pure,
virtuous, and good, VJe are admonished to move out of the city to
a home (built of natural materials) in a natural setting, where we
;^-ill eat natural foods and act naturally, "It’s natural," and,
"It’s nature’s way," have become modern equivalents to, "It’s
God’s will." Carried to its extreme, everything that is uniquely
human is unnatural and, thus, bad—a form of original sin
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I am not suggesting that there is no merit in a great many
“natural” practices. VJhat I do object to is that this use of the
v;ord describes things as being good without reference to the reasons
for their being, good. In effect, the word has become a smoke
screen, or barrier to clear understanding, behind which the user
hides a bundle of beliefs, dogmas, and presuppositions. After all,
not everything in nature is good from our perspective. If they were,
for example, we would not want to cure disease, or store food for
use betv;een growing seasons, because diseases and winter are a
part of nature.
Advertisers are learning to take advantage of this unthinking
assumption that to be natural is to be good. All sorts of yjroducts
are being sold as "natural,” or "nature's way.” A notable and
particularly absurd example is the recent promotional campaign
for a brand of cigarette, v;hich contains no artificial flavoring;
"The natural cigarette is here!"
I suggest that we use the words "good” or "bad," "healthy" or
unhealthy," "desireable" or "undesirable," or whatever other words
V7hich indicate the values underlying our statements, rather than
simply saying that something is natural, or unnatural. Such terms
are more likely to force us to probe for the underlying criteria
of goodness, health, desirability, and so forth, and decide
whether
or net v;e agree with what is being said.
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The ethos underlying what Santmire called the cult of
compulsive manipulation is quite different from that of the
cult of the simple rustic life. This cult is a religion of
civilization, which grew from a second, conflicting nineteenth
century theme. Civilization versus Nature. Nature was viewed
as something mechanical, material, and intended to be used for
human ends.
VJhile the Puritan used nature to glorify God by the
fruitful exercise of his Divinely bestowed dominion,
the capitalist used nature to enhance his o’.m enter-
prise and so to fulfill what he considered to be
his own Divinely ordained destiny. For both, then,
the chief criterion for man's dealing with nature was
utility
.
Hence we can conveniently refer to this
coalescing of the Puritan doctrine with the apology
for capitalism as the utilitarian view of nature. . . .
Positively, this religion means that society seeks
to overcome the ancient enemies of mankind: natural
disaster, disease, and, above all, hunger. It also
iTieans that men strive to build a society with a level
of economic productivity and a breadth of popular
distribution of goods which \ri.ll provide the under-
pinning for political institutions vdiich, in turn,
will prohibit the enslavement of the individual.
Poverty is the door to serfdom; remove the fj.rst and
the second will disappear as well.
7
At its heart, this is the Domination value orientation.
0 SS
,
as we see, it has positive features. As oantmire
points out, "'the theme Civilization versus Nature was egalitarian,
whereas the theme Nature versus Civilization was conservative.
Similarly, in a religious context, the faith in civilization was
r'rogressj ve, founded on a vision of a commonwealth that is yet
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to come, wh*-ireas the faith in nature generally was regressive,
structured on a vision of a peaceable kingdom that has been lost or
that is in the process of being lost through the incursions -.f
civilizaticn.
The negative aspects of the religion of civilization led to
our environmental problems. The negative aspects of the religion
of nature led to a retreat from civilization and the quest for
social justice. At its extreme it is an expression of the Sub-
mission value orientation. On the positive side, the former
motivates us to deal with the problems of our society, and the
latter motivates us to deal with the problems of our biophysical
environment. Neither, however, can help us to solve the major
problems of our day, because they are a reflection of the human/
nature dichotomy and make it difficult to recognize that our
problems may share a common origin.
We need to affirm "both civilization and nature, both the
progressive forces implicit in human society and the rejuvenative
pov/ers implicit in the wilderness, without setting civilization
or nature in opposition to the other. "9 It is the value
orientation of Mutuality which underlies such an affirmation.
What is Environmental Mutualism?
A number of the authors who have exandned social mutualism
in
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detail have al-o commented upon mutualistic (or dialogical; interac-
tions with non-humans. Although they generally did so only in
p'^ssing, and their understanding of non-hunan ecological processes
was limited, it will be useful to examine their ideas, because they
rest upon a sound understanding of mutuality among people. Another
group of writers has focussed upon what I consider to be mutualistic
interactions between people and their bio-physical environment.
An examination of their ideas will be of considerable value to
this discussion, although the strength of the ecological background
is offest by their general unfamiliarity with the sizable
literature concerning mutualistic interactions between people.
(Again, we see the influence of the human/nature dichotomy.)
Perhaps we will be able to achieve some sort of a synthesis of
these two valuable resources.
Edwin A. Burtt’s primary interest was in enhancing philosophic
understanding, and his statements about nature were made in terms
of knowledge about nature. He believed that love, as he construed
it, is the value which m.ost promotes understanding. Through
love ”we can respond in open and free sensitivity not only to
other personas but to any object attracting our attention, and such
a response is the necessary medium for attaining the truth
about
Love, in Burtt's sense, involves a freedom from self-
centeredness, combined with an interest in promoting the
growth
of the one loved, Tiiere are two reasons for being interested in
this sort of growth. He pointed out that, from a pragmatic point
of view, it is not sufficient to be free of self interest and
act in a neutral manner toward another person. People respond
to the uay in which we interact with them. In order to promote
the fullest positive response from them, we must take a
positive interest in then. This means being interested in
promoting their fullest growth and expression of what is
ixaportant to them. But ecological systems, populations, and
most individual organisms do not respond to us as do people.
This element in Burtt's philosophy does not apply to most of
our interactions with our environment.
Nevertheless, being interested in promoting the welfare of
another is central to his concept of love, and love is the
motive which promotes the fullest knowledge of another. An
interest in promoting the welfare of our environment, although
not a pragmatic element of communication, may be a prerequisite
to an enhanced understanding of it. However, although it is
relatively easy to emphathize with other people and recognize
what is in their interest, how do we identify what is in the
welfare of something that is not human? This is one of
the
problems central to environinental mutualism and will be
dealt
wi’th later in this chapter, Burtt offers us no help
here.
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He does, however, provide us with the insight that love is the
guiding motive central to the fullest knowledge of, and mutualistic
irberactions v.'ith our environment.
For love in its widest meaning, is simply an intense,
positive interest in an object. When we love a thing
we become deeply engrossed in it with all our senses.
This is true whether the thing is a woman or a flower,
a food or a landscape, a song or a philosophical theory.
In each case we want to come into the closest possible
contact with i’’ —tolook at it, touch it, listen to it,^^
This particular description of love is reminiscent of Martin
Buber's philosophy, Buber believed that the relationship between
a person and arg/thing else, be it person, animal, rock, or tree,
can be established on either an I-You, or an I-It basis. In
the It-world I can know a tree as its separate qualities, classify
it, note its parts, understand the v;ay it functions, and overcome
its uniqueness. In the You-world the tree becomes vinique and
all of the It-qualibies become fused. He called this a relation-
ship of dialogue. "Does the tree then have consciousness,
similar to our own? I have no experience of that. But thirJcing
that you have brought this off in your case, must you again divide
the indivisible? VJhat I encounter is neither the soul of a tree nor
1 p
a dryad, but the tree itself.
This kind of close personal feeling of relatedness with a
part of nature is important. It deals with nature not as an abstract
er*ological process, but as an individually meaningful reality.
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Ecological theory tends to be abstract, alienated knowledge.
It must be linked with a personally meaninglul felt relationship
with nature before v:e can expecL people to genuinely value the
welfare of the -non-hujiian environment,
Mohandas Gandhi had almost nothing to say about nature.
He did, though, believe that, ”To see the unive:^sal and all-per-
vading Spirit of Truth face to face one must be able love
the meanest of creation as oneself, ”^3 it is not clear to me
whether he was referring to animal creation in general, or to the
lower social classes of India, In either event, he vias speaking
primarily of a principle of huinility,
Paulo Freire did write about human interactions with nature,
if he meant, "nature," when he wrote, "the world." He viewed the
world as the setting for human conflict and dialogue. Dialogue
cannot take place under oppressive conditions and, thus, cannot
be used as an instrument of domination, "The domination implicit
in dialogue is that of the world by the dialoguers; it is the
conquest of the world for the liberation of men,"^ He seemed
to be echoing the theme of domj.nation of nature which Leiss
criticized. It is difficult to be sure of this, though,
because
Freire was not specifically addressing an ecological
theme. "The
world" could have either of two meanings in his
writings. In
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one sense, the world is the world of natural resources from which
people derive their physical and economic wellbeing. In another
sense, it is the hman social reality, v;hich can be transformed
through an historical, dialectical process,
Huey P, Newton made comments similar to Freire's during his
conversations with Eric Erikson in 1971, He demonstrated, however,
a greater ecological sophistication than had Freire,
People have always struggled against nature, and
it is impossible for us who are struggling for the
necessities of life, who have to set up our own
survival programs, to talk about the struggle
ending. The difference between us and the
capitalists, though, is that we want a rational
relationship with nature, VJe know that the
capitalists have put us in a situation where
nature cannot support us; and because we have not
yet discovered the source of life, vre cannot
support nature either. So our struggle is two-
fold: we struggle to survive and gain power over
our environment, and we struggle to have a rational
relationship with that environment,- Like I've
said, we are a part of nature ourselves, so we
think the difficulties vie have with the environ-
ment are all in the family, you might say, and
can be solved without hostility. The capita-
lists are not a part of that family. They are
madmen and will destroy nature as well as us, so
our struggle to survive and gain a rational
relationship with the natural world is
directed toward getting rid of these madmenl^
V/hat Newton seems to have meant by "a rational relationship
with nature” is a relationship in which nature will continue to
provide us with whatever is needed to insure our survival.
Nature
is valued only foi its usef-ulness to us. His
valxie orientation
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is one of Domination j we do what is necessai"^ to get our ovor. way.
The Domination approach to nature is underscored in his comments
which preceded those quoted abore.
V/e' believe that the primaiT- motivating drive of
people is a vri.ll to power, a drive to free them-
selves from both external and internal controls.
But we do not believe that this drive necessarily
ends in the domination of one group of people
over another: it is only because people lack
knowledge and technology that their natural drive
for control has been distorted into a desire
for power over people rather than a desire for
power over things .
So we can conceive of a time when people will
not find it necessary to steal power from other
people. Given a high level of technological
knowledge, people will control the universe
instead. They will m.ake the stars go in the
direction they desire, and then they can resolve
their differences peacefully.
Although both he and Freire are working for a mutualistic
relationship between people (the oppressed), their proposed rela-
tionship with nature is not one of Mutuality; it is strongly
motivated by the desire to dominate. Neither, then, has much
to offer us in our attempt to understand environmental mutualism.
Human interactions with our environment are quite complex,
and it will take much more than love, or an intense, positive
interest in nature to solve our problems. A large part of the
complexity lies in the fact that we are not dealing simply with
our objective environment. We are dealing with our vjorld as we
believe it to be. Our hopes, expectations, and mythologxc-^ .
-<^7
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a role in creatinr; our environment as v;e understand it, VJe
need to find a way in which to integrate the meaningful environ-
ment which exists as an image in our minds, and the objective
ecological reality which science is trying to understand.
In her essay, "A Postcard from Delphi," Madeline Doran
exarp.ined some of the elements associated with the development
of our inner image of a place. In this case, she examined the
differences in the feelings evoked by the landscapes of Oatman,
an Arizona ghost town, and Delphi, Greece, The physical land-
scape of each place make their own unique psychological impact
upon the visitor. She felt, however, that the major source of the
difference lay not so much in the physical site, but in the
historical and cultural associations that the visitor projects
upon it.
This is particularly the case with Delphi, "Even a Christian,
an agnostic, or an atheist may feel, in the great mountain amphi-
theater, the rumbling thunder, and the circling eagles, the
numinousness of Delphi, Why? Because the place itself is in\ested
-
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with ancient myth and the enduring poetry that has celebrateo it,
Oatman, on the other hand, lacks a history. The visitor is
unaware of the history of the natives who had lived in the area
before the European conquest, or of the ancient record of
geological
events preserved in the rocks of the naked landscape
itself.
White men had lived there for so short a time that
no lasting
had been left. The visitor, then, comeshistorical impression
without a mythic image c,o project upon the town. It is a dead
landscape.
Lavn-ence Durreil shared her view that there is a special
relationship between h'oman history and the landscape within
which it was set. lie added the thought that the landscape
projects its influence upon us as well. He has argued that the
character of a nation is largely created by the influence of its
landscape upon its people. Thus, when we visit a country we
should pay as much attention to its landscape as we do to its
cities and people, if we wish to understand it fully.
It is a pity indeed to travel and not get this essen-
tial sense of landscape values. You do not need a
sixth sense for it. It is there if you just close
your eyes and breath softly through your nose; you
will hear the whispered message, for all landscapes
ask the same question in the same whisper, ”1 an
watching you—are you watching yourself in me?‘'^°
In other words there is an interaction between people and their
landscape which creates a new relationship, which is greater than
either alone. It is a blend of both, and we cannot understand
either without recognizing the reality of this new synthesis.
In A God Within Rene Dubos added an ecological perspective to
the kind of perception of which Coran and Durreil vrrote. He, too,
pointed to the complex and subtle interplay beU^een a people
and
its environment. The climate, biological and geological
resources
ecological character, and ae-^thetic qualities of the
landscape
exert a strong influence upon the people who live within it. At
the same time, the people change the landscape in order to realize
individual and cultural values. The product of this interplay is
the unique quality which we notice in each place we visit. This
quality is called the "spirit” of the place. It is the product,
not 01 just the people, or of their environment, but of both in
concert.
This is an important concept. The spirit is unique in each
place, because the people and land of each place have their own
special characteristics. This is a much more inclusive concept
than are those of ecology or culture, in their traditional usage.
It implies that when we change one, we will inevitably change the
other, as well. This means that when "we act to change our
environment, we must question not just what vie want of the land,
but what we want of ourselves. Likewise, when we act to change
our society, we must be aware that this may also lead to changes
in our environment, Dubos called for a new, enlarged approach
to ecology; and ecology of the spirit of place.
He recognized that there are limits to v/hich an environment can
change and still maintain a viable ecosystem. The arctic, for
example, may only be able to support a tundra, and only then
under conditions of a limited impact by people. The temperate
/•egions of the world, however, can support a va -iety
of ecosystems.
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Dubos suggested that each area has its ov.-n set of potential
’’vocations.” That is, v:e ca:i alter an area in order to realize
0'’e of these vocations and still maintain a viable ecosystem.
This means that we must determine vrhat are the vocational
potentials, or ecological possibilities of an area before
we act to alter it. In determining which of the possibilities
to actualize, we must alo consider which of our cultural and
personal values vie wish to preserve or enhance in the new
spirit of place that will be created.
Dubos’ spirit of place is the product of a reciprocal
relationship between the land and its people. By calling for
a new kind of ecology, he is calling for a conscious, mutualistic
approach, which will resolve human/environment conflicts in a
manner which is favorable to both. The new ecology, as a
science, would be a synthesis of the natural and social sciences.
In application, however, it would be much broader, because
it would go beyond description and analysis, to prescription.
It would apply the combined knowledge of the values and
aspirations
of the people, ecological analysis, environmental
engineering, and
other relevant fields, and create a new spirit. It
would be as
much an art as a. science.
There is a great need for this new kind of ecology.
This
is particularly evident, for example, in the
problem of the
Sahelian drought. The Sahel region of North
Africa appears to be
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becoming a desert. This is publicly accepted as the product of
a regional drought, but ecological analysis has suggesteo that it
is the result of the impact of economic and agricultural aid
programs, exacerbated by an arid climate.
The people of the region are largely nomadic herdsmen. Their
wealth is measured in teims of cattle on the hoof. As the human
population of the region increased, so too did the hci^is.
There was, however, relatively little water in the region, which
limited the number of cattle it could support. Foreign aid programs
attempted to solve this problem by sponsoring the drilling of new
wells. This only created another problem, because once water
became readily available the ecological factor which next limited
herd size was the amount of available pasture land. The effort
to make water available by drilling deep wells has resulted in
an increase in the herd size, and in overgrazing,^^
As a result of their concept of wealth the nomads have no
desire to limit their* herd size. The trampling of hooves around
the boreholes has destroyed vegetation and begun small, expanding
desert areas. An additional problem was created by French efforts
to introduce cash crops to the area. "With the best lands given
up
to the cultivation of cotton and peanuts, people had to bring
the more marginal lands into use to grow their own food.
In many
cases these ecologically fragile zones could not take
the strain
of intensive agriculture.
The United States agricultural aid to Chad has
emphasized the
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f 3.1‘iiis based upon "the intensive^ mechanized agricultural
practices of our country. The Chineses aid had led to the con-
struction of rice paddies in the drought-stricken region, Ir.
each case, the visiting specialists have projected their image
of the ideal agricultural landscape upon the Chadinian landscape.
These were culturally biased approaches, which were not
necessarily the most appropriate for Chad. A mutualistic approach
would have tried to get beyond cultural bias and determine what
is the most viable approach in the unique Chadinian ecological
and cultural context.
Both situations, the aid that originally brought on the
drought, and the aid extended to help solve the problem, are
examples of what Paulo Freire called cultural invasion. No
real effort had been made to devise aid programs v/hich would
become an integral extension of the historical culture of the
region. Ever, if it had not led to a drought, the aid probably
would have created an alienating agricultural system. This is a
commonly heard complaint about Western aid programs in general.
Many of the problems of the green revolution are associated
with the cultural impact of changes in agricultural practices.
On the most fundamental level, for example, it is not sufficient
simply to produce more food, it must also be eaten. However,
each culture has its own ideas of vxhat foods arc acceptable,
and few, if any, accept all of the eatable food in their
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enviroiuTient, In the United States, for exair.ple, few people
are prepared to eat dogs, acorns, or termites. Yet these foods
are readily acceptable in other cultures. The difference between
what is, or is 'not acceptable can also be much more subtle.
The Rockefeller Foundation supported a prograia to develop a
variety of corn, called opaque-2, which has a high lysine content.
Most com is deficient in this amino acid, and this can lead to
protein deficiency in people whose diet depends heavily upon
corn. Despite its obvious dietary’’ advantages, hov;ever, opaque-2
has received poor acceptance in Colombia,
In the lowlands, v;here most of the country's com is
grown and eaten, the people are used to flinty-hard
and lustrous kernels, in contrast to the chalky and
dull-appearing kernels of opaque-2 com. (To urban
consumers buying the packaged product, these differen-
ces are unnoticeable, and in the highlands the people
already eat a corn that is soft in texture). Also,
farmers find that opaque-2 corn does not store
as well as the flint varieties and suffers more
insect damage both in the field and in the crib.
Rural housewivevS, for their part, report that
opaque-2 com grinds less well and cooks differently.
The problem can probably be solved through further breeding
experiments, which nay produce corn varieties without these
drav;backs. But Colombia did not feel that it had the time to
wait, and started a public education program designed to change
consumer tastes. This is a small, almost inconsequential,
example
of cultural disruption. It does, though, illustrate
how subtle
?10
the change can be.
Still greater disr-aptions can be associated with tne technology
of the green revolution. It io a high technology entei-prise
involving special hybrid seed, intensive use of fertilizers,
irrigation, large scale monoculture, and mechanization. This
requires a radical change in the agricultural practices of Third
VIorld farmers. It can also increase the disparity of '.ncome
between the poor and wealthy, because the marginal farmers cannot
afford either the technology, the seed, or the risk of losing a
single crop. The wealthy can afford to take the chance of in-
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creasing their income by increasing their production.
V/hether or not a green revolution program will become a
cultural invasion depends in large part upon whether its
implementation is guided by the values of social domination,
or social mutualism. V/hether or not it will establish a mutualisoic
relationship with the non-human environment also depends, in
part, upon the way in which the professional agricultural
experts interact with the local farmers.
The potential for applying green revolution technology vrithout
regard for the welfare of the environment is quite high. Never-
theless, much research is being done to insure that the technology
and the environment are compatible. But the people who
have the
best knowledge of a specific agricultural environment
are often
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the local farmers. Unfortunately, the "experts" often dismiss
such people as being ignorant, or backward. As Brown and
Pariser have pointed out, "we must encourage the examination of
local problems in terms of the use and improvement of local
technologies which are often quite sophisticated and the result
of centuries of development."^^
In a similar vein, P.obert Anderson has pointed out that
the professional experts can learn much about the development
of deep water rice culture in Bengladesh by talking with the
local experts.
. .
.there are already many experts in the field.
These are the farmers who have gained good harvests
in tricky conditions, in floods where water is 12
feet deep, where rice has to be harvested by
clinging to upturned jars and swimming back to the
boat, where each different current calls for
different plant-type, where the plants’ roots
are often not in the ground but actually floating.
Given the nature of research and its isolation from
the actual practice, will scientists and technolo-
gists learn from these experts before they begin
to "improve" the technique which has evolved over
hundreds of years
The approach to applying green revolution technology seems to
be changing, and there is a growing cooperation between agri-
cultural and behavioral scientists. The emerging perspective
is perhaps best summed up by Brown and Pariser when they
wrote,
"The time is past when ’West is best’ can be taken for
granted;
’adopt and adapt’ is surely ler. offensively arrogant
and much
more to the point. This is a mutualistic attitude.
It is an
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attitude which seems to be gaining wider acceptance for quite
pragmatic reasons.
As we can see, social mutualism and environmental mutua'ism
are sometimes not easily separated from each other. Ideally,
environmental mutualism involves our trying to clarify our core
of truth; the needs, desires, and values which we wish to
preserve in the synthesis. It also involves trying to clearly
establish nature's truth; that is, the dynamic processes which
support life, and which must be honored if we wish life (including
our own) to continue. There are universal h\iman needs, and there
are values which are unique to each culture, and we should try
to preserve both. In a similar manner, there are universal
ecological processes, and there are distinctive ecological
elements in each ecological setting, which must be preserved if
we are to preserve its character. These must all be taken into
consideration when we make a mutualistic decision.
The Elements of Environmental Mutuality
The things of our minds have for us a greater toughness
than external reality. p,,
—John Steinbeck^
'
Mutualistic decisions can be made only with reference to
specific people within the context of their specific environment.
It is impossible, then, to abstractly state that this or
that
decision or act is mutualistic. I want, insteau, to examine
the
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process by which v/e can go about making nrutualistic decisions.
More specifically, I am trying to identify the attitudes and
values which underly that process.
At the conclusion of the previous chapter I identified three
elements which appear to underly the value orientation of
Mutuality as applied in a social context. The list was based
upon a study of the model of interpersonal dialogue. To what
extent do these elements apply to environmental mutualism?
Let us examine each of the three elements and their relevance to
our interactions with our non-human ecological environment.
Again, it is important to keep in mind that we are dealing with
an artificial dichotomy, and that there is no clear distinction
between the extremes of "totally human," and "totally without
human influence,"
Element One ; Mutuality Occurs VJithin a Meaningful ^Afhole . In the
previous chapter I proposed that, dialogue can occur only when
the parties are joined as members of a larger whole. It is
important to recognize that the way in which our non-human
environment interacts with us differs from the way in v:hich we
interact with it. The fundamental difference lies in the
phenomena of self-consciousness and mind. Our ecological
environment is aviare of our presence in the sense that it
^esoonds to our actions, but it is not aware thet it is aware.
It is not self-conscious and does not plan for, or worry
about
ita future, and it lacks our rich inner life of conscious and
unconscious dreams, fantasies, and desires. Instead, it responds
to the circumstances which exist in the present.
There are, then, two senses in which we must speak about
being a member of a larger whole. The first is that of the
ob jec tive whole ) the ecological and evolutionary patterns within
which we are embedded, and which birthed and nourishes us.
The second can be called the ”felt whole" or the psychological
whole ; the unit in which we exist cognitively, mythically,
and emotionally.
It has become well established that we, and all of the
other lives on this earth, do indeed exist as parts of a larger
ecological and evolutionary whole. EnvironiT*ental mutualism and
our ecological problems cannot be understood vnthout reference
to this concept. The problem is that this insight is not a
part of the reality of our day-to-day lives. In 1837, Charles
Darwin wrote: "If we choose to let conjecture run wild, then
animals, our fellow brethren in pain, disease, death, suffering
and famine—our slaves in the most laborious works, our
companions in our amusements—they may partake of oiur origj.n
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in one common ancestor—we may be all melted together.
In the intervening 1^0 years his evolutionary theory has, in
T'ovised form, becorri -^videly accepted in t-ne scientific commun-'tj-
PIS
However, in the psychological lives of the general public, and
of many scientists, the "melting together" has, at best, progressed
slowly.
Ernst May-r has argued that it took nearly 250 years for
evolutionism to become accepted; a process which began about l80
years before, and continued roughly 70 years after the publication
of Darwin's The Origin of Species
. This long period of time over
which the evolutionary view of the world became accepted does not
seem to conform to Thomas Kuhn's theory^^ that revolutionary
changes in scientific thought occur quite rapidly. Mayr explained
this by arguing that the Darwinian revolution in biology was more
complex than is usually thought, "The long time span is due to
the fact that not simply the acceptance of a new theory was
involved, as in some other scientific revolutions, but of an entirely
new conceptual world, consisting of numerous separate concepts and
beliefs. And not only were scientific theories involved, but
also a whole set of metascientific credos.
Of the six changing elements which he reviewed, three involved
scientific theory. First, the accepted view of the earth's age
had to expand enormously, from theories of a young earth (about
6,000 years old), to one of treat antiquity. Only then would
we have the span of time necessary for evolutionary change to
take place. We also had to view change as taking place continually,
rather than in sudden, catastrophic events, or not at all. Third,
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vre had to racogntzo thcit. evolution does not progress in a line of
increasing perfection from the lowest to the "more evolved" highest.
Instead, evolution had to be seen as involving change in adaptative
response to environmental circumstances, without necessarily
producing ijriprovemeno in an absolute sense.
The last three elements v;ere not simply scientific, but
related to religious, philosophical, and other aspects of our
cultural wor].d-view. For example, we had to accept the evolutionary
process as something which worked on its own, without the necessity
of a god residing outside of nature who continually tinkers with
the creation. V/e also had to break out of the essentialist view
of the world. This philosophy, first put forth by Plato, proposes
that the v;orld of our experience is an expression of fundamental,
discrete, and imm.utable forms, or essences, which underly it.
In biological terms, the view of species as expressions of
typologically discrete and jjnmutable essences is incom.patible
with evolution as x-he chajiging genetic composition of a population
of organisms. Finally, we had to do away with our anthropocentric
view of the world as something which exists for our benefit; a
view with which we have not completely done away.
It is net surprising that it took so long for the scientific
community to accept the evolutionary viev;. And it is not surprising
that the public in general ?s ’-'rving still greater difficulty.
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Although the Darvrinian i-evolution may have taken place in the
biological sciences, it is still in progress in the world of
the non~biologist , After all, the Copernican revolution has
not completely altered our world view; we still, speak of the
sun rising and settj.ng, as if it were revolving around us.
It is much more useful to an astronomer to use the sun as the
central reference point In our solar system than it is to use the
earth. In our everyday lives, however, it is simpler to place
the earth at the center of our psychological universe. Most
of us are not tri''ing to navigate from one planet to another.
The same cannot be said about our narrowly anthropocentric
view of our world. Wo are trying to move about within our
ecological environraent, and anthropocentrism is not necessarily
our best point of reference.
But is it possible not to be anthropocentric? W, H, Murdy
has argued that it is not. All species value, in an evolutionary
sense, their survival over that of other species, ”To be
anthropocentric is to affirm that mankind is to be valued more
highly than other things in nature—by man. By the same logic,
spiders are to be valued more highly than other things in
nature—by spiders. It is proper for men to be anthropocentric
and for spiders to be arachnocentric. This goes for all other
living species. Thus, we value those parts of our environment
218
which are instrumental to our survival.
He pointed out, though, that we are discovering that more
su'.d more parts of nature are of instrumental value to us. His
view of anthropocentrism, then, is based upon ”the recognition
that an individual’s well-being depends on the well-being
of both its social group and ecological support system.
He went on to wi^ite that^ ”An anthropocentric faith in mankind
affirms that we are not isolated monads acting out absurd roles
within a meaningless context, but that we are essential elements
of a meaningful whole and that our individual acts are vitally
significant to the self-actualization of the process of human
evolution itself and to the enhancement of value in the world.
Gchv;eitzer and Leopold have pointed out that we tend to
recognize fellow members of our group to be of intrinsic value.
Once we recignize that we are part of an ecological whole, that
whole is likely to be viewed as being of intrinsic value. This
does not mean that we will not also use parts of the whole to
satisfy our needs. It does mean that our total environment
and
its parts will be of more than simply instrumental value
to us.
Despite its avowed focus upon anthropocentrism, Murdy's
article
became a discussion of Mutuality.
Just as astronomers prefer a sun-centered model
of our
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solar system j not becauise sii earth-centered model could not work,
but because it is far too cuiiibersome j so, too, we must switch to
a view which recognizes our relatedness to, and the intrinsic
value of the whole system of w'nich we are a part. We must do this
not because it is .inconceivable that we could accomplish the
same results by valuing the individual parts of nature for their
intrinsic value to us. ».e are discovering that a careful analysis
can lead us to recognize the value of a multitude of parts which
were not previously recognized to be of an obvious instrumental
value. But the careful examination of all of the parts and
their complex interactions as they relate to each of our decisions
is simply far too cumbersome a task,
Murdy’s reference to a "meaningful whole" is important.
Evolutionary biology and ecology have identified and explored
the processes of the objective whole of which we are all part.
Psychologically, however, few people tacitly feel themselves
to be a part of that whole. To most of us, the people and
"things of our everyday experience have a much more meaningful
and concrete reality. How do we integrate ecological abstractions
into the context of our psychological needs, cultural values,
and historical background in a meaningful v/ay?
The sheer magnitude of the ecological whole creates an
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enormous problem. It is dirficu3.t enough Toi people to avoid
ethnocentrism and the creation of pseudocpecies, and to deal
vjith all of humanity as a corrara''al unit. How can we deal with
something as v^st as all life, or the ecosphere? It is
probably impossible to do so without resorting to metaphor
and syjabol, "Mother Earth" and "Spaceship Earth," for example,
are metaphors which incorporate some of the key concepts.
The photographs of the earth taken from an Apollo capsule
presents an important visual symbol; the image of the fertile
earth rising above the horizon of the sterile luriar landscape.
In time, we must evolve still more powerful metaphors and
symbols, which provide psychologically palpable and evocative
references to complex holistic units and concepts.
Another approach to dealing with the problem of enormous
scale is that of actually reducing the scale on whj.ch we are
interacting. E. F. Schumacker's book, Small is Beautiful , has
stimulated a great deal of discussion in this area, particularly
as it relates to our social, economic, and tecnnological scale.
It has been argued that small scale technology-'’ and decentralized
political systems allow people to become more consciously
involved v/ith, and in control of the forces which influence their
lives. This philosophy has influenced the back-to-the-land,
self sufficiency, and homesteading movements. There is also
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value in thin app-^oach to our envirorunent, In addition to its
value as an approach to social systems. For example, it is
much easier to understand and meaningfully interact with
a fann woodlot^than with an Arabian oil field which is several
thousand miles away. Small scale, localized systems are more
immediately a part of our experience. Nevertheless, many of
our environmental problems are on a global scale and we cannot
avoid dealing vzith an environment of enormous magnitude.
In addition to comprehending what it is that we are related
to, we have the problem of identifying the ways in which we are
related to it. What is our relationship with the world around
us? In the predominantly Domination approach, we seem to view
our environment as an enemy to be subdued ("the conquest of
nature"), or as a slave to be mastered ("Harnessing the forces
of nature for the betterment of humanity"). Alternatively, the
"Mother Nature" metaphor involves a parent/child relationship.
But even this sense of the way in which we are related to the
world around us may be problematic.
EridiFromia has noted that the easiest and most frequent
models for relatedr.ess are those of the primary ties of
infant relationships, "We see it in the matriarchal religions in
which the Great Mother and goddesses of fertility and of the soil
are worshipped. There seems to be an attempt to overcome the
primary tie to mother and earth in the patriarchal religiona, in
which the great father, the god, king, tribal chief, law, or
state are objects of worship. "3u But these are relationships of
submission to a superior authority. They foster a childlike depen-
dence, rather than maturity. But over the past few thousand years
a new vision of relatedness on the larger scale has developed.
It emphasizes a filial bond of broi-herhood and sisterhood, which
provides solidarity, without restriction upon freedom, ’'This
is the reason why the solution of brotherliness is not one of
subjective preference. It is the only one which satisfies the
two needs of man: to be closely related and at the same time
free, to be part of a whole and to be independent. "35
Fromm wrote primarily of relationships between people.
However, might his comments provide some insight into our
relationship with our environment? The relational model of
enemy or slave is appropriate to Domination, but not to
Mutuality. The model of nature as parent may be appropriate to a
value orientation of Submission, but not to Mutuality, (It is
interesting, also, to reflect upon our environmental problems
in light of the psychoanalytic analogy of the child asserting
its identity by rejecting, or destroying its parents.) Perhaps
the model of brother and sister relationships can provide a
223
•useful metaphor. This was the view, in spiritual terms, of St.
Francis of Assisi. Contrary to Church doctrine, he believed that
all of the earth's creatures shared in the same spark of div'i-uty
that was in peo'ple. His idea of what was a creature was quite
broad, and included Brother Sun, Sister Moon, Brother Fire, and
Sister Bodily Death. His extremes of asce'bicism certainly
cannot provide a model for our larger society, but his fellow-
feeling with the world about him may. In any event, we need a
new image of the world which is meaningfulj an image of our world
which can be savored, loved, respected, and which fulfills our
need for relatedness. Perhaps a sense of filial relationship
with the creatures of the earth will meet this need; perhaps
not.
The scientific view of our world provides a view of the
whole, but it alone is not sufficient. In some way it must be wedded
with our personal and cultural vision of our environment. Our
interpretation of the personal meaning oi a scientific theory
is not a scientific process. It involves the interplay with the
scientific view, of our conscious and unconscious needs, the
historical and mythical context of our culture, and a host of
other factors. It is here where the objective ond psychological
wholes come together.
Our interpretation of the psychological mer>ning of the
scientific, ecological view need not, and probably will
not be
scientific in nature. It is, however, important
that the way we
behave in the world of our psychological whole
not conflict witn
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our continued well being in the world of our objective whole.
On the other hand, we should not accept a view of our world which
ic scientifically accurate, but which is alienating, I propose
that we be g-aided in our selection by a principle which I will
ca]l The Embrace : When confronted by differing psychological
interpreations of the objective view of our world which are
equally compatible with ''lat view, we should embrace those
which are the most meaningful.
The means by which we achieve our ends should no: be
alienated from those ends. One cannot achieve mutualistic ends
by means of either dominative or submissive methods. It is
possible to give the impression of so doing (by manipulating
people into making a preselected decision, for example), but
there is a fundamental difference betv/een pseudo-mutualistic
and mutualistic processes. Mutuality is bom of the belief that
the other person or thing is of genuine value, and is an
important part of the process by which we came to understand
our vjorld and make decisions about how we shall conduct our
lives. If this belief is based upon a truthful understanding
of this process, then a failure to act in a genuinely mutualistic
manner genuinely diminishes our understanding and our lives.
Mutualism is more a process through which we work toward
certain objectives, than it is the ends themselves.
At the same time, mutualism is not simply a technique for
achieving our ends. It is more a way of living. To the t-xtent
that we embrace the values of mutualism, we will genuinely be
motivated to apt in a mutualistic manner. To the extent that we
do not, we will be motivated by either a will to dominate, or
the futile sense of submission. These psychological motives will
give shape to the vforld which we create around us. If we believe
that means and ends are closely bound together, if we value the
welfare of others, and if we recognize that we have human
limitations, we are likely to value nonviolence. However, life
and death are inseparable, and we cannot live without altering
the world aroiind us and taking other lives. Is, then, it
possible to be nonviolent toward our non-human environment? I
believe that it is possible in a limited sense, but that we can
never live in a way which is completely without environsiental
violence. Although there is no way in which we can avoid
violence, it is possible to avoid unnecessary violence. But
what violence is, or is not necessary?
Although small scale disturbances of our environment are
impossible to avoid, there are large scale disturbances which
we must avoid. If, for example, we destroy our ecosystem, or
the ozone layer in our atmosphere, we will destroy ourselves
as well. Obviously we should avoid so doing. It is
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relatively easy to deal with the issues of envirormental violence
when we are dealing with clear issues of physical survival. It
is the grey areas where psychological and cultural needs of
a non-survival -nature conflict with the interests of our non-hur.an
environment that the problem of violence becomes more ambiguous.
Should we eat meat, vegetables, or both? Should we cut trees
for shelter and fuel? Should we plant gardens for either food
or aesthetic pleasure? To what extent, and by what means should
we control agricultural pests, disease organisms, unsightly weeds,
human and non-human populations?
Although we cannot achieve total nonviolence, vje can be
motivated by the desire to avoid unnecessary violence. This
means that we will have to work, on both the individual and
societal level, to define what is environmental violence,
and what it is not, and to what extent it is necessary. It
is important that we be motivated by this value, that we recognize
the intrinsic value of others, and that we accept responsibility
for our actions. This should temper our actions, and contribute
to an emerging environmental mutualism.
Element Two i Mutuality Peouires Openmindedness . Humility,
in the sense of being aware of one's shortcomings or not being
arrogant, is a prerequisite of openmindedness. Inherent in
Domination is the idea that we can do anything. Submission is
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based, ia parb, on the perception that we can do nothing. Mutuality,
however, involves the middle ground; it involves the perception that
oe are neither pov/erless, nor omnipotent. It is, then, important
that we he aware of both our strengths and our limitations.
The belief that, there is a technological solution to all,
or most of our environmental problems is a modern form of hubris.
This is evident, for exoMpie, in the approach of the United
States medical establishment tx) the problem of cancer. By far,
the greatest human and financial resources are devoted to
cancer treatment, and the search for cures. Essentially, this
is an effort to employ medical technology to achieve control
over the disease. The Submission approach to the problem would
be to give in and accept cancer as an inevitable facet of our
lives, A m*utualistic approach, however, would probably emphasize
a preventative solution. It is known that the majority of
cancers are the result of environmental factors, and we should
be able to identify these factors and avoid them. The preventative
approach, however, is based upon the recognition of the limitations
inherent in human biology and technology , and of the fact that we
must refrain from some activities in order to maintain our health.
This is not a very popular idea. Many of us even want to lose
v;eight without altering either our diet or exercise habits.
The debates over whether or not we should build either
nuclear weapons, or nuclear power plants provides another
example, because much of the deoate is generated by differing
opinions about the nature of hijiraan abilities. The proponents
of both feel that "fail safe" devices can be designed and built
into the systems. Opponents feel that there is not such thing
as a system which is safe from failure, because there is not
such thing as an infallable human being. If one accepts the
idea that we are not infallible, then we must be extremely
cautious about building devices through which a mistake can
be magnified into a holocaust.
With humility comes a changed perception of our importance
in the world. As our sense of our self-importance is reduced,
our sense of the relative importance of the other life on earth
should increase. This may be expressed both in the 'onderstanding
that our lives are entwined with theirs, and in the view that
other lives are of intrinsic value. The recognition that our
powers are limited and that other lives are of intrinsic value
is a fundamental aspect of environmental mutualism.
It is impossible for us to live without threatening other
lives. We are biological organisms and depend upon other
organisms for food. In addition, we all have cultural and
personal
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needs which conflict with the needs of other lives, both human and
non-human. If this is so, then it is impossible for us to be
totally without self-interest in our interactions with our
environment, "^here are, however, times when we should try to do
just this.
First of all, we must do so as a part of doing scientific
research. There is nothing new in this statement, because
objectivity has long been a fundamental principle underlying the
way in which science is done. It is important that we understand
our environment; what are its components and the ways in which
they interact. The sciences, both natural and social, are our
best tools for learning the answers to these questions.
There is, however, something else which we need to know.
Mutuality involves trying to meet the needs of both parties,
therefore we need to know what is in the best interest of our
non-human bio-physical environment. This is not a scientific
question, although science can play a significant role in
answering it. "Best’' is a heavily value laden word, and the
question of what is in the best interest of our environment
is
extraordinarily ambiguous. If, for example, we define
"best"
as, "that which facilitates a stable population
of "x" number of
individuals," then we would be able to tackle the
question with
the tools of science. Unfortunately it
is not that simple.
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What ir. in the best interest of our environment? In order to
answer the question we must first take great care not to project
our own self-interests into the answer. This does not mean
simply ignoring our interests, but consciously recognizing what
they are as a first step toward temporarily transcending then
during the course of our study. As Burtt has suggested, tiiis
will require considerable training, if not personal tnerapy.
The whole question involves so many conflicting interests,
both ours and those of the multitude of other organisms and
systems in the world, that the most appropriate answer might
be, "That is in the best interests of our environment which
would occur in the complete absence of humanity and human
influence." It is not a very good solution, but it provides
an unrealistic extreme against which we can contrast our own
xinrealistic hopes, wishes, desires, dreams, and fantasies.
The two would be in a dialectical tension, and a mutualistic
decisionmaking process would attempt to achieve some sort of
a synthesis of the two.
In practice, things will be quite complex, because v;e will
not be dealing with a vague thing called, "environment," but
with specific environmental systems composed of specific
components. We will also be dealing with many viable communities
«nd ecosystems which could not exist without the influence of
people. Is it, for exarriple, in the interest of the New England
rural landscape to cease to exist? I think not, but, this does
not argue against my proposal of what is in the best interest
of our environment. Such a landscape, or community, or eco-
system is the product of a mutually successful interaction
between people and their environment.
I do not really know what is in the interest of our non-
human environment. Perhaps we can never really know. Perhaps
such things have no real interests, and the whole concept
is merely a useful fiction. I do, though, wish to pose the
question, and I argue that it can be answered only to the
extent to which we are able to identify and transcend our own
self-interests.
We can be without self-interest and still be dogmatic or
prejudiced in our understanding of our world. I am not speaking
simply on the level of religious dogma, or the more blatant forms
of racial prejudice. I want to focus special attention upon
the subtle, tacit ways in which we structure our conception
of our environment. These are operating on the level of the
unconscious presupposition of which Burtt wrote, and of the
ways in which each culture unconsciously creates its own image
of reality. These unconscious, unexamined, but firmly embraced
images of T<he world can be examined on both an .individual an^-. a
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cnl^ural
Examine, for instance, the following account.
The stars were phining, and the leaves restied in the voods
ever so mounful; and I heard an owl, av/ay off, who-whooing
about somebody that was dead, and a whippowill and a dog
crying about somebody that was going bo die; and the wind
was tri'-ing to whisper something to me, and I couldn't make
out what it was, and so it made the cold shivers run over
me. Then away out in the woods I heard that kind of a
sound that a ghost makes when it wants to tell about
something that's on its mind and can't make itself under-
stood, and so can't rest easy in its grave, and has to go
about that way every night grieving. 1 got sc downhearted
and scared I did wish I liad some company. Pretty soon a
spider went crawling up my shoulder, and I flipped it off
and it lit in the candle; and before I could Vjudge it was
all shriveled up. I didn't need anybody to tell me that
that was an awful bad sign and would fetch me some bad
luck, so I was scared and most shook the clothes off of
me. I got up and turned around in my tracks three times
and crossed my breast every time; and then I tied up a
little lock of my hair with a thread to keep the witches
away. But I hadn't no confidence. You do that when
you've lost a horseshoe that you've found, instead of
nailing it up over the door, but I hadn’t ever heard
anybody say it was any way to keep off bad luck when
you'd killed a spider, 36
Although this is a fictitious account. Huckleberry Finn's
image of the world is representative of one which has been widely
held. It has its own internal consistency, is peopled by a
specific cast of characters, and has its o\m moral order. It
is blatantly superstitious, but it is firmly believed. It is a
fearful world, but it is also understandable and somewhat predictable
(watch out if you burn a spider)
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On "thG individual level, Huck and those who share such a
world-view and ethos, actually believe that the world is put
cogether in this way. It is not something which one even
thinks to question. Many people in other cultures have shared
similar understandings of the world as a place peopled by
ghosts, witches, demons, and other such beings. They are,
however, individuals who are holding to beliefs which are a
part of the culture of which they are a part. The world-view and
ethos are cultural phenomena, and this makes it incredibly
difficult for members of the culture to question them, because
they do not have alternative models from which to select, and
little or no incentive to do so (indeed, there may be severe
sanctions against so doing).
People did not believe that the earth was flat, or that it
was at the center of the universe, simply because they were
stupid or vrhimsical. In their cultural context the earth was
flat, and at the center of their universe. To believe other-
wise might literally have been unthinkable for most members
of the culture. This is a form of unconscious, cultural dogmatism.
My examples are extreme, and it is easy for us to develop
an inflated sense of our own sophistication. But what are our
cultural dogmas, which blind us to alternative ways of seeing
things? Those which are the most alive and active are likely
to be the most difficult to identify, because they are the ones
which are shaping our view of our world. (This does not
necessarily mean they are not appropriate views to hold, just
that they are views which we are not aware of holding.) There
are others, however, which are changing and which are more
visible to us. One, for example, is the ethos of progress
j
the idea that we can improve our earthly lot through c't own
efforts. This has played a major role in the cultural history
of the United States. From the manifest destiny of westward
expansion, to Horatio Alger's stories, to our ever increasing
Gross National Product, to lunar exploration, the idea of
progress has shaped our hopes and dreams. "Bigger and better,"
and "progress is our most important product," provide the keynotes
of our age. Now we are beginning to realize that bigger is nou
necessarily better, that quality may be more important than quantity,
and that change can occur at too rapid a rate for our own good.
The idea of progress is becoming more visible, and is being
carefully examined.
Another image which has changed is that of wilderness. To
the Puritans the wilderness was a place of chaos, fearful beasts,
and evil. Satan waited in the wood. One v;ent to the wilderness
only on errands, and their special errand was to bring it under the
axe and plow; creating order, beauty, and good. It is only in the
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past- 150 years or so that, wilderness began to be viewed as a place
of beauty, to v/hich people journeyed for pleasure and renewal,
I'njsy people are now surprised to learn that the early Americans
disliked wilderness. It seems so obvious to us that it is a
place of great beauty and wonder. What, I wonder, will people
think 150 years from now when they contemplate our present
views about wilderness?
We are not dealing here with the process of individual
psychological projection, or selective perception, which distort
our view of our world. These elements are important and must
be addressed, as Burtt has argued. But what I am pointing out is
that we are all embedded in a socially shared image of reality.
It is a pervasive image v/hich is very difficult to transcend,
because it is at the root of what gives our sense of our world
its stability and meaning. It can, however, also create problems.
The European-American way of doing things has made an
enormous impact upon the rest of the world. Airports and hotels
are so similar throughout the globe that it can be very difficult
to tell where in the world we are. Our agricultural practices
have also circled the globe, sometimes to the detriment of other
societies. We have been engaging in what Paulo Freire has
called cultural invasion. Little thought, though, has been
given
to the culturally and environmentally unique factors of
each locale
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This has happeiieh, in part, because V/estern advisers and business-
men just aid not realize that there are other valid ways of
doing things. Their own cultural biases have shaped their approach
to the rest of the world and, thus, helped to create an inter-
national sameness.
V.'e also have cultaral biases in terms of what we expect of,
and how we ought to inteiact with our non-human ecological
environment. The value orientations of Domination, Mutuality,
and Submission are a part of this. It is important that we be
aware of these biasis and be openminded in our attempt to
determine what are our needs, and what are the ways in which we
ought to shape our world in order to meet these needs. We may
find useful models in other cultures, and we may sometimes find
it necessary to transcend the existing models and discover new
ways of doing things.
This is not an easy task, but it is already happening as
the global flow of information and people increases. We must
be careful, though, as we become familiar with other cultures
and
try to create totally new approaches, that we do not
become
alienated from our own cultural roots and create an
alienated
and alienating vjorld around us.
Element Three; Mutuality Promotes the Welfare of
Others.
attempt to satisfy the interests of bothMutuality involves an
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ps.r'bi6s
. . 1,0 is, then, not sufricisnt siiiiply to know what are
the Interests of the other; one must be committed to promoting
the other's interests, E. A, Burut wrote of this in teniis of
promoting the growth of others. He v/as examining the inter-
actions betvreen peop3.e, and viewed them as developing, maturing,
becoming beings. However, this may not be appropriate with
respect to noii-human ecological systems. Although we may wish
to promote the growth of an individual, there is a point beyond
which the growth of a population C8.n be hanuful, both to the
individuals within the population and to other populations it
may influence. In some situations, then, it may be more realistic
to think in terms of stability, or adaptation than it would be
to speak of growth,
Aldo Leopold was one of the first and most eloquent pro-
ponents of this approach to ecosystems. He argued that actions
which promote the vjeifare of an ecosystem are good, and that those
which work to the contrary are bad. He played an instrumental
role in establishing national wilderness preserves; actions
which embody this value. Kis work is being carried on by many
organisations and thousands of people, who are working to
preserve wilderness areas, Naturally, these efforts are not
unclouded by self-interests, such as the desire to preserve
soriOfavorite environments for hiking and can'.ping. In addition,
people have the mistaken view that wilderness ecosystems are
static, unchanging things, and they attempt to eliminate chsi.ge
factors, such as fire, as components of the systems. Nevertheless,
their goals seem to be directed toward preserving and promoting
the interests of wilderness.
Those who are working to preserve endangered species also
are often motivated by this environmental Mutuality. This has
particularly become the case as more and more preservationists
have recognized that a species can be preserved in the wild only
by preserving its habitat. Their motives, too, are not unclouded.
Generally it is the large, aesthetically pleasing or awe-inspiring
animals which receive their attention. Often, too, there is
little consideration of the point that a particular species may
become extinct without the added burden of human influence.
Despite this, they are working for the preservation and promotion
of the welfare of other species.
Preservationists such as these are often portrayed as being
a bit strange. The wilderness preservationists are "anti-civili-
zation," and the wildlife preservationists are pictured as
precious sentimentalists. Both, of course, are opposed to "progress.
True, some may overstate their case, but there is another reason
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for the negative view that many have of these people. Kany
are genuinely corrmited to working for the welfare of nor- humans.
To those who do not share this value, such actions roist appear
strange, and might even be threatening if the preservationist's
acts impinge upon their self-interests.
Preservationists who wish to promote non-hioman interests
at the expense of all human interests are no more mutuali stic
than are those people who promote the human without regard for
the non-human. Environmental mutualism includes a concern for
the interests of both humans and non-humans. The genuine ex-
tremists, however, are rare am.ong the preservationists, and
their actions do harm to the movement.
The efforts to preserve wilderness areas and endangered
species are examples which are not representative of most
mutualistic endeavours. Perhaps the majority of preservation
efforts are much more limited and close to home. Seme people
may try to preserve a park, others a spot of wetland, a stream,
or a grove of trees. The issues, battles, and threatened areas
exist on a smaller scale. People who become invoi/ed in such
efforts often do so only when something with which they are
familiar, and which they love is threatened. This is under-
standable, because a genuine corrunitment to promoting the
interests of another grows out of a respect and love of that person
2U0
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In nratualistic rclationchips, freedom from oelf- interest
and a positive interest in promoting the interests of another
are closely int^rtvrined. Burtt has argued that the combination
of these two values defines love. If this is true, then
mutualistic relationships with our environment are loving
relationships. Our problem is that of creating ways which
to learn about, and interact with our environment, which
embody the value of love.
Abraham Kaslow has pointed out that:
Classically, “scientific objectivity” has been most
successfully achieved when its objects were m.ost
distant from human aspirations, hopes, and wishes.
It is easy to feel uninvolved, detached, clear-
eyed, and neutral if one is studying the nature of
rocks or heat or electrical currents. One doesn’t
“care" about it as one does about one’s child*
It is easy to take the laissez-faire attitude with
oxygen or hydrogen and to have noninterfering
curiosity, to be Taoistically receptive, to let
things be themselves. To be blunt about it, it
is easy to be neutrally objective, fair, and
just vjhen you don’t care about the outcome, when
you can’t identify or sympathize, \>nen you neither
love or hate,^^
He was writing of the social sciences in particular, but
his
comment is relevant to mutualistic knowledge of our
environment.
We ^ care about the
outcome of our interactions with our
environment, because we have our own interests to
protect. Also,
as I have already noted, if we are to interact
in a mutualistic
manner we cani.ot be emotionally neutral; we must
love the object
of our study.
Maslov proposed that there is a second kind of objectivity,
vhich he called "caring objecti'-ity."
. .
.if you love something or someone enough at the
level of Being, then you can enjoy its actualization
of itself, vhich means that you vill not want to
interfere with it, since you love it as it is in
itself. You vill then be able to perceive it in
a noninterfering way, vhich means leaving it
alone. This in turn means that you will be tble
to see it as is, uncontaminated by your selfish
wishes, hopes, demands, anxieties, or precon-
ceptions. Since you love it as it is in itself,
neither will you be prone to judge it, use it,
improve it, or in anv other way to project your
own values into it.^^
We need to develop new ways of doing the environmental sciences
which embody science both as an objective study and as a loving
enterprise. Probably all good scientists love what they study,
but that love is not valued in the same way as is reproducibility,
prediction, and objectivity. Indeed, the last three factors are
carefully displayed in research papers, while evidence of the loving
relationship between the scientists and the object of study is
systematically excluded.
However, despite the strengths of Maslov’s caring objectivity,
it is a very passive approach to w’hat is being studied. There comes
a point at which we must interact with our environment in a much
more active manner. We make demands of it, and we alter it. This
is inevitable. We must, then, also develop methods of environmental
intervention which are guided by love. Rene Dubos pointed this
out when he wrote of the attention which we should pay to the
”god within" each landscape.
Although there are many examples of this kind of active,
loving interaction between people, there are few v;hich can guide
us in our interactions with non-humans. In their search for models,
a number of people are examining the ways in which the traditional
cultures, particularly native Araerican ones, interact with their
environments. Although these explorations will lead us in
important directions, they are not likely to discover models which
are completely satisfying. We need to evolve new ways which are
appropriate to our own unique circumstances.
A Direction
As we increasingly come to recognize our world as a system of
interrelated people, organisms, and objects, we must develop an
ethos which is compatible with this view of the world. This is
particularly important at this point in our history, because we
have developed enormous powers to alter, if not destroy, the
earth. The values underlying social mutualism can, with minor
modification and thoughtful concern, be effective guides in our
interactions with our non-human environment. I propose that
we work to enhance the elements of social and environmenta.1
..mtualisr.i in our culture
I'/hat ve are dealing with is an evolving change in our culture.
As such, it is not likely to occur rapidly, but over the course
o.f decades. We, however, can act to hasten the change by
consciously working to spread the idea. We will never develop a
>
culture which is completely mutualistic. It is unrealistic to
even attempt this, because the value orientations of Domination
and Submission are integral and, under some circumstances, useful
elements in. alL cultures. Our task is that of reducing the
relative emphasis upon Domination, and enhancing that of Mutuality.
Many people are already working toward this end on an
individual level. Efforts to introduce this ethos into our social
institutions has come more slowly. There are, however, already
promising signs. Federal requirements for environmental impact
statements represent an important beginning. There are no
requirements that the statements consider the rights and welfare
of an environment, this is not the motive underlying the requirement,
but the statements do insure that people become avjare of the
environmental impacts of their actions. Town conservations
commissions, such as those in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
provide another example of an institution which pays attention to
the impact of human activities. In this case, care is given to
the preservation of wetlands in particular. Their motivation
for preserving wetlands, however, is that of preserving
water
supplies for human use. Christopher Stone’s proposal that
natural
objects be granted legal rights and the legal standing to sue in
defense of those rights, suggests a v;ay of introducing into our
legal institutions a concern for the environment as an end in
itself. Additional approaches will certainly develop in the
coming years.
The key, the fundamental motivation which must underly our
efforts is that of love. As Lewis Mumford eloquently wrote;
V/hat v;e need to confront the threatening omniscience
and omnipotence of posthistoric man is to cultivate
powers equally go^’like in a quite different part of
the personality. Must we not cultivate a force that
came late even in man's conception of godhood—the
force that Henry Adams prophetically summoned up in
opposition to the dynajno? I mean the force of love.
And I mean love in all its meanings: love as erotic
desire and procreativeness; love as passion and
aesthetic delight, lingering over its images of
beauty; love as fellow-feeling and neighborly
helpfulness, love as parental solicitude and
sacrifice; love as the miraculous capacity for
overvaluing its OT,m object and, thereby, glori-
fying it and transfiguring it, releasing for life
something that only the lover can see. V/e need such
a redeeming and all-embracing love at this moment
to rescue the earth itself and all the creatures
that inhabit it from the insensate forces of hate,
violence, and destruction.^^
This may be edifying, but it is not very encouraging news.
The world has never been blessed with a great abimdance of love,
Although there are some signs that this may be changing, they
are not very strong, VJe must, hovxever, act witn love, and in
the faith we can become more loving, because if we do not, then
cy the nature of self-fulfilling prophecies, we will not.
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The effort to promote Mutuality must, in the final analysis,
be pursued on a deeply personal level. We are the living bearers
of the ideas and valuOvS of our culture. Unlike any other creatures
on earth, we are able to shape the world around us. The shape it
takes is the physical and social expression of our collective
ideas and values, hopes and dreams. The quality of our outer
environment, then, depends in large part upon the quality of
that which wo bear within us.
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CHAPTER V
EDUCATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MUTUALITY
One of the fundamental objectives of environmental education
(EE)^ is that df preparing people who will be able to work towai'd
the solution of our environmental problems. Fostering Mutuality
is central to the solution of these problems. In the following
pages I will examine the role that EE can play in fostering this
value orientation.
There are three areas in which I will focus my attention.
First, I will examine the underlying conceptual structure of EE
and the place within it of education for environmental Mutuality.
Then I will examine values education, an approach which is
increasing3.y usea in EE. I will propose that education for
Mutuality be the values agenda that values education embrace, I
will argue that it already embraces much of this agenda, and
that the agenda is ideally suited to EE.
Third, I will examine a variety of approaches to EE which
can help to foster 'he elements oi Mutuality, I will describe
a number of existing educational methods and content areas that are
useful means of doing this. Since much of my teaching experience
has been in undergraduate education, my attention will be directed
largely to EE as it is implemented on the college level.
(Environmental Education on the college level is often called
environmental studies, and I will use the latter term in this
sense.)
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The iriajor goals of EE on both the college and pre-college 1^‘vels
are essentially the same, however, and the points 1 raise will
also be relevant to elementary ind secondary education.
The Place of Mutuality in Environmental Studies
Relatively little has been published in the areas of the
philosophical foundations of, or curriculum development in environ-
mental studies (ES), compared to the wealth of material available
regarding EE in elementary and secondary education. Since their
goals are similar, it will be useful to examine some of the
literature of pre-college EE in an effort to understand what is, or
should be, happening on the college level. Gary D. Harvey has
conducted a detailed conceptual analysis of EE and proposed that:
The precept (man-environment relationship)
operationalized in a formal values-laden context
results in the development of two criteria for
differentiating what is, from what is not, environ-
mental education. For a topic (used in the broadest
sense) to be considered part of environmental
education, it must meet both of the following
criteria:
1, All three components of the pr<-.cept (man,
and relationship) must be present.
2. A human values component representing
different positions relative to a man-
environment relationship must be present.
To this general description of EE he has added descriptions of
three of its important educational objectives. They are stated in
Lerms of the environmentally educated personj who must be literate.
competent, ^nd dedicated. Thus, EE attempts to create an;
Environmentally literate person--one who posseses basic
skills understandings, and feelings for the man-environ-
ment relationship.
Environmentally competent person—one who is environmentally
literate, and in addition, has the ability to apply, analyze,
synthesize, and has values consistent with the man-environment
relationship
. . ,
Environmentally dedicated person—one who is environmentally
literate and environmentally competent in the affective
domain, and in addition, is characterized by a values system
in which one acts consistently in a manner compatible with
homeostasis between quality of life and quality of environ-
ment. The environmentally dedicated person is inferred to be
able to operate at the highest levels of the psychomotor and
cognitive domain as well as the affective.^
The Belgrade Charter, one of the founding docuir.ents of the
UNESCO environmental education program, states similar goals. It
proposes that;^
The goal of environmental education is:
To develop a world population that is aware of, and
concerned about, the environment and its associated
problems, and which has the knowledge, skills, attitudes,
motivations and commitment to work individually and
collectively toward solutions of current problems and
the prevention of new ones.
Harvey's statements and that of the Belgrade Charter provide
a clear image of what is EE, and I will accept them as the foundation
of my examination of both EE and ES. When ± write about these
approaches to education, I am referring to programs which:
- are problem-motivated
- focus upon the interrelationships between people and their
environment
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- combine analytical^ valua live, and action-oriented
approaches in an elfort to understand and improve
upon our interactions with our environment,
- attempt to teach people to be environmentally
literate, competent, and dedicated.
The statements which I have quoted make it clear that EE
is not simply an approach to cognitive education. EE and ES
also involve education in the affective and psychomotor
domains, ° Education for Mutuality falls largely in the affective
domain, because it involves the formation of attitudes and
values within the students. Education for a conscious awareness
of Mutuality and mutualistic approaches to problems falls
in the cognitive domain, and provides guidance for selecting the
psychomotor activities in which we engage.
Since I will not be exploring mutualistic approaches to
scholarship in any depth, my examination of education for
Mutuality will be weighted toward affective education; toward
teaching Mutuality, rather than teaching about Mutuality. Never-
theless, there is an important place for Mutuality within the
traditional approaches to scholarship and discipl''.nar2/’ education.
This will be hinted at in the following pages and has been demon-
strated throughout this dissertation.
The analytical, valuative, and action-oriented approaches to ES
define three central programmatic components, each of which deals
wloh a different )cind of problem and employs different modes
of'
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inquiry and action. The sciences can play a vital role in ES
programs, particularly in what I call their analytical component.
This part of ES is involved with establishing what are the dynamics
of the bio-phy^ical and socio-cultural systems, and of the
interactions between the two. Also, it tries to assess what is the
current state of these systems. It aims at both description and
prediction, and includes both the natural and the social sciences.
Historically, this component has played the central role in most
ES programs; reaching ulie point at which, in many programs, environ-
mental studies and environmental sciences have become synonymous.
However, despite their great strengths, the sciences do have their
limitations and must be complemented by the other two ES
components.
The second part of ES programs is the valuative component.
Description and prediction are not sufficient in themselves; we
also want to determine what is good or bad, right or wrong,
desirable or undesirable, healthy or pathological. These are
questions which involve values and ethics, and are not readily
amenable to scientific solutions.
The distinction between the analytical and valuative
components is important, and substantive. As I mentioned in
Chapter Two, David Hume pointed out that one cannot leap directly
from a statement of what is, or is not, to one of what
or
ought not . In other words, an analysis of the present
state of
affairs (what is) does not lead directly to a statement of what that
state of affairs ought to be. In his Frincipia Ethica^ G, E. Koore
reotatea this understanding when he pointed out that one cannot
equate the good (ought) with an object in nature (is). By
"object in nature" he meant any phenomenon in nature, not just
physical objects. He referred to the belief that the good is
sjmonymous with an object in nature as the naturalistic fallacy. As
an example of this kind of fallacious reasoning, he pointed to
social Darv.dnism, which attempted to derive an understanding of
what is ethical from an understanding of evolutionary principles.
The debate over the validity of Moore's conclusions has
played a central role in the literature of twentieth century ethics.
Arguments have been made both in support of and against the idea
that such reasoning is fallacious. The very fact that there is such
a debate should make us pause before we leap directly from empirical
study into ethical pronouncements. The ease with which people
are able to use scientific information to support their (often
unconsciously) preconceived conclusions should also make us very
cautious about the role of science in this area. We need to give
careful thought to what we are doing when we are dealing with
values and ethical issues.
When it comes time to evaluate our interactions with our
environment and project alternatives we must refer to an image of
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what ought to be. The task of articulating this vision is better
suited to the humanities, arts, and religion, than to the sciences,
111 projecting an image of what ought to be, they must work with
an understanding of the limitations which bio-physical and socio-
cultural processes place upon what is possible. Unfortunately, the
humanities, arts, and religion have been slow to become involved
in problems of this sort, and the valuative component of most
environmental studies programs tend to be their most poorly
defined and "mushy'* aspect.
The third component of these programs is that of application .
Once a situation has been analyzed and evaluated, the problem
arises of how to use this information. The application component
of ES programs deals with the application of knowledge and skills
in an effort to affect change, anploying the knowledge of the
human/environment d;^mamics developed in the analytical component,
the students are prepared to actively change the world in order to
make their vision of what ought to be, a reality. In the appli-
cations component they develop the technical and interpersonal
skills necessary to act effectively.
These three components are closely interrelated. Application
involves action on the basis of the understandings derived through
analysis, guided by the values decisions made in the valuation
ccmponent. In a similar manner, each component must be informed
by the other two. V/hat they have in common is their general
area
of study; the interactions between people and their environment
(see figure 6).
An ES program must be examined to determine whether it includes
these three componenT.s. and whether appropriate emphasis is given
to each. This does not mean tnat a program must keep them
separate from each other. It is possible, and often preferable, to
blend them together within courses and ether kinds of learning
activities. At the same time, each part of the program need not
include all three components. It is necessary that the overall
ES program strike some sort of a balance among them. Just what
emphasis will be placed upon each component will depend upon the
particular program (e.g,; its special programatic emphasis, the
interests and capabilities of its staff and students, the design
of its curricxilum, the resources available to it, the priorities
of the sponsoring institution).
This view of ES provides a philosophical framework within
which most of the traditional disciplines can be included. Environ'
mental sciences, political science, engineering, anthropology,
religion, philosophy, law, business and administration, to
mention a few, fit vrithin this scheme and need not lose their
traditional integrity. It is important, though, that the people
who are organizing the program be committed to creating a
progranv
mabic integration of these disc’plines, and in teaching an
under-
standing of this integration. This understanding is a part
of
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Figure 6. CONTENT COMPONENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
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environmental literacy in higher education. There is an ecology,
an interrelationship of knowledge, understandings, skills, and
disciplines which must be an integral part of the educational
context of environmental studies.
Education for Mutuality can occur within all three components
of ES. It is most obviously at home in the valuation component.
On the affective level, ceachers can help students to explore
mutualistic value alternatives and, perhaps, incorporate them
into their own values systems. On the cognitive level value
issues can be critically analyzed in terms of Mutuality, and the
value orientation itself can become the object of critical study.
Mutuality can also be introduced into the analysis and application
components. The ways in which we go about analyzing a problem or
affecting change can strongly influence the results of the
analysis or action. It vri-ll be useful, then, to explore mutualistic
ways of conducting research and acuing as change agents. Finally,
Mutuality can be introduced not as a topic of study, but as an
environment in which education takes place. We need to explore
mutualistic ways of teaching, both in terms of pedagogical tools
and interpersonal relationships between teachers and students.
Values Education and Mutuality
ji]_l S3 programs of w^hich I am ai'jare include the analysis
component, and a great many include application in one way or
another. Moctj however, do not include the valuation component as
a consciously designed part of their curriculum. Although they do
deal v/ith values and ethical decisions, they do so in an unconscious,
unreflective, and piecemeal manner. This may result, in part, from
the fact that most ES programs are rooted in the natural or social
sciences. The humanities have played a very limited role in ES
to date. In addition, higher education places great value upon
cognitive knowledge and tends to place little value upon affective
education. There is, hov;ever, a growing niimber of teachers who are
exploring the cognitive interface between ethics and the environ-
mental sciences. There are, also, some teachers who are intro-
ducing affective approaches to values education into their classroom.
The valuation component is a difficult one with which to
work. It involves both an objective examination and questioning
of our values, and making decisions as to which values we will
embrace. It is necessary that we strike a balance between the
objectivity necessary for thoughtful study and the passionate
valuing which leads to action. Both aspects of the component are
essQitial to ES.
Many teachers do not vxant to deal with values in the classroom,
because they do not v:ant to take the responsibility for teaching
a specific set of values to their students. We live in
a pluralistic
society and people are justifi^'^ in their fear that the values
of
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one segment- of our society will be taught at the expense of those
of other parts of our society. In addition, most teachers simply
do not know what values ought to be taught. At the same tim-:, we
must face critical environmental problems which influence all
elements of our society. There are significant value issues which
lie at the heart of these problems and we cannot deal with them by
ignoring them. VJe need to find ways in which to work with values
in education, while maintaining a respect for our cultural
diversity. This is an important issue, which I will explore in
greater depth.
Inherent in the EE and ES goals of fostering environmental
awareness, competence, and motivation is the need to help students
to articulate what kind of an environment they value and wish to
either preserve or create. The Belgrade Charter points to this
need when it states that one of the goals of environmental action
is, "For each nation, according to its culture, to clarify for
itself the meaning of such basic concepts as 'quality of life'
and 'human happiness' in the context of the total environment, with
an extension of the clarification and appreciation to other cultures,
beyond one's own national boundaries," Within this statement is the
central issue of environmental values education. There is tne
necessity of articulating values by which to live, and there is the
injunction to respect the values of other peopl‘d, which may differ
?61
from our own. But how far can we go with ethical relativism?
At the bottom line, someone else’s actions can affect my environ-
ment and, potentially, threaten my life. Their values, then, are
not simply a personal matter; they can have an ijiipact upon me.
The tension between the recognition of the social importance of
values and the desire that they be articulated on an individual
level pervades contemporary values education. There h^ve been
a number of attempts to deal with it
,
of which I will examine
three.
The use of the word “clarify” in the Belgrade Charter statement
is significant, because it might be a reference to a specific
values education technique called “values clarification.” This
method places its emphasis upon the valuing process, rather than
upon teaching what one ought to value. The wide variety of values
clarification activities which have been developed often involve
students in listing or inventorying their values, rank ordering
them, and examining them in a number of ways. In addition,
students are often asked to state their value positions regarding
thorny situations which involve significant values conflicts with
no clearly right or wrong solution. The teacher's role is that
of helping the students to recognize, or clarify what are their
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values. During this process the teacher can speak with authority
in areas of truth or falsity, but not in those of belief or
values.
Louis Raths, a principal developer of values clarification,
and his colleagues define "value" in terms of seven criteria, wnich
emphasize the ways in which values are chosen and the ways in
O
which the chooser feels about them and acts upon them.
Choosing: (1) freely
(2) from alternatives
I, j) after thoughtful consideration of the
consequences of each alternative
Prizing: (U) cherishing, being happy with the choice
(5) willing to affirm the choice publicly
Acting? (6) doing something with the choice
(7) repeatedly, in some pattern of life
An advantage of this definition is that each of the criteria can be
stated as an educational objective which can be acted upon and
evaluated
.
Values clarification is a useful, successful method for helping
students identify and ponder their values . The technique can be
integrated into a wide variety of educational situations, and
students generally enjoy participating in the process. It takes
advantage of their interest in themselves, is non-threatening
when
properly used, and is fun. As an added bonus, the process
appears
to be value free (an impression which is incorrect). As
a result,
it has been used widely on the elementary and
secondary levels, and
is beginning to be need on the college lev*'.l..
There are, however, some problems wit-h it. An important problem
arises out of its veiT successfulness. Since it works so well and
is rewarding to both students and teachers, it is easy to lose
sight of its limitations. Although values clarification is an im-
portant beginning, it is just that— a beginning. Once one has
identified one's values, what is the next step? Rodney Allen
has pointed out that, "the educator cannot arouse such awareness
and let the student hang there, especially if that student is
dissatisfied. An adequate study would have to go beyond that
point, to help students explain how persons develop values, how
values operate in one’s life, and the implications of a variety
of values for decisions and lifestyles,"^ He has also noted that
the ethical standard of values clarification is that of being
happy with one’s choice. Is this, however, a good standard
and should teachers teach only one standard? "Values education in
a public institution must deal with the rich variety of human
commitments and a sp'^^ctnim of approaches to ethical discourse,
not restrict or approve only certain approaches and religious-
philosophical corrmi tments. .
A fundairiental presupposition of many values clarification
advocates seems to be that people are inherently good, and once
ve clarify our values sufficiently we will behave in an ethical
manner. There also seems to be an assumption that, despite
the
heavily individualistic approach to valuing, people who
have
26h
sufficiently clarified their values will interact in a socially
otnical nanner.”^ Ihis would resolve the conflict between social
r-sponsibility and individualistic valuing. However, although there
may welD. be come abstract universal human value needs (as the
research of Abraharn Maslow seems to indicate), the assumptions
of values clarification advocates seem to be simplistic and to
lack a cross-cultural pe-ipeetive. We learn values, in large
part, through the processes of socialization and enculturation.
Values clarification may only help us to clarify our positions
within this context. I do not believe that a personally
clarified value is necessarily ethical, or that individual
values are necessarily compatible vrith either social values or
ethics. I believe that values clarification can be most successful
when the people in question share similar cultural backgrounds
and have been socialized to accept similar ethical standards.
Lavrrence Kohlberg has developed an approach to education,
which he believes does deal with culturally universal moral
processes, and he has conducted crosscultural studies which
support his point. He, too, focuses upon process, rather than
content. He has identified six developmental stages in moral
12
reasoning.*-^
LEVEL STAGE
0. Amoral Stage . Prior to under-
standing the idea of rules a-'.d
authority, ’’good" is what is
pleasant, exciting, non-painful
and non-fearful. The person does
what he can do and wants to do.
1« Pre-conventional 1. 0h> dionce and Punishment
Orientation
. The persoii
aefers to power or
authority. Tnis is a
trouble avoiding mind-set.
2. Naively Epoist Orientation
.
Right action is tnat which
satisfies one’s desires and
needs. The person talks
of "rights" and motives,
and believes that one good
turn deserves another.
This is a marketplace,
exchange, or "back scratching"
sense of moraiity,
II. Conventional 3 . Interpersonal Concordance
Orientation
.
Correct
behavior is that which wins
approval from others—it fits
what others think is proper.
Empathy with others becomes
a factor in moral reasoning,
h. Lav7 and Order Orientation .
Good is that vinich is best
for society, the majority,
and the social order. It
is codified in rigid, insti-
tutional laws, rules and
principles, which one must
obey.
III. Post-conventional 5* Social Contract , Legalistic
Orientation . Right action is
defined in terms of general
* individual rights and
principles which the society
apjproves of in its basic
notion of the "social con-
tract." Lav/s should be
obeyed, but one can work to
change lav7s v/hich one does
nou believe are right.
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6. Conscience or Universal
Prlnciplf-s Orientation ,
kignt, action is defined
in terms of individual
conscience. One is guided
by a set of self-chosen,
abstract principles and
commitments.
These are stages in the development of our ability to reason
about moral issues. As infants we all reasoned on level one, and
progressed from one stage to the next as our moral reasoning
matured. In Kohlberg's view, this is a universal, invariable
sequence in our psychological development. We cannot get to
stage five, for example, wdthout first progressing through stages
one, two, three, and four in that sequence . His studies seem to
demonstrate that this is true of all cultures, although the average
age at vrhich one begins to reason in terms of each stage may
vary from culture to culture. Although the moral content may
vary bet^^reen cultures, the reasoning process does not.
Kohlberg believes that the teaching of morals is not linked
to the teaching of a particular belief system. He proposes
that moral education involves both stimulating the students*
moral judgment abilities and helping the student to apply those
judgments to his or her own actions. The teacher must identify
the students* present stage of moral reasoning and then challenge
the student to reason in terms of the next highest stage. This is
impertant, because the seque.iCr of stages cannot be varied. Tf the
teachers reasons on the basis of a level below that of the student,
the student's development will be retarded. Similarly, reasoning
on a level two or three stages ceyond that of the student will only
create frustration,
Iraplicit in Kohlberg's theory is the belief that the more
abstract levels of moral reasoning are better than the earlier
ones. This seems to be derived from his belief that L*-.ere are
universal moral ideals. Thus, the more abstract our moral
reasoning, the closer we can come to understanding these ideals.
He believes that these ideals are generated internally within
the individual and are not the product of socialization or
enculturation. He also believes that, "Basic values are different
largely because we are at different levels of maturity in thinking
about basic moral and social issues and concepts. Exposure to
others more mature than ourselves helps stimulate maturity in
our own value process,"
Although I believe that there is great merit in his develop-
mental scheme of moral reasoning, I hesitate to accept his views
of its implications in terms of universal moral ideals. He
believes, for example, that one of the universal moral ideals is
"justice or reciprocity,"^^ This seems to be close to the idea
of Mutuality. Are there, then, also universal moral
ideals of
Domination and Submission? I suspect that v:hat he is
doing is fil-
tering his observations through his own presuppositions
about what
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is and is not ethical. And even if there wera a univeisal ideal
of justice, each culture is likely to interpret what is a just act
in its own way, thus frustrating: his search for universality.
1 suspect that there are greater similarities between values
clarification advocates and Kohlberg than either would wish to admit.
Both seem to ground their theories on the assumption of a universal,
intuitive sense of v/hat is ethical. Values clarlficati-ni deals
with this primarily on the affective level. Kohlberg, on the other
hand, emphasizes a cognitive approach. They seem to have the
potential of complementing each other quite well,
Rodney Allen has attempted such a synthesis, and has added a
few elements of his own. The result is a much more complex and
subtle approach to values education, which includes the analysis
of value statements and a systematic approach to moral decision
making. The most complex and comprehensive of his processes
involves leading the student through nine phases in making a
decision. First, the student attempts to clarify and comprehend a
situation, then states the issues and conflicts which it involves.
The third phase involves trying to emphathize with each of the
people involved in the conflicts, which requires that the student
attempt to overcome his or her ov/n biases. The next phase is that
of stating the intentions or goals of each party. Then the student
tries to lay out the alternative courses of action which are
open
to each party, and predictc their consequences. Seventh, the
student considers the specific acts necessary to bring about the
consequences, then makes and justifies his or her ovm decision.
Finally, the student examines the consistency of his or her
decision v;ith respect to the decisions which he or she had
previously made,^*^
Allen’s approach also emphasizes the valuing process, rather
than specific values. The student is the source of the value
content and Allen does not help us in our attempt to decide what
values should be taught. He does, though, place a strong emphasis
upon an empathetic understanding of other people and their values
and needs, and he requires that students articulate their own
values within a social context. This is an important contribution.
His approach is still heavily cognitive and, thus, is of more
limited value with children. It is, though, very useful on the
college level and provides a systematic method for dealing with
values conflict with regard to environmental issues.
The teacher’s role in values education is a sensitive one.
The teacher must help the students to engage in the valuing process,
but must not impose his or her own values upon them. People may
state specific values either out of compliance, identification,
or internalization.^'^ Values vjhich are stated out of compliance are
adopted in order to gain approval or some other social reward, but
thoy do not lOxloct a personal oelief, V/e rr.ay s].so identify with
the values of another person or group. Although vre may actually
believe in these values, they are imiportant to us because of our
identification and desire to establish a relationship with the
person or group. Their specific content, however, is not
particularly important, VJe internalize values when \.’e find them
to be intrinsically rewarding. Here it is their content which is
significant to us. A goal of values education seems to be to help
students to thoughtfully develop their own internalized system of
values. It is very important, then, that the teacher not impose
his or her value system upon the students in order to avoid their
adopting them through either compliance or identification.
Does this mean that teachers should not try to foster
specific values? I think not, but the problem becomes, "what
values should we teach?” Values clarification and Rodney Allen
have avoided the issue by placing the valuing responsibility upon
the student. Kohlberg, on the other hand, has made the specific
proDosal that the public schools should teach the moral value of
"justice.”-® He argued that justice is a socially pluralistic
value, and that it does not necessarily favor either minority
or majority social groups. In addition, it is central to our
country's political system. There is merit to his argument.
Justice is a wide--' anging concey^t, which can be applied tc a
variety of value issues and conflicts. In addition, it can be
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embodied not only in the overt educational content, but also in
the educational process employed by the teacher. On the other
hand, is uhe teaching of justice in keeping with the objective
of helping students to internalize their own values ? Kohlberg
might argue that it is, because justice is a universal moral
ideal, vxhich will emerge within the mature person. I, however,
believe that it is more a matter of how justice is taught. It
must be taught in a manner v/hich is mutualistic, rather than
dominating. Indeed, the idea of justice can be subsumed under
that of Mutuality,
I propose that values education not attempt to teach specific
values, but that it attempt to foster the value orientation of
Mutuality, If its educational objective is to help students
to develop their ovm internalized system of values, then teaching
methods must be employed vihich discourage both compliance and
identification. The values which underly the educational process
should promote what is in the welfare of the students, rather than
the selfish interests of the teacher. In other words, they should
be mutualistic in nature.
Mutuality is particularly appropriate in ES prograiAs, because
the very world which they study is problematic and in a state of
change. There are few clearly defined solutions to the multitude
of complex, ES issues, and the teacher ccjinot asswe the role of a
??2
deliverer of certain knov/ledge. It is important, then, that the
guiding programmatic values be amenable to open, mutualistic
learning on the part of both the students and the teachers.
In addition, as I have argued in the earlier chapters of this
dissertation, the solution to our environmental problems depends,
in part, upon enhancing Mutuality, One of the goals of ES is to
prepare students who will be competent to work tov;ard the solution
of our environmental problems and, if my argument is valid, these
programs should help students to internalize the value orientation
of Mutuality.
This approach also resolves the tension between social
responsibility and an individualistic valuing process. Mutuality
does not emphasize the group at the expense of the individual, or
the individual at the expense of the group. It places value upon
the welfare of all parties involved in an interaction. In
Florence Kluckhohn’s scheme (see Chapter One), the value
orientation of Individualism is Domination on the level of inter-
personal relationships. The tension in values education, between
mutualistic goals and a dominating valuing process, becomes
understandable. I believe that the best of educators have tacitly
resolved the problem in their own teaching by teaching
Mutuality,
and teaching mutualistically.
In order to educate for Mutuality we need to
introduce the
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value orientation into all of the values loci of a classroom.
Much of the concern about values in education is based upon the
fear that the teacher will inpose his or her values upon the
student. Here we have t\>ro important values loci; the teacher
and the student
. Values, however, may also be inherent in the
discipline, or content being taught. Science, for exajnple, is
based upon a cluster of values (e.g.; objectivity, predictability,
and reproducibility) which the student must learn in order to be
able to do science. In addition, there are values inherent in
the educational process
,
or methodology being used. There are,
for example, considerable differences between the values underlying
teacher-centered and student-centered, or inquiry-based and rote-
memory approaches to education. These values loci, which represent
educational loci in the classroom, are also influenced by the
institutional setting within which they are located. This, in turn,
is influenced by the society and culture of which it is a part
(see figure 7).
The values agenda, or hidden values curriculum of a classroom
or other learning situation is the product of the interaction
between the four loci and their institutional setting. An analysis .
of the values of individual loci, or of the institution will not
necessarily reveal what is the values agenda of a program. The
inquiry values inherent in the sciences, for example, can be lost
in an educational process which emphasizes the unquestioning
Content 0—0 Stiident(s) *>v
> Values Agenda
igiire 7. ELEMENTS VJfllCH CONTRIBUTE TO THE VALUES AGENDA
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in6’noi“i2a bic^i of Tact-G, As another example, the teacher *s values may
be of xittle significance in the face of student peer pressure.
The full interaction of the values loci and their inGtUutio. -al
setting, the values ecology of the situation, must be taken into
account if we vash to understand what is being taught. Similarly,
we cannot effectively teach specific values without including
the full values ecology'' in our planning,
I propose that teachers of environmental studies work to
include Mutuality as a fundamental part of each of the loci of
values education. As I have already argued, the process and
methods of education should be mutualistic. The educational
content should include mutualistic interpretations of and
approaches to the solution of environmental issues. The teacher
is in a central power position and should be motivated by the
value orientation. The students should be included as copar-
ticipants in a mutualistic process of designing and conducting
ES programs. We need, also, to develop mutualistic educational
methods, EE and ES texts and educational materials which include
mutualistic views of environmental issues, and programs for
preparing teachers to teach in a mutualistic manner, ihe
objective is to create a values agenda which is mutualisuic
and which will help students to internalize the value orientation.
This will not be an easy task, given the strong Domination
orientation of our institutions, society, and culture.
ApTiroaches t-o i eachinp foi’ Mut'ualit.y in Environjnental Studies
Values education is one way of dealing with Mutuality in R3.
There are other ways in which education for Mutuality can be
introduced into the analysis, valuation, and application
components of ES, and into the values loci. In the following pages
I will examine the elements of Mutuality in an effort ’’a suggest
questions, issues, methods, and content which should be considered
by teachers, program planners, and educational administrators.
My focus will be upon environmental mutualism, but it will also
be necessary to touch upon social mutualism.
Education for Mutuality is not just values education, A
value orientation is not a specific value; it is an orientation,
an attitude of predisposition to chose certain kinds of values and,
thus, actions. The mutualistic elements of being a part of a
meaningful whole, openmindedness, and promoting the welfare of
others are more evocative phrases than they are a descriptive defini
tion. Mutuality is, essentially, a valuing style. It is, then,
very difficult to teach, and formal modes of education play a
relatively limited role in the process through which it is learned.
However, a careful?.'/ designed educational environment may help
to foster it. All of the parts of the ES program should complement
each other
20 o« I
For example, if ve want to help students to feel a sense of
meaningful relatedness to a larger v;hole, be it a local community,
humankind, or the ecosphere, th>-re needs to be a conginencc betv.’cen
the ethos and 'the world-view which vje teach. VJhat is the
educational message in a weather map which includes only the
political boundaries of our ovm country, and on which all
meteorological activities terminate at these boiuidaric''? Weather
patterns are not determined by political patterns. Should not the
boundaries of the maps v/hich we see on television and in newspapers
be determined by the weather? This would provide an holistic
view of weather, and would demonstrate the meteorological common-
alities among nations. But most people are only interested in what
the weather will be like in their ovm little fragment of the
world. The maps which we commonly see foster a world-view of
political and meteorological isolation, rather than wholeness.
If we try to foster attitudes and values ’which embody wholeness and
a world-view based upon fragmentation, we are likely to create an
ethos and world-viev; which are alienated from each other. Each
should be compatible with, and supportive of the other.
If Mutuality can only exist within a meaningful v/hole, then
ES must help students to deal with the question of what is the
whole of which they are a part. If the answer to this question is
to be truely meaningful to each student, then it must be ansv/ered by
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the whole p.^rson and not by only his or her cognitive self. A
number of traditional disciplines help to foster a holistic world-
viev;; for example, geology can give us a perception of our pli ice
in time, ecolo'gy our place in the living system, astronomy our
place in space, and anthropology our place in the human family.
Most of trie courses in these fields, however, teach only the
facts and modes of inquiry, and do not explore the students'
feelings about these views of their world. Introducting an
affective component into these courses would be useful in
helping students to internalize these views,
Abraham Kaslow has pointed out the difference between
extrinsic and intrinsic learning. Extrinsic learning is content
oriented and is based upon the goals of the teacher. It is
external to the learner and impersonal. Intrinsic learning is
based in the learner, and deals with personal experiences and
values.
These learnings are unique instances, not the results of
dril.l and repititions. In my life I think of the death
of my father, the birth of my children, and of my grand-
child, as such moments. In such experiences do ve
discover who we are, what we are, what we might become.
In this realm of intrinsic learning, intrinsic teaching,
and intrinsic education I think that the arts, and
especially the ones that I have mentioned [music, art,
dancing and rhythmj , are so close to the psychological
and biological core, so close to this identity, this
biological identity, that rather than think of these
courses as a sort of whipped cream or lujoiir, they must
become basic experiences in education.!^
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The individual artistic and poetic experience of our environment
is important and should become a legitim.ate part of ES programs.
The arts and the sciences deal with two different facets of .uman
experience which must be united in our exploration of our environ-
ment. If they are split and isolated from each other, then our
understanding of ourselves in our environment will also be split
and fragmented.
One of the courses I teach at Hampshire College, called
"Views of Nature," is designed to help students to understand the
different ways in which people perceive their non-human environment.
It is centered around a number of books by nature writers. As a
part of the course the students write essays or poems about their
own experiences in nature which try to evoke what was personally
meaningful about the experiences. This has been one of the most
successful parts of the course. It helps them to identify and
understand, on both affective and cognitive levels, those aspects of
their environmental interactions that are personally important.
In addition, their experience as people reflecting upon nature,
and as writers, helps to inform their reading of the nature wTiters.
As an unexpected outcome, a number of students who were supposed
to be poor writers did some fine work. It would be interesting
to experiment with introducing this approach to our environment into
a tr'aditional ecology course.
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The scien't-l ic viev; of the v/orld, although of enormous
importance to ES, is not able to provide a personally meaninpful
view of our environment. It must also be integrated with the
history and inner life of the students. Harvey Cox has stated
that, "All hutuau beings have need to tell and hear stories and
to have stories to live by. Religion, whatever else it has done,
has provided one of the '.r.in ways of meeting this abiding need."^*^
As he sees it, stories unite one's history, emotions and values.
Currently there is a great deal of interest in ancient myths
and religions. This interest may be based, in part, upon the
desire to find a personally meaningful story, or understanding
of the world. There have also been a number of recent books,
which have combined new findings in animal behavior and human
evolution with a lot of speculation in an attempt to explain
the roots of human behavior. These, too, can be viewed as attempts
to develop new mythologies. Myth and religion provide the linkage
between ethos and world-view, and it will be useful for ES to
explore this avenue.
Environmental studies programs should provide models for
holistic approaches to our environment. Where, though, is there
a program which integrates the sciences, arts, humanities and
religion? The issues and themes associated with our interactions
with our environment, and the educational approaches to Mutuality
are so broad and far ranging that they appear to cut across all
261
academic disciplines. No program can handle it all, and each
must employ its own philosophy and standards of selection. We
need, however, to give greater breadth to liS programs. Environ-
mental educators have frequently been criticized for focusing upon
the non-human environm.ent and avoiding our social environment.
Similar complaints can be made about many ES prograiris. The
extent to which these complaints are time is a measure of the
extent to i%’hich such programs are failing to meet the objectives
of environmenual studies.
There is so much information available to us that we cannot
conceivably deal with it all and must, necessarily, be selective
in what we study. Specialization is a principle of selection
which limits the field of information with which a person must
remain current. However, this can also lead to a narrow,
fragmented view of the world. We need to develop other, equally
legitimate principles of selection, which will help us to avoid
fragmentation in our understandings. If this is to happen in
higher education, we must also develop more meaningful definitions
of academic rigor. The National Conference on Environmental
Studies Programs in Higher Education has made the following
recommendation. '‘We recommend a redefinition of 'rigor' as it
applies to interdisciplinary studies. Perception of broad impli-
cations is at once 'rigorous' and condi\cive to the inculcation
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of* precision, intensity, and depth of analysis. Interdisciplinary
environnenta.l education need not apologize on the grounds of
'rigor. *‘*2^ The definition of a rigorous education should also
be extended to. include affective approaches to knowledge.
The need for openmindedness, which includes hamility and
freedom from self-interest, in education for Mutuality underscores
the need for a broader definition of rigor. Openmindedness is
central to academic rigor, yet teaching openmindedness involves
far more than either cognition, or any single academic discipline.
At its extreme, it is not simply an educational problem, but a
therapeutic one as well, Lawrence Kubie has argued that our
neuroses distort our perception of the world around us and our
choices of actions. What we create in our world, then, reflects
our neuroses. We must deal with the neurotic aspects of ourselves
if we are to become openminded and free of self-interest.
"Without self-knowledge in depth we can have dreams, but no art.
We can have the neurotic raw material of literature but not
mature literature. V/e can have no adults, but only aging children
who are armed with words and paint and clay and atomic weapons,
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none of which they understand.
Education for Mutuality must include education for self-knowledge.
This sort of psychological education, however, is not generally
well regarded by the academic community, and it is not likely that
many people who are teaching in the traditional disciplines will
become involved with it. There are many stucients who are willing
to engage in such an exploration, if the opportunity were made
available to them. Many of them are finding informal opportunities
when formal ones are absent. We need to strenghten psychological
education in our colleges and develop techniques which are
particularly appropriate for working toward Mutuality; including
techniques which deal with our personal relationship with our
non-human environment as well as with other people.
It is not just our students who need to engage in this sort
of learning. We, the teachers, also need to deal with our own
neurotic processes, and need to gain insight into our own motives
and interests. Haslow has pointed out that, ’’Teachers and other
kinds of professionals suffer from having been indoctrinated
into a mastering, manipulating, controlling outlook toward
nature, toward people, especially toward children." He felt that
the best people to assume a helping role are those who are the
most emotionally and physically healthy and mature, because,
"The better person you are, the less neurotic you are, the less need
you have to manipulate, control, and force people into imitations of
yourself rather than help them grow in their own style.
A note of caution: The line between psychological education and
psvchological therapy car be difficult i^o identify, and the^e is a
potential for the iinproperly trained teacher to do real harm to
the student. Althou^jh therapy may be complementary to, and
inseparable from education for Mutuality, it is not the task of
the educator.
The easiest way to approach the issue of openmindedness in
higher education is through the selection of the traditional
educational content. This involves including a diversity of
viewpoints in what is being studied, rather than filtering it
through a particular political, class, ethnic, sexual, economic,
or other limiting perspective, and helping the students to gain
an empathetic understanding of these different views. The
efforts to introduce feminist and Third World interpretations
of history provide examples of this approach. In education for
environmental mutualism, we can attempt to introduce historical
and multi-cultural perspectives on the diverse ways in which
people have interacted with, valued, and understood their
environments. In addition to providing a more holistic view of
the topics, this approach may help students to gain insight into
the nature of their own interactions, values, and understanding;
both through the recognition that there are alternative approaches
and by being forced to articulate and examine their own deeply
held presuppositions.
The ''Views of Nature” course, which I mentioned earlier, was
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designed priii'.arily vath this objective in mind. It is based upon
the cissjjT.p i-ion that part of what we see in nature is a reflection
of ourselves, because we psychologically project ourselves upon what
ve are viewing'. This is particularly true in nature literature,
V7h?ch explores the author’s experience of nature. We read
books by Loren Eiseley, Annie Dillard, Henry Beston, Aldo Leopold,
Edward Abbey, and Sally Carrighar, and some biographic pieces
about them. One focus of class discussion was the similarities
and differences between the views of nature which the authors
reported, and the students' personal responses to those views.
The students also had the opportunity to explore and become aware
of their own views by doing some nature writing of their own.
Although this sort of course does not necessarily teach openmin-
dedness, it does encourage self-awareness, which is a first
step toward openmindedness,
I have also helped to teach a workshop in lifestyles, which
provided students the opportunity to examine their own style of
living and project alternatives which they wish to explore.
In addition, it strongly encouraged them to examine their o^im
/
assumptions and biases about how one ought to live. Between class
meetings the students either critically examined or tried to
alter an aspect of their way of living (e.g.j diet, transportation,
what they did with their time, images of their ideal homes, and
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patt/sms of consumption) • Class discussions focused upon their
experiences during the week, and encouraged divergent points
of view (something which is not always easy, considering the
interests of the students who would register for such a course).
We also read and discussed a number of popular books about
lifestyle, and some articles critical of the views expressed in
those books.
The "American Literary Landscape"^^ course offered at
Hampshire College provides another example of this approach to
teaching. The course examines the cultural history of the image
of landscape in the American mind. It provides an historical per-
spective on our changing understanding of what is our landscape
and how we ought to interact with it. In addition to providing
traditional academic rigor in American Studies, the course
includes educational methods which encourage the students'
affective exploration of their personal landscapes and sense of
place. The course provides a model for integrating cognitive
and affective education on the college level. It is remembered as
a significant educational experience by many students, because
it encouraged their first awareness of their own culture-bound
presuppositions about their environment.
College teachers, however, tend not to engage in either
interdisciplinary or affective approaches to teaching. Harvey
Cox has pointed out that, "Like other people, academics arc
hesitant to stray from fields where they feel they are more or
less masters into questions on which they would have to give up
any pretense to omniscience
. , , Only when people are freed from
the need to control and master can they run the risk of admitting
they are not omnipotent." Education for Mutuality requires that
teachers be able to interact with students as co-learners and
not employ what Paulo Freire called the banking concept of
education. This requires that they recognize their own limitations,
that they are not and need not be omnipotent, and that teaching can
also be a learning experience. In other words, it requires a degree
of humility.
Both the Global Survival Freshman Year Program at the University
of Massachusetts, Amherst, and the Environmental Studies and
Public Policy Program at Hampshire College have embraced the concept
27
of teacher and student as co-learners. ' This has been embodied
both in the ways in which teachers and students interact with
each other, and in their programmatic design. The design of both
programs has provided the flexibility necessary to allow students
to play an important role in program planning, designing and
teaching courses, program evaluation, and the day-to-day administrative
details. As a teacher in both of these programs I have seen the
pxc optional efforts which the students invested in this approach to
learning. I have also seen the maturing effect it has had upon those
233
who have been most closely involved in the general planning
and operational details. For many students, the boundaries between
learning, the content learned, and the other aspects of their
daily lives began to become less distinct; they began to become
affectively integrated. The teachers' experiences were similar.
No effort was made to sacrifice traditional academic rigor. V/hat
we did try to sacrifice was the narrowriess and will- to-mas ter,
which can become crutches of insecure teachers,
I have been writing of humility as it relates to social
mutualism, but we also need to foster humility with respect to
our environment. On this level, humility may be fostered through
our efforts to teach the vievj of our place in time, space,
ecosystem, and the human family, which I have already suggested
might help us to develop a sense of cur place in a meaningful whole.
We are, each of us, part of a \iniverse of time, space, lif^ and
people v;hich is far greater than we, and of a complexity beyond
our full comprehension. This avjareness cari be humbling if properly
taught. We should be careful not to make this vision a fearful
one, because the desire to control may be bom of fear. If this
is taught not as a view which is ovex-whelming and fearful, but as
a view of an awe-inspiring universe of which x^e are a meaningful
part, then we may be humble before a X'jorld of wonder.
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Many people have spoken or written of the inportance of a sense
of wonder to EE. In her fine book, The wSense of Wonder ,^^ Rachel
Carson emphasized the importance of a child's sense of the wonder
in nature and the necessity of cherishing' and preserving that
sense in one's adult years. There should be a place for the
wonderful in £S, and an effort should be made to foster the growth
and expression of this sense in students. But wonder cannot be
turned on and off like a light bulb. The teacher can share his
or her own wonder, and try to create situations in which the
students will also wonder at their environment.
The sense of wonder can be stimulated on different levels
of abstraction. Some people, for example, can be captivated by
the beauty, elegance, and endless ramifications of a mathematical
description of a subatomic phenomenon. Others are awe-struck by
the astronomical view of a cosmos in which stars are continually
being born, maturing, and dying in an ever expanding universe.
In terms of education for Mutuality it is important that such
views be integrated into a sense of a personally meaningful
whole. For this reason, perhaps the majority of people find
wonder in less abstract, physically involving experiences. Take,
for example, Edward Abbey's description of a huge stone arch in a
Utah desert.
If Delicate Arch has any significance it lies, I will venture, in
the power of the odd and unexpected to startle the seas:;.-, and
surprise the mind out of their ruts of habit, to compel us
a reawakened awareness of the wonderful—that v;hich is full o
wonder.
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A weird, lovely, fantastic object ont of nature’ like
Delicate Arch has the curious ability to remind us— like-
rock and sunlight and wind and wildness—that out there
is a different world, older and greater and deeper by
far than ours, a world which surrounds and sustains the
little world of men as sea and slcy surrounding and sustain
a ship, 'The shock is real. For a little while we
discover nothing can be taken for granted, for if this
ring of stone is marvelous then all which shaped it is
marvelous, and our journey here on earth, able to see
and touch and hear in the midst of tangible and mys-
terious things-in-themselves is the most sti-arige and
daring of all adventures. 30
Abbey emphasizes the importance of the unexpectedness and
novelty of the sight. It has the power to shake the viewer out
of everyday, stereotyped seeing. Unfamiliar sights, or familiar
things seen in new ways have special ability to kindle wonder.
It is also important that the experience be as fully involving
as possible, so that one experiences without detaching oneself from
the experience and examining it. Many EE, and some ES programs
include outdoor activities which provide an opportunity for
this sort of experience, A special effort should be made to
facilitate such wonder-full activities.
One summer I helped to lead a group of summer campers on an
overnight hike up one of the mountains in New Hampshire’s
Presidential Range. This was the first tiine that many of the boys
had climbed a mountain, and one of them did not want to be there
at all. He was a city boy from the Bronx, although everyone called
him Brooklyn. He was overweight, uncomfortable in the outdoors,
and often made fun of those who enjoyed themselves in the woods.
m
"Bird watchers" he called them, with a sour expression on his
face. After hours of hiking we reached an empty cabin and
decided to stop for the night. He removed his pack, dropped it
to the groiind* and sat on it exhausted and grumbling. After a while
he and some of the others stared down into the valley and made
amazed remarks about the fact that they had walked all that way.
It was late and the sun was beginning to set. We all stood
watching the sky redden as the sun sank to the horizon. The
colors were incredibly deep and bright. Shortly before it set,
the light reflected off the surface of a distant lake, which rested
between us and the sun. Suddenly there were two blinding red
stars, one above -the horizon and another in the valley. The one
in the forest burned brighter and brighter, then faded, and the sun
set.
VJe stood quietly in wonder, then the group slowly broke up,
Brooklyn remained there in silence, crying. He did not say much for
the rest of the night. He got up early in the morning and saw the
sunrise reflecting off the dew covered forest canopy, each tree
a flame.
The next summer Brooklyn returned well read in woodcraft, a
little less heavy, and eager to be off. He had spent the winter
reading everything he could find about hiking, camping, and other
outdoor activities. In the following years he became one of the
best outdoorsmen in the camp and shared his skills and appreciation
with others.
0Q-?
Alt.hcuj^b it. does not fully account for the chani^e, his
first experience on that mountain was a turning point in
his attitude toward the outdoors. He had a full affective, cognitive,
and psychomotor experience which, although it was initially un-
comfortable, became personally meaningful and valuable. The
experience, though, did not lead to a passive sense of humility.
It led to a positive valuing of that kind of experience,
environment, and activity. We tend to value that with which we
have had a positive experience, and the more fully we experience
it, the more deeply we value it, V/e should work to include
intense positive experiences of our environment as a part of ES,
We need to reestablish, contact with our non-human ecological
environment. We need to regain an experiencial understanding of
the cylcical patterns of night and day, growth and decay, weather,
and the multitude of other phenomena from which our built
environment has isolated us. Outdoor education provides some
valuable techniques for doing this; two of which I will mention
briefly, Steve Van Matre’s method, "acclimatization," places
strong emphasis upon direct sensory involvement vjith the environment.
Ke asks educators to involve their students in "the most sensory
experiences imaginable: mud baths, bog crawls, marsh wading—and
let’s do it at times blindfolded or ear-plugged—with all of our
->eTis3s ir. total operation: tas+e, smell., touch, sigho, and sound.
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This is a strongly affective approach to EE, although a good deal
of cognitive learning also takes place. It was originally designed
for use with children in sumner ca'r.ps, but is finding its way into
elementary school level EE. Some of its methods can be adapted
for use with much older students.
Another approach, called the 2[i-hour experience, can be
12
readily used with all ages,'^ It employs a variety of outdoor
education methods within a 2i4-hour formate. Participants rest
during siiort catnaps, but they are essentially active at all hours
of daylight and darkness. The unusual formate promotes an
intense learning experience, and provides an opportunity to become
directly aware of the daily cycle of events in nature. There is
enough flexibility within the formate to tailor a trip to meet a
variety of EE and ES objectives.
Adventure education is a popular and rapidly growing field of
outdoor education. It brings students into an intense
experiencial involvement with the outdoors environment and, thus,
may be of considerable value in ES. It generates a great deal
of enthusiasm on the part of students, can be used in a variety
of educational contexts, can be a valuable tool in group-building,
and seems to be of value in helping participants to develop self-
confidence and a positive self-image. Although a grovjing number of
people a-’.'e beginning to perceive adventure educc'tion as synoni'mous
with envirorunental education, this is not necessarily the case.
It can play an important role in EE and ES, but care must be
taken not to lose si^ht of their goals as a result of the
enthusiasm generated by adventure education methods.
A rnimber of people have been concerned about the way in which
some adventure education programs use outdoors experiences to
improve- participants’ self image, and cooperation within groups.
Stated simply, some programs are based upon the belief that this
happens when individuals and groups face and overcome adversity.
In this case, the adversary is a difficult or hostile outdoors
environment (e,g.,5 climbing a rock face, hiking through difficult
terrain, camping in bitter cold, and canoing or crossing a
raging river)
.
This approach is a militaristic one in which
individuals develop self-confidence, and groups of people learn
to cooperate t’nrough the effort to dominate the environment. To
what extent, though, is this attitude necessary in order to
accomplish the programmatic objectives? Many successful adventure
education programs d-. take a much less dominating approach to
nature, and it is unfair to dwell overlong upon this issue. We
must, hov/ever, be continually aware of what value orientations
underly our teaching.
The issue of mutualistic means and ends is not limited to the
•ji'eiationships between teache'>'o :^id students. It is also relevant
to the vays in which they interact with non-hxL-nans, I recall,
for example, at time when I was a lab assistant in a freshman
b.'ology course. V/e were studying the circulatory system and I
had to set up 'a demonstration of a living heart. I anesthetized
a large turtle, placed it on its back in a dissecting pan and
tied dovm its legsj each appendage stretched out tovjard a corner.
Using a hole saw mounted on an electric drill, I cut a 2-3 inch
hole through its plastron into the chest cavity. Bone fragments
collected like sawdust and the cut smoked from the friction of the
spinning blade. Man.y of the women were squeamish and made faint,
by shrill protests on behalf of the animal. The men braced
themselves for the job that had to be done. I tried to be on
top of it all and explained that the turtle could not feel anything
and, besides, it was all educationally necessary. The beating
heart was exposed, connected to recording instruments, physio-
logical ex]Deriments were conducted, and we all had an instructive
and successful lab session. I wonder now, though, what was
also taught about the living turtle and the value of a turtle's
life.
The experience of seeing the living, beating heart and the
blood pulsing through living tissue is something X'jhich cannot be
communicated through print or film. It is v/onderful, and it is the
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complete antithoois of a mutualistic relationship with the turtle,
I value that educationval experience, and it also disturbs me. This
sc-'-t of animal experimentation may, if properly handled, contribute
to a mutualistic appreciation of turtles in the abstract, but ve
must know what we are doing. If we are out to foster a mutualistic
relationship with the individual animal, this is not the proper
educational method to use
. If we are interested in turtles as a
population, or species, then such an approach may have its place,
but 'ohe teacher and students should also consider the effect of
that death upon the population as a part of the educational activity.
Many schools are examining the role of animal experimentation in
their curriculum, both for humanitarian and political reasons,
V/e should also examine the role of animal experiinentation from
the perspective of education for Mutuality, There is positive and
negative pedagogic value in both participating in and refraining
from such experiments. It is important that we be aware of what are
our educational objectives and whether our methods are in harmony
with them. The same can be said of all of our other teaching methods.
People are not likely to become interested in promoting the
welfare of their non-hujnan environment until they have direct,
positive experiences of that environiaent. The same can be said of
their relationship with their human environment. However, most
approaches to experiential EE and F.S emphasize the experience of
nature, to the exclusion of the urban and suburban environment.
This is a serious problem, because the human environment is not
;iust sparkling rivers, trackless forests, and pure mountain air.
Many people in EE tend to disregard or be hostile to the urban
environment; the environment in which the majority of people are
located and which, despite its serious problems, many find to be
of positive value. VJe need to find ways of facilitating direct,
positive experiences of the urban environment, as well as of
the non-human environment. We need to find ways to help students
to recognize not only the disfunctionai aspects of the urban environ-
ment, but also ii-s healthy, and socially and individually fulfilling
roles in h\iman life and history.
The Boston Children's Museum developed two urban EE projects,
which were designed to focus participants' attention upon the
*
3
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physical and social environraent of the city,-^ One was an
imaginative workbook called, Citygames , Employing an exciting
children's gamebook formate, Citygames leads the participants on
a scavanger hunt throughout Boston, The second p’^oject was a
combined museum exhibit and street fair focussing upon the
(environment of Center Street, a main street in Jamaica Plain,
Massachusetts, It attempted to turn three storefront blocks along
the street into a learning tool. During the one-day fair specialized
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exhibits vjcrG pjAced in stores, merchants taught an aspect of
theii* trade, ano the Kuscum staff conducted participatory
educational demonstrations on the sidewalks. This was comple-
mented by a ma,ior e>vhibit in the Museum. Both of these projects
portrayed the city not as a place of environmental horrors, but
as an arena of human interactions and creativity.
It is important that and ES deal with the full human
environment; the built, social, and natural environments.^^ We
can find both positive and negative elements in each, and none
should be rejected or ignored. VJe cannot foster an environmentally
mutualistic ethos by ignoring the positive aspects of the
environments which we create. Global studies, or "Education
for Global Survival," provides an important model for such an
integrated approach, The Global Survival Freshman Year Program,
which was rooted in this approach, focussed its curriculum upon
issues involving natural resources, environmental deterioration,
peace and war, cross-cultural communication, and population. It
fused the agendas of a niunber of educational movements, including
environmental education, peace studies, and international
education. It was a rare model of EE as envisioned in the Belgrade
Charter,
There is a good deal of data available which demonstrates that
the Program was quite successful in meeting its educational
objectives, h'evertheless, it was suspended at the end of the 1976-77
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academic year, after four years of operation. One of the main
reasons for this was that the University administration and Program
staff were unable to generate enough support in the form of adjunct
faculty from the academic departments. However, the issue goes
deeper than this, to the political and institutional structure of
the University. Throughout higher education there are factors,
such as faculty reward systems, departmental structures, and
disciplinary specialization, which make it very difficult for
any interdisciplinary or pedagogically innovative program to
survive, It is very easy for individual teachers to introduce
some degree of Mutuality into what and how they teach. However,
before this can be done on a large scale, we must find ways of
dealing with these major institutional problems.
Directions for Further Research
In this dissertation I have explored the philosophical
foundations of education for environmental Mutuality. The next
step is to develop the tools necessary’- to do and evaluate this
sort of education. The following questions point to specific
rCvSearch problems, the solutions of which will help us progress
in this direction.
How can we evaluate a student’s value orientation? We
need to develop methods of pre-testing and post-testing, which
will help us to determine what students’ value orientations
are.
and vha^ value orientations they are leamine. Kluckhohn’s and
Strodtbeck's anthropological research instrument^® may provide an
important model for the kinds of educational research instruments
vihich we need -to develop.
How can we determine the extent to which an educational
environment is mutualistic? V/e need to develop methods of
evaluating institutions, cxirricula, educational materials,
teaching methods, and other factors in the educational environment
for the presence of the three elements of Mutuality. As a part
of this effort, we may need to develop a list of the elements of
Domination and Submission, and determine the extent to which
they are also present.
To what extent is the present educational environment
mutualistic? Employing these evaluation methods, we need to
determine what value orientations our present institutions, curri-
cula, materials, and methods are teaching. This will involve a major
reexamination of education, A study of specific adventure education
methods and programs, for example, would resolve the debate over
the extent to which they are fostering domination of the environment.
VJhat, in our total life experiences, are the most influencial
factors in determining what value orientations we will learn? I
expect that formal education has a relatively limited role in
shaping
our \alue orientations. VJhat are the most important factors?
The
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answers to this question will help us to decide where we can niost
effectively direct our educational efforts. If, for example,
we discover that our early home environment has a profound
and perhaps li'fe-long influence, we might want to put a good
deal of our resources into teaching mutualistic methods of
parenting.
Are there periods in our psychological development during
which we are most likely to aquire our value orientations? The
answers to this question will also help us to decide where to
direct our educational efforts.
V/hat are the underlying economic, political, institutional,
and social structures within our schools and society which promote
and hinder education for Mutuality? We live in a culture which
is primarily oriented to Domination. The creation of a mutualistic
learning environment will involve changes in our institutions and
society, as well as in our pedagogy. We need to discover what
specific changes must be made,
VJhat acts are environmentally mutualistic? Throughout this
dissertation I have focussed upon the ways in which we should
decide how to act, avoiding specific proposals of what acts are
mutualistic. We need, however, to identify specific decisions,
policies and actions which are clearly mutualistic and use them
as case studies in environmental education programs.
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How does one teach for environmental Mutuality? I know of no
programs which have been designed with the specific objective of
teaching for envirormental Mutuality. V;e need to experiment in
this direction, vve need to develop the curricula, materials, and
methods which will effectively achieve this educational objective,
VJhat are the limitations of Mutuality? I have not argued
that mutualistic approaches to problems are invariably the most
appropriate means of dealing \;ith them. Under what circumstances
would Submission or Domination be appropriate?
To what extent will we have to move outside of the formal
school system in order to successfully educate for Mutuality?
One of the ways of dealing with the political and institutional
resistances to education for Mutuality in our schools is to side-
step the problems and teach elsewhere. Non-formal education
has played an important role in environmental education,
arid many public and private agencies have already made a
commitment to it. These include non-profit educational organi-
zations, philojithropic foundations, Ul'JESCO, foreign aid missions,
the World Bank, and a number of labor unions (such as the United
Auto Worlcers) and private businesses (such as Weyerhaeuser). We
need to fi3id v/ays in which to make effective use of this approach
to education.
How can we develop systems vhiich are supportive of people
who are trying to teach for Mutuality, introducing a
strong values
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position into one's teaching can create a potentially explosive
political situation. Teachers, administrators, school committee
members, anyone involved in education for Mutuality, need to
be mutually supportive of each other in their efforts to teach
effectively, and to respond to pressures which make this difficult.
How can we involve the full community in planning these
39programs? Education for Mutuality should be guided '*/ tliis
value orientation in its planning process. Ideally, the process
should include the teachers, students, admins trators, parents, and
other members of the community who will be affected, V/e need to
explore ways in which, and the limits to which, this can be
accomplished.
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